Islamic State in Libya Emir Abdel Qader al-Najdi Returns From the Dead

Islamic State in Libya Emir Abdel Qader al-Najdi Returns From the Dead

On September 28, Sadiq al-Sour, head of investigations for the Libyan attorney general’s office in Tripoli, held a press conference in the Libyan capital providing fresh information regarding the recent reorganization of Islamic State (IS) in Libya (al-Jarida, September 28). The group, which was dislodged from its stronghold of Sirte in December 2016 by the Bunyan Marsous militant coalition, made up of fighters mostly from the city of Misrata, has made an important comeback in Libya since last summer after several months of underground activity, confirming earlier reports that the group managed to smuggle key militants out of Sirte in the weeks leading to the offensive. Al-Sour stated that IS militants in Libya have set up a desert army composed of at least three brigades, each with its own commander (Maghrebvoices.com, September 29; Jerusalem Post, September 29). Most interestingly, al-Sour detailed the composition and organization of the various IS cells in Libya and their commanders, officially confirming for the first time that the group’s emir, Abdel Qader al-Najdi, is still alive and wanted by the Libyan authorities. [1] What follows is a profile of al-Najdi that attempts to shed some light on his real identity and investigate his potential role in IS’ revival in Libya.

The al-Naba Interview 

Abdel Qader al-Najdi first came into the fore in March 2016, when IS’ Arabic-language newsletter, al-Naba, featured an interview in which al-Najdi was presented as a new IS Emir “deputized to oversee the Libyan wilayat (provinces).” [2] Al-Naba is issued on an almost weekly basis, often featuring interviews with prominent senior IS figures. The publication covers a wide range of topics, including military developments in the theaters where IS militants are engaged, theological and ideological issues and tactical advice. In the interview, al-Najdi claimed that Libya had become a “destination for mujahidin and a sanctuary for the oppressed,” adding that “the numbers of immigrants multiplied from all areas despite the ardent attempts by the West to prevent their immigration” (al-Wasat, March 11, 2016). Nevertheless, al-Najdi acknowledged that IS was struggling to expand its authority beyond Sirte as the group had hoped, citing the rivalry and animosity among jihadist factions (a likely reference to the competition with al-Qaeda affiliated and leaning jihadist entities) as the main cause for this (EremNews, April 16, 2016). He stressed, however, that the Libyan wilaya was attempting to follow the footsteps of the Khilafa (Caliphate) in Syria and Iraq, suggesting a greater role for Libya in the group’s strategic plans in the near future (Ewanlibya, March 10, 2016).

He then presented Libya as a country relevant for jihadists not only for its location — it is ideal to wage jihad across North Africa — but also because the country is a “gift of God” given its abundant oil resources and ideal conditions to “re-establish the authority of God’s law,” a reference to Shari’a (Islamic Law). Al-Najdi also made an argument that will become a key element in future IS messaging and narrative — namely, that the group had not been affected by the death of its leaders or by the military defeats on the ground, stressing that the mujahidin continue to remain steadfast and willing to fight “their enemies” until the end (Libya24, March 10, 2016). After introducing this argument, al-Najdi officially eulogized his predecessor, Abu Mughirah al-Qahtani (a.k.a. Abu Nabil al-Anbari), the late IS emir in Libya who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Derna in November 2015 (al-Jazeera, November 15, 2015). In a bid to mobilize potential supporters around the group’s flag, he urged supporters to make the hijra (pilgrimage) to both the Levant and Libya and to continue to flock in the Caliphal land. Concluding his statement — and attracting the most attention from the Italian media — al-Najdi stated that Libya was also a key country that would open the door to Europe and Rome, threatened France, the United Kingdom and Italy for their “crusade” against the group in Libya and vowed to “conquer Rome” one day (Ansa, March 10, 2016).

Who Is al-Najdi?

The interview presented the new IS emir only by the name “Abdel Qader al-Najdi,” providing no alias or nom de guerre. The al-Naba piece also failed to reveal his nationality or provide a picture of al-Najdi, triggering speculation about his real identity among journalists and Libya watchers alike. Most Western and Arab media covering the news speculated that Abdel Qader was a militant of Saudi origin — his nisbah (attribution indicating place of origin) “al-Najdi” was interpreted as a reference to the Saudi region of Najd. An article published in March 2016, and quoting Libyan security sources, also suggested that al-Najdi moved to Libya sometime in 2015 from the Syrian province of Deir al-Zour (one of the main IS bastion in Syria) and indicated his real name as Suilam al-Hadi al-Ruiali (Dzayerinfo.com, March 12, 2016). Saudi authorities issued an arrest warrant against al-Ruiali in March 2016 for his alleged role in terrorist activities in the country. However, the fact that al-Ruiali was reported to be in Saudi Arabia when the al-Naba interview was issued indicates that the information was not reliable (al-Riyadh, March 13, 2016).

