PRC Escalates Political Warfare Against Philippines
Executive Summary:
- Beijing is ramping up its political warfare targeting the Philippines. Beijing’s escalation since the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration came to power in 2022 is likely due to what it perceives as Manila’s increased maritime assertiveness and comments surrounding the Taiwan Strait.
- The Chinese government sanctioned Philippine defense minister Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro Jr. in June, an unprecedented step against a cabinet official of a country with whom it maintains diplomatic relations. The sanctioning forecloses any deescalation, at least until Teodoro leaves his position.
- Beijing’s political warfare is also targeting domestic Philippine politics. Philippine authorities have accused the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of election interference and of improper financial links with Philippine vice president Sara Duterte. Beijing’s response has been to sanction Philippine senator Francis Tolentino after he presented evidence of PRC electoral interference.
- The efficacy of the PRC’s actions appears limited. Instead, the influence campaign is likely stoking Philippine nationalism and pushing the country closer to the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is escalating its political warfare campaign against the Philippines in a bid to discredit the pro-U.S. government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and enable the victory of a more accommodationist leader in Manila’s May 2028 presidential election. Elected in 2022, Marcos is limited by his country’s constitution to a single six-year term (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, February 2, 1987).
In recent months, the PRC has verbally attacked senior Philippine officials, sanctioned the Philippine defense minister, claimed that the Philippines’ Batanes archipelago is under Chinese sovereignty, and amplified propaganda narratives that support one of Marcos’s political rivals.
Beijing’s gambit, driven by anger with Manila’s maritime assertiveness, is likely to backfire. Its actions will aggravate the high levels of distrust it already faces in the country while pushing Manila closer to the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.
Playing the Sanctions Card
The PRC and the Philippines have long been at odds over conflicting South China Sea claims. Notably, the PRC has refused to abide by a 2016 South China Sea international tribunal ruling in favor of Manila (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], July 12, 2016). Yet both countries have historically sought to prevent those tensions from undermining the broader bilateral relationship.
In recent months, however, the PRC has taken a hard line against the Philippines for its more proactive defense posture. Manila has refused to yield in the South China Sea, deepened security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, and become more outspoken about its stake in cross-Strait peace.
Beijing has reserved the harshest treatment for Defense Secretary Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro Jr., whom it sees as the architect of Manila’s challenges to its so-called “core interests.” In June, after Teodoro criticized Beijing’s aggressiveness in its territorial waters at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual security forum in Singapore, Beijing banned him and his family from entering PRC territory and doing business with PRC entities (MFA, June 11). In October, a NetEase article mocked Teodoro as an “acting president” (代总统) with “pitiful approval ratings” (可怜的支持率) trying to undermine the Presidential Palace by “creating a separate policy towards China” (制定另一套对华政策) (NetEase News, October 15).
While largely symbolic, the sanctions are still significant. They marked the first time Beijing has targeted a sitting cabinet official of a country whom it diplomatically recognizes. By defining the Philippine defense secretary as a direct geopolitical adversary, Beijing has closed off a key de-escalation ramp with Manila until he leaves his position. [1]
The PRC, meanwhile, may double down on the sanctions tool. In October, Chinese-language Philippine media, citing “well-informed sources,” warned that Beijing is “running out of patience” (失去耐心) with Manila. Among measures to punish the Philippines being considered is sanctioning a group of Filipino politicians considered “anti-China.” The article further stated that if the Philippines allows Taiwan to open a representative office in Cebu, Beijing could demand that Manila close some of its consulates in the PRC, including the one in Hong Kong (Chinese Commercial News, October 21).
Claiming the Batanes
In some cases, the PRC aims to pressure the Philippines through lower-level unofficial channels. For instance, at a June 30 academic symposium in Guangzhou, academics from Jinan University, Nanjing University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that the northernmost Philippine island province of Batanes, which is about 88 miles from Taiwan, belongs to the PRC. To support this argument, they claimed that the archipelago is a natural geographic extension of Taiwan that was governed by the Ming and Qing dynasties. The academics said that the symposium was convened in direct response to the launch of maritime delimitation negotiations between the Philippines and Japan (South, July 2).
