Brief: Security Services and ISWAP May Be Pushing Nigeria’s Shia Minority Toward Iran

Executive Summary:

• Ongoing pressure by Nigerian security services and Sunni militants may be pushing the country’s small Shia population toward Iran.
• Nigeria’s Shia, who comprise some 1.3 percent of the total population, are likely to be influenced by Iran through members of the Lebanese diaspora or local Shia leader Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, who is on good terms with Tehran.

Nigeria is not commonly thought of as a country hosting Iranian-backed Shia proxy groups, though Tehran has explored the idea of building ties with the country’s embattled Shia population for decades. Nigeria’s Shia, who comprise some 1.3 percent of the population, are influenced by a number of different actors, including the Lebanese diaspora. At one point in the 2010s, Iran, an advocate for Shia beliefs across the Islamic world, seemingly withdrew its support for the most vocal and politically oriented Nigerian Khomeinist Shia group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), led by Ibrahim al-Zakzaky (see Terrorism Monitor, July 26, 2019). Instead, Iran appeared to be increasing engagement with the more theologically oriented Shia groups in Nigeria that largely abstain from politics (African Journals Online, August 28, 2018).

Iran may have recognized the diminishing returns in trying to expand its overextended and beleaguered Middle Eastern proxy network into a country like Nigeria. The Christian half of Nigeria’s population tends to be pro-Israel, and given U.S. and Israeli influence on Nigerian politics, there are many groups that would oppose Iranian interference in the country’s affairs (Vanguard [Nigeria], October 8, 2023). Moreover, the Muslim half of Nigeria’s population is mostly Sunni and tends to be more supportive of Saudi Arabia-sponsored Salafi preachers in the country who oppose both the Shia and Iran (see Terrorism Monitor, July 26, 2019).

Despite all of this, Iran has still been cultivating relations with IMN leader, Ibrahim al-Zakzaky. In February 2024, for example, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s representative in the Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq met with al-Zakzaky to discuss issues affecting the Islamic world and, more specifically, Africa (PressTV [Iran], February 22, 2024). This reflects how the IMN is one of the few entry points for Iran to influence Shia politics and ideology in Africa.

Given the struggles Nigeria’s Shia face with the country’s security forces and other anti-Shia Islamist groups, Iran may be cultivating relations with the IMN in the hopes that they one day turn to Tehran for assistance. Saudi Arabia allegedly urged Nigerian authorities to crack down on the IMN, leading to an incident in 2015 where up to 500 IMN members were killed during a street protest (Al Jazeera, December 16, 2015). Al-Zakzaky himself was nearly killed during the fighting and was put under house arrest with his wife until 2021. Following a lengthy battle over travel documents, al-Zakzaky obtained permission to travel abroad for health reasons, and sought treatment in Iran from October 2023 to February 21, 2024, after which he returned to Nigeria (Arise News [Nigeria], February 22, 2024).

While this could be taken as an indication of al-Zakzaky’s close relationship with Tehran, the IMN has been under severe pressure over the last several years. For example:

• On November 17, 2023, two IMN members were killed in Kaduna State during a protest condemning Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.
• On April 5, 2024, five or more IMN members were killed, and up to 20 were wounded when they clashed with police officers during an International Quds Day procession in Kaduna State.
• On August 25, 2024, the IMN clashed with the police in the capital Abuja’s upscale Wuse District and killed two policemen and a civilian. They also  burned three police vehicles, which led the Commissioner of Police, Benneth Igweh, to claim that “the Shiites” have “declared total war on us” and that “this is the last protest or procession they will carry out” in Abuja.
• And on September 1, 2024, an IMN member was shot by police, a policeman was injured, and several police vehicles were burned at a protest near Abuja’s National Assembly building (Daily Trust [Nigeria], September 10, 2024).

The constant skirmishes between the IMN and the police in the aftermath of the major 2015 riots put the IMN on the radar of the security services, and another crackdown on the organization seems possible one decade later. At the same time, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) massacred a Shia community in Nigeria in late August 2024 and released pictures of stacks of bodies of the victims, who were shot to death (X/@ajaltamimi, August 31, 2024; X/@p_vanostaeyen, September 14, 2024). ISWAP alleged they had collaborated with security forces, although their being Shia “rejecters (rafidha)” was sufficient to warrant their execution, according to ISWAP ideology. This was, however, the first time ISWAP had specifically targeted Nigeria Shias since 2015. Together, these incidents display how Nigeria’s Shia population is embattled, both vis-à-vis the security services and ISWAP, potentially creating an opportunity for Iran.