Some analysts also suggested that Abdel Qader al-Najdi was most likely not the real name of the new IS emir. They argued that, taken together, the theological expertise evident in the language he used in the interview and his Saudi nationality actually point to the profile of another well-known Saudi commander, Abu Habib al-Jazrawi (Il Foglio, March 9, 2016). Al-Jazrawi arrived in Libya in September 2014 as an emissary from IS leadership in Iraq along with the Yemeni Abu al-Bara al-Azdi. Together, the two militants collected pledges of allegiance to IS from the Mujaheddin Shura Council brigades based in the eastern city of Derna in October 2014. No evidence supporting al-Najdi’s Saudi nationality or the fact that he might actually be Abu Habib al-Jazrawi has ever emerged in open source information: IS never has released a video featuring al-Najdi that would allow for analysis of his accent and somatic traits.

News about al-Najdi ceased emerging around December 2016. This lines up with when, after a seven-month offensive, the Bunyan Marsous coalition eventually defeated the last pocket of IS resistance in Sirte (The Arab Weekly, December 11, 2016). According to multiple media reports, at least 1,700 bodies of killed IS militants were discovered during the military campaign, including those of senior leaders. Sources from Misrata also identified Abu Habib al-Jazrawi among the casualties, again presenting the militant as al-Najdi (Afrigatenews, December 9, 2016; al-Jazeera, December 11, 2016). While the reports highlighted the fact that IS did not announce the killing of its leaders, media reporting went on suggesting that the Tunisian Jalahuddin al-Tunisi had been chosen to replace al-Najdi (al-Masdar, September 30, 2016; Akherkhabaronline, January 16; see Militant Leadership Monitor, August 2).

The Libyan Investigation    

Information provided by the Libyan authorities in September 2017 was likely built on intelligence gathered during the battle for Sirte, presumably from recovered documents, confessions obtained from captured militants and intelligence received from third-party countries. While these details do not completely resolve the mystery around al-Najdi’s background, they offer key insights that help to establish some facts about his real identity. In March 2017, an IS Egyptian national known as “Abu Hamza al-Masri,” who was arrested in Sirte by Misratah security forces, offered an account of his journey to join the group in Syria, providing interesting details about the group’s structure (Alghad, March 30). Abu Hamza claimed that the group recruited him in Derna before moving to Sirte. He then revealed that three IS leaders had arrived from Syria to organize the group’s ranks in Libya, naming Abdul Aziz al-Anbari, presented as the head of military operations; Abu Hazim al-Iraqi, who had the task to oversee the administrative aspect of the group; and Abdel Qader al-Najdi, presented as a former Shari’a judge with IS in Libya (Alghad, March 30). Al-Najdi’s former role as IS Shari’a judge would explain the theological and religious expertise he showed during the interview with al-Naba, while his presence in Syria would corroborate part of the story put forward by Libyan security forces that traced al-Najdi’s presence in Deir al-Zour.

In late May 2017, the Egyptian air force launched six strikes targeting alleged jihadist training camps near Derna, where militants responsible for the May 26 attack on a bus carrying Coptic Christians in Egypt’s Minya province were believed to be trained, according to military sources (al-Jazeera, May 27). According to anonymous Egyptian security sources, the strikes targeted senior IS leaders in Libya, including al-Najdi, suggesting for the first time that the IS emir was still alive (al-Arabiya, June 3). Another clue emerged in late August 2017, when a pro-IS channel on Telegram referred to al-Najdi as the current IS emir in Libya. [3] This was confirmed officially during a Libyan attorney general’s office press conference, when al-Sour stated that al-Najdi was the most wanted militant in Libya and revealed for the first time that the IS emir was actually an Iraqi national from the city of Tikrit known by his nom de guerre Abu Ma’dh al-Tikriti (al-Masdar, September 28; al-Jarida, September 28).

Conclusions

Recent revelations about al-Najdi have emerged at a time when IS has made a significant comeback in Libya. Since July, the group has carried out a number of attacks south of Sirte, in Misratah and central Jufra province, further highlighting that the group will remain a threat to Libyan security over the coming months (see Terrorism Monitor, October 12). The group has managed to re-organize its ranks and regroup after the loss of Sirte, going underground for an extended period of time before starting the second phase of its militant trajectory in Libya, a guerrilla-style insurgency. Al-Najdi has likely played a key role in this transition. Both his time spent in Syria and his appointment to run one of the most promising IS provinces beyond Syria and Iraq mean that al-Najdi is a trusted leader among the IS leadership, sent from the Levant into Libya with key strategic instructions on how to keep the group’s prominence in the north-African country alive during the period following the loss of territorial control. The way in which IS is “re-emerging” in Libya and conducting its hit-and-run guerrilla style operations is hence a key indicator to watch in order to assess the future trajectory of IS in Syria and Iraq as the post-Caliphate phase begins.

NOTES

[1] All slides of al-Sour’s briefing are available at the Facebook page of Bunyan Marsous: https://www.facebook.com/BMCLY/

[2] The al-Naba issue released in March 2016 is available here:  https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/the-islamic-state-e2809cal-nabacc84_-newsletter-21e2809d.pdf

[3] https://twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/902247227053285377