Ibrahim Sadr: The Hardline Former Military Chief Maintaining Influence Over the Taliban
Ibrahim Sadr: The Hardline Former Military Chief Maintaining Influence Over the Taliban
In early May, the Taliban announced the appointment of Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, son of its founder-leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and deputy to its current amir (leader) Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, as chief of its military commission. Ibrahim Sadr, who Yaqoob replaced, and Abdul Qayyum Zakir would work as the new military chief’s deputies and also lead the military commission in the southwestern zone and eastern zone respectively, the Taliban said (Arab News, May 10). The changes are significant, as they come just months after the Taliban and the United States signed a peace deal under which the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan while the militant group engaged in talks with the Afghan government to settle the decades-old conflict in the country.
Sadr has been part of the Taliban military for over two decades and has functioned as its chief of military commission since 2014. He is also among the “most influential members” of the Rahbari Shura (leadership council) (Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 22, 2016). He is credited with “transforming the Taliban from a humiliated pariah government to one of the world’s most effective guerrilla armies” (Asia Times, July 16). According to terrorism analyst Abdul Basit, Sadr is “the architect of the Taliban’s recent battlefield victories and territorial gains.” [1] Why has a leader who has contributed significantly to the Taliban’s military resurgence been replaced, even demoted, in the recent leadership reshuffle?
Early Years
Born in the late 1960s in Jogharan village in Helmand province, Sadr is of Pashtun origin and belongs to the Alakozai tribe. His family participated in the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s; he and his father joined the Jamiat-e Islami, one of the largest mujahideen groups. However, Sadr distanced himself from the fighting when inter-mujahideen violence broke out after the fall of the Communist government in 1992, leaving the country for Peshawar in Pakistan for religious studies. He was among the first batch of recruits to heed the Taliban’s calls to join the jihad to set up an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. Although he was close to Taliban leaders, he seems to have maintained a low profile during this period and it was only after the Taliban took power that he began to rise in its hierarchy. During Taliban rule, Sadr was in charge of Kabul airport and was a commander of the Air Force for Kabul. He is said to have “played a small but important role” in fighting the Northern Alliance. Pilots under his command carried out aerial bombing of Northern Alliance targets during this period (Asia Times, July 16).
In November 2001, Sadr, like other Taliban commanders, retreated in the face of the advancing fighters of the Northern Alliance and the U.S.-led coalition forces. Little is known about his activities during this period but he is believed to have played a key role in strategizing the Taliban’s anti-U.S. insurgency.
Proximity to Mansour
In 2014, Sadr replaced Zakir as military commission chief. Differences between Zakir and Mullah Mohammad Mansour, then Omar’s deputy, over the question of negotiations with the Afghan government were reportedly behind the decision to replace Zakir (Militant Leadership Monitor, July 2). Besides his military skills, Sadr’s proximity to Mansour is said to have played an important role in his appointment as military chief. Their relationship went back to the late 1990s, when Mansour was Minister of Civil Aviation and Transportation in the Taliban regime and Sadr was part of the same ministry (Asia Times, July 16). Over the years, Sadr emerged as a close associate of Mansour and this likely weighed in his favor, especially in the 2013-16 period, when Mansour was trying to consolidate control over the Taliban. Unknown to the outside world at that time, even to many Taliban leaders and rank-and-file members, Omar had died in 2013, a fact that Mansour kept secret until 2015. Having old confidantes in key positions would have been imperative to Mansour during this period, hence the appointment of a reliable person like Sadr as military chief.
Sadr’s Achievements
Following Mansour’s death in a drone attack in Pakistan in 2016, Sadr pledged loyalty to the new leader, Akhundzada, who retained him as military chief. In the years since, the Taliban has done well on the battlefield. Not only has it wrested control over vast swathes of Afghan territory from the government—it controls more territory today than at any time since its ouster from power in 2001—but it has also been able to contain the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) to a few districts in Nangarhar province (see MLM, December 10, 2018). The Taliban’s territorial gains under Akhundzada’s leadership can be attributed to Sadr and, importantly, the military commission under him has forced the U.S. out of Afghanistan, says Basit. [2]
Besides being in charge of the insurgency nationwide, Sadr controls the Taliban’s resources, including the money raised from the drug trade and the marble business, says Afghan journalist Sami Yousafzai. [3] Sadr keeps track of all infrastructure development projects in the country and is paid a percentage of the project funds by both government and private entities, an Afghan government official said. [4]
Sadr appears also to have played an important role in the Taliban’s outreach to Iran. According to Yousafzai, Sadr has “very warm relations with Iran” and, along with other Taliban leaders, has been visiting the country “frequently.” The Taliban has an office in Iran and injured fighters are treated there. [5] Indeed, Iran’s provision of financial support and tactical and combat training to the Taliban prompted the U.S. Treasury Department to designate Sadr and eight other Taliban leaders as global terrorists in October 2018 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 23, 2018).
Divisive Figure
Did Sadr’s close relationship with Iran rile the Pakistan-friendly Taliban leadership, culminating in his replacement by Yaqoob? The Taliban would have been under pressure from the United States and Pakistan to cut ties with Iran. It is unlikely, however, to have been the main factor behind the decision, says Yousafzai. [6] After all, relations between the Taliban and Iran are neither new nor have been cultivated by Sadr alone. Indeed, the Taliban formalized its relations with Iran by appointing “envoys” to the country (Tolo News, November 16, 2016).
It is more likely that Sadr’s replacement has to do with his views on the peace agreement. He is said to be strongly opposed to the deal. According to Basit, the Taliban has realized that “military operations can get them territory but not power in Afghanistan” and do not want Sadr, who is a “military hardliner and strongly opposed to talks, power sharing and compromise, to express his reservations in public” and thus derail the talks. Akhundzada wants to unify the Taliban movement and ensure that the rank-and-file stands by decisions the leadership takes in the coming months. Sadr is a divisive figure. In contrast, Yaqoob, given “his lineage and bloodline, commands enormous respect among the rank-and-file” and will be able to rally them around the leadership’s decisions. [7]
Still Influential
Sadr, Zakir, and other Taliban leaders who are close to Iran and opposed to reconciliation efforts are said to have split from the Taliban to form a group, the Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami, which is based in Iran and is in its nascent stages (Gandhara, June 9). However, according to Yousafzai, Sadr is still a part of the Taliban movement and the Taliban remains “a united force.” Importantly, while Sadr may have been stripped of his title of chief of military commission, little much else seems to have changed with regard to his influence in the Taliban. His area of operational command has not reduced. Besides, unlike Yaqoob, who is based in Pakistan, Sadr is active inside Afghanistan. [8] Therefore, it is Sadr who is calling the shots on the ground in Afghanistan.
Reports of Sadr splitting from the Taliban may not be fully accurate. However, as a military man opposed to reconciliation with the Afghan government, he could rebel should the Taliban leadership and the political wing accept terms that are not in sync with his more hardline views. Sadr does, therefore, pose a threat to a negotiated settlement of the Afghan conflict.
Notes
[1] Author’s Interview, Abdul Basit, associate research fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, August 12. [2] Ibid. [3] Author’s Interview, Kabul-based Afghan journalist, Sami Yousafzai, August 15. [4] Author’s Interview, Afghan government official, August 19. [5] Yousafzai, n. 3. [6] Ibid. [7] Basit, n.1. [8] Yousafzai, n.3.
