Profiling Bonomado Omar: The Religious, Business, and Kinship Networks of Islamic State’s Leader in Mozambique

Profiling Bonomado Omar: The Religious, Business, and Kinship Networks of Islamic State’s Leader in Mozambique

On August 6, 2021, the U.S. announced the terrorist designation of Bonomade Machude Omar alongside four other terrorist leaders in Africa. According to the designation, Omar is the leader of the Military and External Affairs Departments for Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP)’s Mozambique branch. In addition, he serves as the senior commander and lead coordinator for all attacks conducted by the group in northern Mozambique. He is further a facilitator and communications conduit for the group (U.S. State Department, August 6).

The Islamic State (IS)-loyal insurgents in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province remain one of the least known jihadist groups. Despite occasional media releases through IS’s centralized media apparatus, the Cabo Delgado insurgency’s communications strategy has remained mostly localized and delivered overwhelmingly through “local channels.” Based on recently published research and other available data, this profile takes a closer look at one of ISCAP’s main leadership figures in Mozambique, Bonomado Machude Omar.

Bonomado Machude Omar’s Background

In August 2018, Mozambican security authorities revealed the names of six leading figures of the Cabo Delgado militants, including “Ibn Omar” (Militant Leadership Monitor, October 4, 2018). Mozambican journalists similarly noted Bonomado Machude Omar’s alias was Ibn Omar and that he was one of the key leaders of the Cabo Delgado insurgents in late 2020. According to the Centro Journalismo Investigativo (CJI), Omar himself is a Mozambican who was born in the Palma district of Cabo Delgado province, with part of his childhood spent in Mocímboa da Praia. Omar was characterized as “the brains behind the insurgents’ attacks” who  “defined all targets and the necessary operational logistics” (Centro de Journalismo Investigativo, September 29, 2020).

Recently published research, conducted by a Mozambican researcher from the NGO Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), also provides additional details on Omar’s childhood and path to head of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Similar to the CJI article, OMR concluded that Omar is a native of Cabo Delgado,  born in 1988 in the village of Ncumbi in Palma and has three wives and multiple children (OMR, August 10).

There seems to be some discrepancy between the CJI report and OMR research concerning Omar’s childhood: while the CJI report stated that Bonomado Omar´s father was a “retired teacher and a local politician,” the more recent OMR report states that Omar became fatherless at the age of five. Omar’s family then moved to Mocímboa da Praia and his mother married another man, locally known as “Mze Tchidi.”

Where the CJI report and OMR research concur is that Omar excelled in school. He finished tenth grade at the Januário Pedro Secondary School in Mocímboa da Praia and, according to former teachers, “was a calm young man, a good student and a good football player.” Due to his tall stature (roughly six feet) and the fact that he played midfield in soccer, he acquired the nickname “Patrick Vieira” after a famous Senegalese-French football midfielder.

After coming of age, Omar performed his military service in the Mozambican navy in Pemba. After his military service, Omar returned to school, residing at the “boarding school of the African Muslim,” where he finished twelfth grade. In school, Omar “became a charismatic figure with the other young people, where he was known for his sense of justice and protection of the younger ones” (OMR, August 10). This assessment was also reflected by the earlier CJI report, which stated that as a student Omar had been hardworking and dedicated, scoring high marks in school. At the same time, Omar seems to have been already seriously practicing his faith because “he did everything based on Allah’s commands; he never got involved in fights and knew how to navigate his school colleagues” (Centro de Journalismo Investigativo, September 29, 2020).

Sometime around the years 2008 and 2009, Omar worked at the Maringué market in Pemba, where he sold vegetables and Muslim clothing on behalf of a foreign trader, described as Tanzanian or Somali. Business travels then took Omar to Tanzania and South Africa. It seems that Omar tried to combine his religiousness and business activities because after returning from his business travels and settling to Mocímboa da Praia, he ran a mosque and a stall selling trinkets bought in Tanzanian markets or in Pemba itself.

Omar’s path to radicalization, however, is unknown. It is said that his stepfather introduced him to Islam, which he studied and perfected (OMR, August 10). Other sources have claimed that Omar was seen as a “great Islamic scholar, clever and very intelligent” (Centro de Journalismo Investigativo, September 29, 2020). Whatever the case, by 2017 Omar had already become radicalized.

At the Cabo Delgado Insurgency’s Helm

The Cabo Delgado insurgency started on October 5, 2017, when the first insurgent attack took place. An estimated 30 armed men opened fire on police posts in the coastal town and surrounding area of Awasse. The town was besieged while the shootings continued for more than 24 hours, with a total death toll of around 15 attackers, two policemen and one civilian. [1] The attackers, who were mostly from the town of Mocímboa da Praia itself, were ultimately defeated by the security forces and retreated into the bush. Omar participated in these attacks from the beginning as a key figure in acquiring weapons for the group and planning its operations (Caboligado.com, October 12).