The National Historical Commission of the Philippines swiftly refuted the Chinese scholars’ claims about the Batanes, noting that Spanish records from 1687 show no Chinese governance, that Spain claimed the archipelago in 1783, and that the islands have long been considered part of the Philippines (Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10).
PRC media commentaries suggest the Batanes claim is not just a response to maritime delimitation discussions Beijing opposes, but also reflects more deeply-seated security anxieties. Highlighting recent U.S.-Philippines military cooperation in the Batanes, a July commentary published by the Jiangxi provincial government said, “Holding a knife to China’s doorstep and calling it ‘defense’—that’s Manila’s real intention” (把刀子架在中国家门口,还说是“防御”。这就是马尼拉的真实算盘) It further accused the Philippines of using the Batanes as “a springboard for intervening in the Taiwan Strait” (干预台海的跳板) (Sohu, July 15).
Political Interference
Arguably Beijing’s most aggressive political warfare moves against the Philippines are its direct interference in Manila’s domestic politics. In April 2025, Senator Francis Tolentino presented evidence during a Senate hearing linking the Chinese embassy in Manila to online disinformation campaigns against the Philippine government ahead of midterm elections the following month (Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2025). That prompted President Marcos to order an investigation into the alleged election interference. The PRC’s foreign ministry spokesperson rejected these claims, insisting that it “adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries” (一贯奉行不干涉内政原则) (PRC MFA, April 24, 2025). It subsequently sanctioned Tolentino, barring him and his family from entering the PRC and any business dealings with Chinese entities (PRC MFA, July 1, 2025).
New allegations have emerged that suggest deepening PRC meddling in Philippine politics. In October 2026, Manila’s National Security Council said that it would investigate reports of remittances totaling Philippine Peso (PHP) 319 million ($4.8 million) sent from the PRC to a company linked to the husband of Vice President Sara Duterte (Daily Tribune, October 8). Duterte, the daughter of former president Rodrigo Duterte, is a political rival of Marcos, despite serving as vice president in his administration (In the Philippines, the offices of president and vice president are elected separately.)
After the allegations surfaced, Sara Duterte was accused of improperly amassing wealth and impeached. Her trial is expected to run through December (Philippine News Agency, October 27). Duterte denies the allegations, claiming the Marcos administration is using them to sideline a political rival (Davao Today, October 7).
Duterte’s public comments suggest, at a minimum, that she favors a more accommodating PRC policy than Marcos. She has consistently advocated for a less assertive stance on maritime sovereignty issues. At a recent press conference, she said that the Philippines is “becoming a troublemaker in Southeast Asia,” echoing PRC propaganda (ABS-CBN, October 14). When Marcos warned that the allegations against her could constitute a grave national security threat, she said that the president’s statement “is a bold and dangerous challenge to China” (OneNews, October 13).
Chinese media has been supportive of Duterte. A Chinese scholar quoted by Global Times said “she holds relatively pragmatic stances,” in contrast to the Marcos administration’s “increasingly radical China policy” (Global Times, October 13).
Conclusion
The PRC has intensified its political warfare campaign against the Philippines in recent months to undermine the Marcos administration, underscore its sweeping maritime territorial claims, and lend support to Filipino politicians it sees as friendlier to its interests. Yet thus far, Beijing’s strategy has failed to bear fruit.
Instead, the PRC’s heavy-handed tactics have stoked Philippine nationalism, allowed Manila to strengthen its alliance network, and exposed the vulnerability of Marcos’s Beijing-friendly political rivals. Even if Sara Duterte is found not guilty in her impeachment trial, her alleged close ties to the PRC and accommodationist approach to Beijing will be heavily scrutinized if she runs for president in 2028.
Notes
[1] The PRC has sanctioned other politicians, such as Tom Tugendhat in the United Kingdom and Marco Rubio in the United States, but only before they were promoted to cabinet-level positions. And since sanctioning Teodoro Jr., Beijing has also sanctioned two more cabinet-level politicians: Francis Fonseca, Belize’s foreign minister, and Gustavo Villate, Paraguay’s minister of information and communication technologies. However, the PRC lacks official diplomatic relations with Belize and Paraguay due to their official recognition of Taiwan.