PRC and India vie for Influence on Rebel Militias in Myanmar 

PRC and India vie for Influence on Rebel Militias in Myanmar 

Executive Summary:

• Ethnic rebel groups in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin states—which control most of the country’s rare-earth element (REE) mining sites—have become increasingly dependent on revenues generated from leasing and facilitating Chinese rare-earth imports.
• Beijing weaponizes the rebel groups’ economic dependence on REEs to dominate the global supply chain and enforce political compliance along its border.
• India is beginning to engage the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to secure independent rare earth supplies, though Beijing’s entrenched influence over Myanmar’s militias severely limits New Delhi’s prospects for success.

Myanmar accounted for nearly two-thirds of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Rare Earth Elements (REEs) imports from 2017 to 2024 (ISP-Myanmar, March 28, 2025). Ethnic rebel groups in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin states, which control most of these REE mining sites, have become increasingly dependent on revenues generated from leasing and facilitating Chinese rare-earth imports (The Irrawaddy, June 3, 2025; see Terrorism Monitor, December 4, 2025). Beijing is now weaponizing this reliance to demand that rebel groups refrain from fighting the Myanmar military junta, primarily to prevent conflict spilling over near its borders and secure its economic interests (AnewZ, July 8, 2025). As India witnesses Beijing’s influence over REE extraction in its eastern neighbor, it is now rethinking its policy toward Myanmar to secure REE supplies by establishing ties with a rebel group in Kachin State.

PRC’s Rebel Diplomacy Along the Myanmar Border

Beijing has accelerated its investments in the rare earth mining boom in Myanmar through its geopolitical proximity and intimate cross-border linkages with these ethnic armies. From 2017 to 2024, around 200,000 tons of REEs were exported from unregulated mines in Myanmar to the PRC (Visual Rebellion, August 24, 2025). Beijing’s rationale is not only to dominate the global supply chain of REEs but also to weaponize its monopoly of REE investment and ventures against these ethnic militias to influence the tide of Myanmar’s civil war (New Security Beat, August 4, 2025).  For example, Beijing, until recently, closed four border gates with Kachin Independence Army (KIA)-held territories and threatened to halt REE imports to pressure KIA to stop its anti-Junta offensive in the strategically important city of Bhamo (TBS, July 8, 2025). These warnings occurred during a REE mining boom in Northern Kachin State, where the number of active mining sites rose from around 130 in 2020 to over 370 by the end of 2024, all unilaterally controlled by Chinese enterprises (ISP-Myanmar, March 25, 2025). These border gates were opened at the end of October 2025, with goods selectively permitted to enter from the PRC to the Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, October 21, 2024; October 27, 2025). Although the KIA asserts that the gates were opened voluntarily by Beijing, the rebel group has likely agreed to certain terms to avoid a humanitarian crisis and to prevent the loss of crucial export revenues from mining activities. 

The PRC similarly exerts pressure on ethnic rebel groups in Shan State (The Irrawaddy, February 4, 2025; 9DASHLINE, April 22, 2025). The Kachin and Shan States directly border the PRC’s Yunnan Province, and groups such as the KIA, United Wa State Army (UWSA), and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) are heavily reliant on Beijing for survival. [1] These groups would likely have to disband without cross-border trade, arms supplies, imports of essential goods, food products, fuel, and crucial political patronage from Beijing. The PRC also maintains a monopolistic and diversified investment portfolio in territories controlled by these armed actors, particularly in tourism and infrastructure construction (Special Eurasia, July 4, 2024; ISP Myanmar, November 9, 2024). The rebel groups, therefore, refrain from any action that might upset the PRC or challenge its strategic interests.

During the first half of 2025, the PRC sent warning letters, conducted military drills, and suspended trade with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) after it defied the PRC’s proposal to cease hostilities against the military junta (The Irrawaddy, May 5 ;June 13, 2025). As a result, the TNLA was forced to accept a ceasefire and return two key townships to the Junta forces in late October 2025, demonstrating the PRC’s leverage over Myanmar’s rebel groups (Narinjara News, October 30, 2025). In April 2025, Beijing also forced the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to transfer control of the strategically significant city of Lashio, housing the Junta’s Northeastern Regional Military Command, which was taken by the MNDAA in a hard-fought offensive (The Irrawaddy, July 29, 2024;RFA, April 16, 2025). The UWSA—considered the most powerful armed rebel group in Myanmar—announced that it will stop arming anti-Junta rebels, explicitly noting a direct warning from Beijing to comply (The Irrawaddy, August 21, 2025). The NDAA also assured the Junta, possibly under Chinese pressure, that its territories do not house any anti-Junta rebels (The Irrawaddy, May 27, 2025).

India’s New Focus on Myanmar for Rare Earths

In September 2025, India entered into talks with the KIA to secure access to the rare-earth mineral-rich belt controlled by the armed group (Mining.com, September 11, 2025). State-owned miner Indian Rare Earth Limited (IREL) and private firm Midwest Advanced Materials—both of which receive government investment to commercialize the manufacture of rare-earth magnets—are involved in the discussions (TDS, September 10, 2025). This development was made public just 10 days after Indian Prime Minister Nahendra Modi held talks with Myanmar’s Junta chief Ming Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in the PRC (CNI, August 31, 2025).

Since the 1980s, the KIA has sought to develop strong ties with India, primarily to counter unilateral Chinese influence and overdependence. India has negotiated key understandings with the KIA, such as not to support the Indian North-East-based rebels in exchange for a KIA liaison office in New Delhi (ORF, October 7, 2020). Yet, due to a lack of political will, the relationship failed to become as close as with the PRC. New Delhi has been a close ally of the Junta in Myanmar, but unlike Beijing, it has not maintained friendly ties with key ethnic rebel groups. Previously, India refrained from angering the Junta by avoiding any explicit interaction with the rebels. A stark exception to that external engagement had been its warm, but cautious, ties with the KIA.

India’s explicit intention to initiate discussions with the KIA regarding REEs, therefore, now constitutes a major exception to the norm. The initiative, however, is likely to face severe opposition from Beijing (SCMP, September 18, 2025). The KIA’s structural dependence on the PRC further complicates the prospects for Indian success in its REE-incentivized rebel diplomacy.

Conclusion

Myanmar has become the crown jewel of the PRC’s global rare-earth monopoly. India has begun rethinking its exploration and extraction of REEs in Taliban-led Afghanistan to reduce dependence on Chinese-processed REEs (The Diplomat, October 17, 2025). India’s alternative deals have limited chances of success despite a high level of interest, however, as unlike Beijing, New Delhi lacks any significant ties with Myanmar’s ethnic militias.

Notes:

[1] For more on USWA’s history as a proto-state in Myanmar, see Patrick Winn, Narcotopia: In Search of the Asian Drug Cartel That Survived the CIA (New York: PublicAffairs, 2024).