After the initial attack, the insurgency gathered pace until culminating in March 2020 with the capture of Mocímboa da Praia. (Terrorism Monitor, May 17, 2019). Omar then became the central figure in a video filmed during the invasion of the town, wearing an IS-style black headband with the writing “La Ilaha Illallahi  (There’s no deity but Allah)” and giving a pep talk in KiSwahili and KiMwani (languages spoken in Cabo Delgado) to his fellow jihadists (Centro de Journalismo Investigativo, September 29, 2020).

However, some doubt existed about whether the aforementioned commander in the video actually was Omar. He has otherwise avoided media attention and there continues to be uncertainty about his names. The OMR report counts no less than six nom de guerres for Omar, including not only “Ibn Omar,” but also “Abu Sulayfa Mohammad”, “Omar Saíde”, “Sheik Omar”, “Nuro Saíde,” and “Abu Surakha”. Similarly, some doubt remains if an insurgent leader featured in a BBC documentary using the names “Abusuraca”, “Nuro” and “Ibn Omar” is indeed Omar himself (BBC Africa Eye, October 4). In July 2020, Mozambican authorities erroneously claimed that Omar had even been killed (Twitter.com/@nrogeiro, July 7, 2020).

Omar has been characterized as someone with “commanding capacity, charisma and leadership,” who dictates the rules and decides where and how to attack, as well as who to kill. Allegedly, it is also Omar who handles the group’s “most delicate situations” (OMR, August 10). However, while Omar undoubtedly is a key leader of ISCAP in Mozambique, it is unclear what his exact responsibilities are. The actual distribution of responsibilities between Abu Yasir Hassan, who the U.S. also designated as an ISCAP terrorist in Mozambique, and Omar is uncertain, but based on the available information, Omar seems to combine the roles of a religious leader and frontline commander. According to the U.S. designation, during the March 2021 Palma attack, for example, Omar led a group of fighters attacking the Amarula Hotel, where a group of foreign workers had sought refuge, while Abu Yasir Hassan led another fighter contingent (iol.co.za, March 28).

In the Rwandan Army’s Crosshairs 

In July 2021, Rwanda made a surprise announcement that it would send its forces to assist the embattled Mozambican forces in Cabo Delgado to liberate areas that had come under the insurgents’ control (mg.co.za, September 14). A month later, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced that it too would send its troops to Mozambique (timeslive.co.za, October 5). Since July, military progress accelerated, with Rwandan and Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) forces regaining control of the main towns of Cabo Delgado and most significantly liberating Mocímboa da Praia on August 8. Since then, Rwandan and Mozambican forces have dismantled known insurgent strongholds and training camps.

While the Rwandan intervention in Cabo Delgado has turned the tide against the insurgents, Omar remains at large. In mid-August, the then commander of Mozambican National Army, Cristovão Chume, stated that “persons close to Omar” had been arrested and that Omar at that point was still alive (Club of Mozambique, August 12). In late September, the brother-in-law of Omar, Ali Buana Aiuba, was also captured by SADC forces after a battle with insurgents in Chitama, Nangade district (Carta de Mozambique, October 5).

The commander of Rwandan Special Forces in Cabo Delgado, major Steven Kuraba, stated in late September that Omar had escaped the recent joint Rwandan and FADM military operation against the insurgents’ stronghold near the village of Mbau. According to Kuraba, Omar had been “in that part of the country,” but had managed to escape (Carta de Mocambique, September 24). Omar is now suspected to be hiding along the forest banks of the Messalo river. The river serves as a boundary between the Rwandan forces, operating to the north of the river, and the SADC forces in the south (Carta de Mocambique, September 24).

Conclusion

The available information on Omar points to a socially capable, and even charismatic, leader, who is familiar with the local terrain of Cabo Delgado. Several details on Omar’s path to the helm of the insurgency are notable. His background as a successful trader connects him to East and Southern African transnational business, religious, and political networks. Omar’s regional connections and existing networks point to a possible role in explaining Omar’s current position as a key leadership figure in ISCAP in Mozambique, and should not be disregarded.

The claim of Omar’s religious upbringing and the arrest of his brother-in-law further underscores the importance of kinship networks in insurgency mobilization. With his background and networks, Omar seems to have become what is called a “jihadist entrepeneur,” who has been able to formulate a jihadist discourse that resonates well with the local social and political climate. This entrepreneurialism has carried Omar to the top of the leadership of ISCAP in Mozambique.

Notes