Muhammad al-Madhuni: Islamic State’s Leader in Western Libya

Muhammad al-Madhuni: Islamic State’s Leader in Western Libya

Zainul Abid

Muhammal al-Madhuni is an Islamic State commander operating from the Libyan city of Sabratah, which is presently controlled by militias. He was born in 1953 and grew up in Ain Zara, located in central Tripoli, though he holds an Iraqi passport under the name of Muhammad al-Madhuni. He moved to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviets in the 1980s after he was targeted by the Qaddafi regime for desecrating graves of holy Muslim men, and his name consequently appeared on the list of wanted Arab Mujahideen fighting the Russians in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, his attempts to enter Libya via Sudan did not succeed as a result of clashes between the government and civilians in eastern Libya. When the U.S.-led alliance pounded the Afghan mountains following the 9/11 attacks, al-Madhuni, alongside his fellow jihadists, retreated to Iran, where they settled until 2012. He then headed to Iraq before returning to his home turf of western Libya. While in Iran, he was in constant touch with militia leaders and political figures, in particular those who were willing to implement sharia in Libya. It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent Islamic State documents, he is referred to as the “head of the jurisprudence, guidance, and recruitment office of the Islamic State in Libya” (Asharq al-Awsat, March 17).

Activities in Libya

After re-entering Libya in 2013, al-Madhuni kept a low profile for several months. While the Libyan militia landscape was dispersed and beset by infighting, al-Madhuni capitalized on the new wave of militancy taking hold in Syria and Iraq. According to a member of another militia group, Liwa-ul Ummah, al-Madhuni and his accomplice known as Abu Hafs al-Libi, were among the first Libyans who traveled to Syria to fight among the ranks of the Islamic State, reversing the trend of Libyans joining Syrian opposition groups. However, the opposition groups’ strong resistance against the Islamic State forced al-Madhuni to flee to Iraq, where he stayed until returning to Libya again at the end of 2014 when the Islamic State had just announced its presence in Libya’s Sirte. He then steered the group’s expansion into the eastern city of Derna, recruiting Libyan—as well as foreign—fighters. Sources suggest he stayed with two al-Qaeda members known as Bin Qumu and Azuz. According to U.S. security officials, al-Madhuni also goes by the name Abu Muad, and is considered to have played a pivotal role in Islamic State’s Sirte expansion (Asharq al-Awsat, March 17).

At the beginning of last year, al-Madhuni moved from Sirte to Tripoli, where he managed to establish his presence easily with the help of a jihadist by the name of Sheikh Yaseen, who ia close to Abu Bakr al-Badhdadi (Asharq al-Awsat, March 13; Asharq al-Awsat, February 29). Al-Madhuni now runs several camps in and around Tripoli, one of which is located near the militia-controlled Mitiga Airport. He also moves between a camp in the coastal area of Qarbuli and another located not far from the offices of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Tripoli (Asharq al-Awsat, March 17).

Al-Madhuni has a strong social network that includes jihadists of Asian, Algerian, and Mauritanian origin. Among them are two Mauritanian fighters who go by the names Amara Would Ahmed and Ali Would Ahmad, who are responsible for patrolling the streets of Tripoli. He is the first point of contact for the foreign fighters arriving in Libya. His headquarters in Ain Zara are said to have special rooms used to manage operations in Tunisia and Algeria. A Tunisian militant, Abu Jareed, was assigned by al-Madhuni to carry out attacks in the Tunisian capital, as well as other parts of the country; Madhuni recruited a number of Tunisian militants in Mount Chaanmbi to carry out country-wide attacks (Asharq al-Awsat, January 30).

Arms Deals and Political Connections

Al-Madhuni stands out from other jihadists for his skills in managing funds and sealing arms deals. He is said to have great mastery over managing resources and manpower, and was involved in clinching some lucrative arms deals for Islamic State. The last deal he secured was the acquisition of missiles “capable of turning tanks into ashes” (Asharq al-Awsat, January 31). Reports also suggest he has bought a sea berth in Zawiya, situated just 100 kilometers from the Tunisia border. He sits on a large amount of wealth amassed chiefly through the smuggling of arms and drugs, as well as through bank robberies (Asharq al-Awsat, January 30). It is worth noting that al-Madhuni reportedly turned his back on an earlier idea of a “unified revolutionary council” that would merge the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood, after he managed to gain territory and build up his own team of jihadists (Asharq al-Awsat, February 29; Asharq al-Awsat, January 25).

Furthermore, there are reports that a Jund al-Haq leader known as al-Sukani had made an agreement with al-Madhuni to use a shipment of sarin gas to secure the mountainous city of Al-Rabita. Another deal was allegedly made between al-Madhuni and a leader of the Abu Salim militia who goes by the name Abd al-Ghani, in which al-Ghani was to sell sarin gas and other weapons to al-Madhuni. Investigations reportedly suggest that stolen sarin ended up in Islamic State camps led by al-Madhuni (Alsharq al-Awsat, January 31). Madhuni similarly agreed to facilitate the delivery of a truckload of weapons, including mines, bombs and other medium-range arms worth around $7 million (Asharq al-Awsat, January 29).

An apparently assertive and influential man, al-Madhuni maintains close ties to lawmakers who participated in the United Nations-led political reconciliation dialogue among Libya’s warring factions in Skhirat. A Libyan security official’s description of him as a “militant in the guise of a political leader” reinforces evidence of his close relations with and influence over political figures. In a conversation after the Skhirat negotiations, al-Madhuni met a lawmaker known as Abu Saif from Libya’s defunct General National Congress (GNC), and reprimanded him for engaging in talks with the “Christian government” of Faiz Serraj, the head of the Cabinet proposed by the UN (Asharq al-Awsat, January 29).

A Libyan military official revealed that al-Madhuni has met with a member of U.S. intelligence in Ain Zara and discussed issues related to future security arrangements in the capital. The source added that the U.S. official was one of the envoys involved in negotiations among Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt over the al-Nadhda Dam issue. He added that the man works for the U.S. team from two locations: one in the Badr region found west of Tripoli, the other in Janzur, within the territory of the capital (Asharq al-Awsat, January 23).

Conclusion

Libya’s unending volatility and absence of a unity front offers a great opportunity for influential militiamen like al-Madhuni to strengthen their political maneuvering. The current situation not only helps them wield more power and step up the intensity and scale of their actions, but also provides them with leverage to use in political bargaining with warring lawmakers.

Zainul Abid is an expert on the Middle-East and Asia-Pacific region based in New Delhi, India.