How Islamic State Commandeers Syrian Tribal Networks—The Case Study of Saddam al-Jamal

How Islamic State Commandeers Syrian Tribal Networks—The Case Study of Saddam al-Jamal

Saddam al-Jamal, a.k.a. Abu Roqaiyya al-Ansari, is a notorious member of Islamic State (IS), and his arrest in May 2018 evoked strong reactions, both in the region and across the world. Al-Jamal was captured, along with four other high-level IS members, by Iraq’s intelligence agency in a raid coordinated with the U.S.-led coalition (Alarabiya, May 10, 2018). The arrest prompted then-U.S. President Donald Trump to tweet: “Five Most Wanted leaders of ISIS just captured!” Jamal held a senior position in IS’ intelligence apparatus and was suspected of involvement in human rights abuses committed by the group. Recruiting Saddam al-Jamal into the ranks of IS had a twofold significance for the organization. First, al-Jamal’s successful recruitment into IS demonstrates the group’s desire to use local figures to create bonds with the local community in Syria with the aim of building a popular base at the grassroot level. Secondly, al-Jamal shows how IS exploits rifts between social groups and militias to penetrate local societies and recruit agents, to the group’s advantage. Today, as eastern Syria experiences increasingly sever tensions between disenfranchised groups, al-Jamal’s insurgent career offers valuable lessons to policymakers and analysts.

Jamal’s Upbringing and his Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

Al-Jamal was born in 1978 in the Syrian city of Albukamal, near the Iraqi border, to a family of nine. He belongs to the al-Nuim tribe, whose members are located in both Iraq and Syria. This tribe does not have a large number of members in the eastern Syrian governorate of Deir ez-Zur, where the Egidate and Baggara tribes dominate. Despite not belonging to these tribes, al-Jamal’s father was a prominent figure in the region who solved problems in the community in accordance with tribal reconciliation laws. This gave al-Jamal the opportunity to spend his formative years meeting members of other tribes and families, allowing him to create strong bonds with the community around him. Al-Jamal finished his education at the age of 18 and obtained a vocational school certificate. He became involved in smuggling in his early 20s.

Smuggling was a common profession in Albukamal, as it was close to the border with Iraq, which did not allow commerce for decades during the reign of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein (Kuna, January 16, 2011). Despite the closure of the borders in 1982, smuggling remained a lucrative trade for many people who lived in the border areas. Al-Jamal talks about smuggling cigarettes, livestock and truffles from Iraq to Syria (Facebook, June 4, 2019). In 1998, the two regimes re-established ties and opened border crossings. Al-Jamal claims that after this date, he obtained official documents to trade goods across the border and started moving legally between the two countries, buying and selling a variety of different products (YouTube, June 4, 2019). After the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, thousands of Arab and Syrian fighters crossed the border to join the Iraqi insurgency. Smugglers on the Syrian side of the border played an important role in facilitating their movement across the border (Noon Post, November 11, 2019). In a video interview with NAS media, however, al-Jamal denied playing any role in facilitating the crossing of fighters into Iraq during that period (YouTube, January 24, 2019).

Before the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, al-Jamal participated in what were initially peaceful protests in Albukamal against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The regime used military force against protesters in Albukamal in 2012, reportedly killing 15, which al-Jamal claims motivated him to join the insurgency (YouTube, January 24, 2019). This was the beginning of his involvement in the armed resistance against the regime. He established the Allah Akbar Brigade as a part of the Ahfad al-Rasoul Brigades, which belonged to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). His background and connections in the area allowed him to earn the backing of the senior leadership in the FSA (Arab48, May 25, 2019). In 2012, the Antalya conference that convened to unite opposition forces fighting the Assad regime selected al-Jamal as the assistant deputy chief of staff for eastern Syria. [1]

Conflict with al-Nusra Front and Joining Islamic State

When the Syrian uprising started, Islamic State sent Syrian jihadists, who had been trained by Iraqi experts, into Syria to establish a Syrian base for the group, later called al-Nusra Front. Tensions between al-Jamal and members of al-Nusra Front emerged, apparently as part of the jihadist group’s attempts to seize military control of eastern Syria from the FSA (Arab48, May 25, 2019). Sources agree that during that time, al-Nusra Front killed two of al-Jamal’s brothers (youm7, July 12, 2018). This provoked a personal grudge on al-Jamal’s part, which IS likely later exploited to recruit him.

By 2013, a rift had grown between IS and al-Nusra Front. The leadership of al-Nusra Front had refused to merge under the banner of IS. This led to divisions among the jihadists of eastern Syria, as some allied with IS while others were affiliated with al-Nusra Front. Al-Jamal claims that al-Nusra Front’s assassination of his brothers pushed him to join IS. However, he has contradicted himself on exactly how he joined IS in different media interviews (YouTube, January 24, 2019). In another interview, al-Jamal claimed that he was forced to join IS after they detained him at the beginning of 2013 (YouTube, May 12, 2019). Al-Jamal claimed that he only gained his freedom after his family handed over some of their weapons to IS.

Upon returning to Albukamal, tension mounted between al-Jamal and al-Nusra Front members again, as they accused him of cooperating with IS. They killed his third brother and forced him out of Albukamal after they took control of most of the Deir ez-Zur area. Al-Jamal found refuge in Shadadi, in northeastern Deir ez-Zur, which was under the control of IS.

