The Mystery Emir: Who is IS-K Commander Shaikh Aslam Farooqi?

The Mystery Emir: Who is IS-K Commander Shaikh Aslam Farooqi?

The sudden rise of Islamic State’s Khurasan Chapter (IS-K, or Waliyat-e-Khurasan) in September 2014 took the security policymakers of Pakistan and Afghanistan by surprise. The global Islamist terrorist organization was able to find immediate support from local and regional Islamist terrorist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. A number of terrorist organizations either pledged allegiance to IS or developed a working relationship for the purpose of perpetrating terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. [1]

The group’s momentum did not last long, as U.S. and Afghan forces carried out consecutive counter-terrorist operations, drone strikes, and aerial bombings (including the dropping of a MOAB in Nangarhar) to decapitate IS-K’s leadership. Over the course of two years, the terrorist entity has lost three of its emirs. This reversal of momentum has hurt the growth of IS-K in the region (CNN Asia, July 14, 2018). The organization, however, still has tremendous potential to expand because of a rich jihadist landscape in Pakistan.

By mid-2017, a faction of IS-K fighters emerged under the command of Shaikh Aslam Farooqi in eastern Afghan provinces. The rise of Sheikh Aslam Farooqi as the new Emir of IS-K (Farooqi Faction) has created a stabilizing factor for the organization. He has not only managed to plan and execute a number of terrorist operations against Afghan and U.S. forces, but has also spread the IS-K’s network in Pakistan. Farooqi has also been able to remain hidden from American and Afghan intelligence, and thus been able to avoid the fate of his predecessors.

It is therefore pertinent to analyze and assess his background and modus operandi.

Who is Farooqi?

Islamic State established its Khurasan chapter with fanfare in 2014, but nominated emirs were targeted and killed by US and Afghan forces. Farooqi was selected by IS-Central after the consecutive deaths of Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai in July 2016, Abdul Haseeb Logari in April 2017 and Abdul Sayed Bajuari in July 2017 (India Today, July 15, 2017)

Little is known about Aslam Farooqi. Even today, he remains a shadowy figure with much of his background information remaining unknown. However, according to information that has come to light, Farooqi hails from Sheikhupura district of Punjab province. Later, he studied at a madrasah in Karachi. [2]

Crucially, Farooqi was recruited and trained in the 1990s by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The group is a Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist organization that has been involved in a number of international terrorist attacks and plots. [3] Most notable among these is the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 164 people consisting of 26 nationalities. (CNN Asia, Dec 12, 2017)

The LeT background of Farooqi is a cause for concern. LeT militants are known for their hardcore Salafi-jihadist views and the extensive training they receive. [4] The group is also considered close to the Pakistani military establishment though it is banned in Pakistan by the Ministry of Interior.

Farooqi served as a low-level commander of LeT but he did not manage to rise further. LeT is overwhelmingly comprised of ethnic Punjabis of the Salafist school of thought from the Pakistani Punjab province.

Farooqi’s change in allegiance to IS-K is not terribly surprising. Both IS-K and LeT subscribe to the same Salafist ideology and share similar anti-Western views—on the caliphate, the Shia and Sufi sects, and the status of women and minorities. It is also apparent from recent developments that scores of LeT militants have joined the ranks of the IS-K in south-eastern Afghanistan. At least 70 bodies of militants killed in the clashes in Ghazni City in August 2018 were later identified as Pakistani (VOA, Aug 16, 2018).

