The Past as Precedent: Is the Taliban’s Military Chief Sirajuddin Haqqani Ready for Peace?
The Past as Precedent: Is the Taliban’s Military Chief Sirajuddin Haqqani Ready for Peace?
On February 29, the United States and the Taliban signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar. The agreement paves the way for a pullout of American troops from Afghanistan. The Taliban has pledged to disallow groups like al-Qaeda from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. The agreement also provides for an exchange of prisoners between the Afghan government and the Taliban and sets the stage for intra-Afghan talks (Tolo News, March 1). However, it has raised several questions. There is apprehension that the Taliban will not deliver on its promises under the deal. Will it cut ties with al-Qaeda, for instance (Tolo News, March 12)? The Taliban’s deputy leader and Haqqani Network chief Sirajuddin Haqqani is known to have strong ties with al-Qaeda. As the Taliban’s chief of military operations, he will now play a crucial role in charting the group’s strategy in the coming months. In a recent article published in The New York Times, Sirajuddin signaled strong commitment to negotiations and peace (Pakistan Today, February 20). However, his record over the past 15 years—during which he is said to have carried out some of the bloodiest attacks in Afghanistan—suggest that his support for the Doha agreement is at best tactical. It is aimed at only getting American forces to leave Afghanistan.
Early Years
The eldest son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, founder of the Haqqani Network who achieved fame as a mujahideen commander in the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, Sirajuddin was born in Afghanistan in the 1970s. He spent his childhood in Miranshah in the Pakistani tribal areas of Waziristan and studied at the Haqqaniya madrassa near Peshawar in Pakistan.
Sirajuddin did not participate in the anti-Soviet insurgency or in the intra-mujahideen battles of the early-1990s. According to a Kabul-based researcher, Sirajuddin showed little interest in the politics and turbulent developments of that period and it was only after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001 that he became active in the Afghan conflict. In the early years of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Afghanistan, Sirajuddin’s importance stemmed from the fact that he was Jalaluddin’s son; he drew his authority from his father’s stature as a legendary mujahideen fighter. [1]
However, within a few years of joining the anti-U.S. insurgency, Sirajuddin managed to carve a name for himself in jihadist circles. The senior Haqqani’s advancing age and failing health prevented him from participating in the fighting and by 2005, Sirajuddin was overseeing the Haqqani Network’s day-to-day activities and operations. Soon, he became its de facto leader and remained in this position until 2018, when he fully took over the mantle of leadership after his father’s death was made public. Thus, much of the Haqqani Network’s anti-U.S. operations have been undertaken under Sirajuddin.
A Formidable Foe of the United States
Under Sirajuddin’s leadership, the Haqqani Network has carried out a string of major attacks. These included the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul in January 2008, the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, the U.S Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul in 2011, the U.S. consulate at Herat in 2013, as well as a truck bomb explosion at a busy intersection in Kabul in May 2017 that killed approximately 150 people. With his attacks on high-profile targets in Afghan cities like Kabul and Jalalabad, Sirajuddin showed that he possessed “significant fighting capabilities” and established his “expertise in commando operations and urban guerrilla warfare,” noted Pakistani terrorism analyst Abdul Basit. [2] Sirajuddin has inflicted significant costs on coalition forces and is therefore considered by some to be their most formidable foe.
Sirajuddin’s strong ties with an array of jihadist groups, especially with al-Qaeda, have been a matter of serious concern to the United States. He provides al-Qaeda fighters safe havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. He has been open to recruiting Arabs as fighters and, as a result, several al-Qaeda fighters are said to be “embedded” in the ranks of the Haqqani Network. In addition to deepening the relationship that his father developed with al-Qaeda, Sirajuddin has established strong ties with other jihadist outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. [3]
This continuing co-operation with banned global terrorist groups and his role in horrific terrorist attacks quickly earned him a place on several terrorist lists. On September 13, 2007, Sirajuddin was included on the United Nations sanctions list for his links with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, and for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities” in support of their activities (United Nations Security Council). In March 2008, the U.S. Department of State declared Sirajuddin a specially designated global terrorist under Executive Order 13224. It doubled the initial bounty of $5 million on his head to $10 million in 2014, signaling its deep frustration with the damage he was doing to U.S. troops and assets in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 19, 2012 (Pajhwok, August 21, 2014).
The Haqqanis’ relationship with the United States was not always hostile. In the 1980s, Jalaluddin was an important CIA asset, who evoked much admiration and respect from Americans. He and his fighters benefited immensely from CIA funding of the anti-Soviet insurgency. So close were the Americans to Jalaluddin that they believed that they would be able to convince him to support their military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda post-9/11. However, that did not happen. Apparently, Sirajuddin, who is strongly against the United States, convinced his father to side with the Taliban against the Americans. [4]
Ties with the Taliban
The roots of the Haqqanis’ ties with the Taliban can be traced back to 1995 when Jalaluddin joined forces with Taliban fighters to take control of Afghanistan. He went on to serve as minister of tribal and frontier affairs in the Taliban regime. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin threw in his lot with the Taliban in the fight against the United States.
The Haqqani Network’s ties with the Taliban have always been hard to decipher. Analysts have often debated whether the network is part of the Taliban or a distinct entity. Washington has always treated the two separately; thus, while the Haqqani Network has been banned, the Taliban is not. It is thus unconvinced that negotiations with the Taliban or a deal would cease hostilities with the Haqqani Network as well.