In December 2013, al-Jamal appeared in a video released by the media wing of IS, regretting that he had joined FSA and calling on other FSA groups to distance themselves from opposition groups, accusing them of “fighting Islamists and hindering the establishment of the rule of God” (Facebook, December 1, 2013). The video portrayed FSA and other opposition groups as foreign entities whose primary aim was to fight IS. In answering questions about FSA, al-Jamal revealed that Qatar was the primary supporter of the organization, with the involvement of intelligence agencies, including those of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. This video announcement represented al-Jamal’s official declaration that he had joined Islamic State (Facebook, December 1, 2013). Subsequently, al-Jamal appeared in a number of other media releases. In each of these, he pledged his allegiance to IS.

Ascending Through the IS Ranks

In April 2014, al-Jamal led his first assault with IS, in which they attempted to seize Albukamal from al-Nusra Front (Orient News, May 17, 2018). The assault focused on al-Nusra Front’s religious commission in the city and they managed to kill the head of the commission, along with many other group members (France24 Arabic, April 11, 2014). However, the attack failed to take control of the city, and local authorities in the area apparently issued a statement marking al-Jamal as a legitimate target for the crimes he had committed during the attack.

In July 2014, IS managed to seize large swathes of territory in Deir ez-Zur, approximately at the same time the Iraqi city of Mosul was captured. The role of al-Jamal during this period is not clear, although he is widely accused of leading the IS offensive against the al-Sheitat tribe, in northwestern Albukamal, in August 2014. More than 700 people were executed in attacks that reportedly lasted two weeks (aman.dostor.org, May 11, 2018).

Al-Jamal assumed the role of head of the intelligence service in Wilayat al-Furat, an area that used to straddle the territories of both Syria and Iraq, and settled in Albukamal. He confessed that he used his contacts in the city to convince its people to stop attacking IS forces. He subsequently took on a role in military intelligence in the wider Deir ez-Zur governorate. In 2016, al-Jamal received a financial gift from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the then-leader of IS, for his services. He was also given the name “Abu Roqaiyya al-Ansari.”

Opportunism and Complicity in Atrocities

Overall, the perception of al-Jamal is that of a pragmatic figure who did not come from a religious background. His involvement in smuggling and, allegedly, in drug trafficking, is often cited as proof of his generally opportunistic attitude, which likely extended to his joining ISIS. His apathetic attitude toward religion apparently led to an IS court sentencing him to a whipping for smoking in public. Social media users who opposed al-Jamal circulated a photo that allegedly showed him smoking shisha tobacco, and used it to prove his hypocrisy and non-religious behavior.

A review of video clips of al-Jamal over his active period in the Syrian civil war, before and after joining IS, shows that al-Jamal has at least used religious language to legitimize himself among his supporters. The Islamist symbolism and references were noticeably clear in the media sources associated with the brigade al-Jamal created before joining IS and the speeches he gave during that time (YouTube, May 29, 2012). During his period with IS, in one video al-Jamal appears to be giving a sermon about women, decency and religious laws (Facebook, October 1, 2017).

Social media accounts and testimonies from those who knew him portray al-Jamal as an extremely violent person. In addition to the aforementioned al-Sheitat massacre, various social media accounts featuring photos allegedly showing al-Jamal near mutated dead bodies and severed heads were circulated widely. In one case, al-Jamal seemed to be posing with severed heads, which appear burned, though the most high-profile crime in which al-Jamal is accused of involvement is the execution of the Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kassasbah in January 2015 (Twitter.com/AR2011B, May 9, 2018). The family of the victim have repeatedly demanded that Iraqi authorities hand al-Jamal over to Jordan for sentencing there (YouTube, May 4, 2019).

Al-Jamal’s involvement in this crime, however, is uncertain. In addition to al-Jamal’s own denial, which one can easily dismiss, no Iraqi court appears to have charged him with the murder of Kassasbah and several reports appear to suggest that al-Jamal indeed had no connection to the murder. The late Hisham al-Hashimi, an Iraqi historian and researcher of strategic affairs and extremist groups, denied in a 2018 tweet that al-Jamal had any connection to the murder of Kassasbah (Twitter.com/hushamalhashimi, May 15, 2018).

His Arrest

Al-Jamal was arrested on May 9, 2018, along with four other high-level IS members: Isam Abdulqader al-Zawbaai, Omar Shihab Qaraboli, Mohammad Hussain al-Qadir, and Ismail Ilwan al-Ithawi. Iraq’s intelligence agency conducted the operation in coordination with the U.S.-led coalition. According to Iraqi security authorities, Ithawi’s initial arrest was in February in Turkey and he was handed over to Iraqi intelligence. Ithawi was one of Baghdadi’s closest assistants and was responsible for financial transfers and overseeing IS bank accounts abroad. According to Hashimi, Iraqi intelligence appeared to have used the Telegram application in Ithawi’s phone to lure the other four leaders from Syria to Iraq, which made their arrest possible (Reuters Arabic, May 10, 2018). Al-Jamal’s current whereabouts, his status within the Iraq’s penal system, and whether or not he is even alive is currently unknown.

Despite IS’ defeat in Syria and Iraq, local communities are still in fear of the group’s resurgence. The case of Saddam al-Jamal shows how IS worked for many years to root itself into local tribal communities. Researchers’ attention has often focused on IS’ attempts to co-opt traditional tribal leaders with the aim of preventing the United States from using the tribes against it in a similar way to the U.S. utilization of the tribes against al-Qaeda in Iraq in between 2005 and 2013. Co-opting young people such as al-Jamal and others who have charisma and the connections in their communities shows how IS has gone beyond the traditional tribal networks to reinforce its existence among the tribes. As a result, more efforts should be done to identify these socially connected figures that might contribute to the group’s potential resurgence.

Notes