Farooqi commands a force of 3,000-5,000 Pashtun and Pakistani fighters who are based in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan (Diplomat, Apr 3, 2018). Farooqi’s area of operations in Afghanistan include: Nangarhar, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Kapisa, Parwan, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan, Ghazni and Zabul. A number of local Afghan Islamist terrorist groups, such as Afghan Khilafat and Tehreek-e-Khilafat Khurasan, have merged with IS-K under Farooqi. The Pakistani component of Tehreek-e-Khilafat was the first to pledge allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014 and currently its fighters are alongside Farooqi. [5]

Tactics and Plan of Action

According to Afghan expert Antonio Giustozzi, Farooqi has taken measures to improve relations with Pakistani authorities and groups. IS-Central has expressed displeasure with these dealings. Despite such reports, Farooqi has extended the IS-K network to the Pakistani cities of Peshawar, Hungu, Swat, Karachi, North and South Waziristan, and Momand. IS-K is also concentrated in the tribal districts of Orakzai, Bajuar, and Kurram. [6]

From recent terrorist strikes in Afghan cities, it seems evident that under Farooqi the IS-K has become a potent force. Farooqi planned and dispatched a number of suicide bombers to Afghan urban centers. Terrorist attacks he orchestrated have resulted in massive casualties and destruction of property. It is also apparent from the trend of terrorist strikes that Farooqi has plans to target certain areas and not the whole of Afghanistan.

Seemingly the emir has reached a truce with the Afghan Taliban at different levels. Previous emirs of IS-K had simultaneously fought the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan security forces. Farooqi, however, seems to be playing differently in a theater of war heavily dominated by the Afghan Taliban. His plan of action is to fight Afghan security forces and hit soft targets in Afghan cities, while adopting a conciliatory approach toward the Afghan Taliban. This is evident from instructions given by the Afghan Taliban Emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada. The Taliban emir directed his fighters to stop fighting against IS-K militants in eastern Afghanistan (Express Tribune, Oct 8, 2017).

It has also been reported that Farooqi signed peace agreements with Afghan Taliban commanders on a province-to-province basis. This diplomacy maintains IS-K’s territorial gains and the ability of the group to collect taxes by extortion and other means. This policy measure has ended years of brutal warfare between the Afghan Taliban and IS-K fighters—at least in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan where IS-K has strongholds. The Taliban forces have continued fighting another faction of IS-K led by the Uzbek militant Mauvia Uzbekistani in the northern provinces of Afghanistan.

With this strategic calculus Farooqi has not only managed to reduce the number of enemies IS-K has faced in the past, but has also curtailed the organization’s losses and consolidated its gains.

According to some estimates, in 2016 the Khurasan Chapter of IS raised $271 million through a combination of private donations, Arab donors, and support sent from Syria and Iraq. Farooqi recruits through sources in Pakistan, which also allows him to access money. The emir also uses training facilities near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Diplomat April 3, 2018).

Conclusion

The lack of adequate information makes it difficult to project the magnitude of Farooqi’s might in eastern Afghan provinces, but it is apparent that he will be able to create security hazards for Afghan urban centers in the near future. He has been able to tactically strengthen his command structure and managed to recruit and swell IS-K ranks in Afghanistan. He has turned out to be a difficult target for both Afghan and U.S. forces. Afghan policymakers need to gather more information about his whereabouts and establish some level of liaison with their Pakistani counterparts in order to root out the IS-K network. IS-K is in Pakistan’s backyard, making the situation equally dangerous for the country.

Notes

[1] Tehreek-e-Khilafat Pakistan, Jundullah, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Shahidullah Faction) in Pakistan and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), factions of Afghan Taliban and Uighur and Chechen Islamists operating in the region.

[2] Discussions with a security expert in Islamabad on Aug 28, 2018.

[3] Discussions with an Islamabad based journalist on August 20, 2018

[4] Daura-e-Aam, a 21-day course for indoctrination of recruits, who then receive Daura-e-Khaas, hardcore terrorist training, in camps. LeT also runs specialized programs, such as counter-intelligence, explosives, assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage.

[5] Antonio Giustozzi, “ Taliban and Islamic State: Enemies or Brothers in Jihad?”, Center for Research and Policy Analysis, December 15, 2017, https://www.crpaweb.org/single-post/2017/12/15/Enemies-or-Jihad-Brothers-Relations-Between-Taliban-and-Islamic-State

[6] Ibid