Whatever differences may have existed in the past, the relationship between the groups have blurred over the years, especially with the Haqqani Network becoming more integrated with the Taliban after the inclusion of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin in the Rahbari Shura (leadership council). Sirajuddin became deputy leader of the Taliban in July 2015, and its military commander as well in May 2016. The fuller integration of the Haqqani Network into the Taliban and appointment of Sirajuddin to top posts is said to have happened under Pakistani pressure. [5]
Pakistan’s ‘Sword Arm’ in Afghanistan
Sirajuddin holds immense value to Pakistan, being their strategic asset in Afghanistan. He is reported to have acted on the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)’s orders to attack Indian targets in Afghanistan, such as the 2008 strike on its embassy in Kabul, to undermine Indian influence there (The Hindu, September 23, 2011). Islamabad’s promotion of Sirajuddin is aimed at ensuring that the insurgent group does not turn against Pakistan.
Sirajuddin is valuable to Pakistan at home as well. He has been useful to the ISI in dealing with extremist groups within Pakistan’s borders, by getting them to desist from attacking the Pakistani military, for instance. [6] He is also said to have brokered peace deals among warring sectarian militias, including in the Kurram Agency in February 2011 (The Hindu, September 23, 2011).
Sirajuddin has also gained certain advantages from his close ties with Pakistan. He owes his rise in the Taliban and appointment as its deputy leader to the ISI. [7] He has received financial and logistical support from Islamabad. Besides, the ISI has allowed the Haqqani Network to operate out of North Waziristan and helped it extend their influence in southeast Afghanistan.
Sirajuddin is an asset to the Taliban, too. His strong ties to the Pakistani government and network of rich donors in several Arab countries have benefited the Taliban. Given his influence on the ISI and the Taliban, Sirajuddin has been able to play a role in breaking deadlocks between them on several occasions. [8] He has also helped resolve conflicts within the Taliban (Khaama Press, April 11, 2016). Besides, as a Pashtun of the Zadran tribe, which inhabits the Loya Paktia region in Afghanistan and parts of Waziristan in Pakistan, Sirajuddin brings to the Taliban this community’s support and strength. He also confers on the Taliban the prestige of the Haqqanis. Most importantly, he is a military asset to the Taliban. As military chief of the Taliban, he more than makes up for Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada’s lack of military expertise or charisma. Under his command, the Taliban has not only carried out several large-scale attacks, but also made huge territorial gains in Afghanistan. [9]
In fact, Sirajuddin’s role in the Taliban’s growing success on the battlefield increased the group’s bargaining power in negotiations with the United States, culminating in an agreement that is widely seen as a victory for the Taliban. This would not have been possible if the Taliban had not negotiated from a position of strength. Sirajuddin’s military leadership played an important role in moving the Taliban into that advantageous position.
On Board the Doha Agreement?
Stressing the Taliban’s commitment to peace, Sirajuddin pointed out in the New York Times article that it had “stuck with the talks” despite unease among its fighters over the U.S.’ “intensified bombing campaign” in Afghanistan and its “flip-flopping and ever-moving goal posts” during the talks last year (Pakistan Today, February 20). It seemed as if he was supporting the talks only to secure the release of his younger brother, Anas Haqqani, who was in jail in Kabul and on death row (see Militant Leadership Monitor, April 2019). However, Sirajuddin did not pull out of the talks even after Anas’ release in November last year. Indeed, Anas was not only part of the Taliban negotiating team in talks with the United States but was also at the signing ceremony at Doha, signaling that the deal has Sirajuddin’s blessings.
In his New York Times article, Sirajuddin drew attention to the Taliban’s “commitment to ending the hostilities and bringing peace” to Afghanistan and pointed out that the group had kept the door to talks open even after U.S. President Donald Trump called off the talks last year (New York Times, February 20). However, neither Sirajuddin’s peaceful rhetoric in the NYT article nor his support for the Doha deal should be interpreted to suggest he is now genuinely committed to an inclusive and peaceful Afghanistan. His support for the agreement is purely tactical, aimed at getting the Americans to leave. His support comes from the fact that the deal gives him what he wants: it provides for the exit of American troops within a timeframe. Getting them to leave has been an important Taliban demand and a priority for Sirajuddin. The agreement paves the way for this exit. It is a gain that Sirajuddin will not give up, at least for now.
The U.S. may see Sirajuddin as a formidable foe. But for now, he and Trump hold similar objectives—getting American troops out of Afghanistan—something which will assist in the American president’s reelection campaign.
Sirajuddin and Trump will “give each other space” until the U.S. presidential election is over. Neither will precipitate an unraveling of the agreement at this point, since both are keen to draw whatever benefit they can from it. The Taliban has gained political and diplomatic capital from the deal and would like to build on it. It could therefore hold its fire against the American forces until the U.S. strategy, whether under Trump or a new president, becomes clearer. [10]
As for cutting ties with al-Qaeda, that is unlikely to happen. Sirajuddin is part of the jihadist group’s ‘innermost circle’ and has participated in its shura meetings (Dawn, August 10, 2015). They have worked together for far too long to be able to cut ties overnight. They need each other and have little incentive to end their relationship.
Sirajuddin and the Taliban will continue on their quest for power in Kabul and use of violence will remain the main path they take to secure that power. Violence as a political tool is deeply ingrained in the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. It unites their fighters. Violence helped them force the Americans to seek an exit from Afghanistan. It put them in a commanding position at the talks with the United States and secured them a favorable deal. They will persist with violence either to wrest control of Kabul or force the Afghan government at the negotiating table to accept a settlement on their terms.
Notes
[1] Author’s Interview, Afghan researcher at a think-tank in Kabul, March 23. [2] Author’s Interview, Abdul Basit, associate research fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, March 18. [3] Afghan researcher, n. 1. [4] Ibid. [5] Basit, n. 2. [6] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid.
