Regional Interventions Fail to Contain M23 in Eastern Congo
Regional Interventions Fail to Contain M23 in Eastern Congo
Executive Summary:
- In December 2025, the March 23 Movement (M23) seized the city of Uvira in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) after a year of steady advances across the country, underscoring the ineffectiveness of regional military interventions against the group.
- Formed in late 2022 to counter M23’s 2021 resurgence, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) has proved ineffective because contributing nations have avoided direct combat, pursued divergent security interests, and lacked a unified operational framework.
- Public confidence in regional forces has been severely eroded as M23 has continued to exercise de facto authority and collect local taxes in eastern DRC. Following civilian deaths, widespread protests demanded the withdrawal of both the EACRF and UN peacekeepers.
On February 24, fighting once again erupted in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as senior March 23 Movement’s (M23) commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Willy Ngoma, was killed in a drone strike near Rubaya in North Kivu province (Africa News; The Africa Report, February 24). M23’s seizure of Goma in the North Nivu province in late January 2025 underscored the failure of successive regional military interventions to halt the group’s resurgence. After re-emerging in late 2021 and steadily expanding its territorial control across North Kivu, M23 has continued to gain ground despite deployments by both the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) (African Insider, January 26, 2023). Within weeks of capturing Goma, the M23 pushed further south into South Kivu province, seizing Bukavu near the borders with Rwanda and Burundi (The Africa Report, February 14, 2025). The group subsequently launched an offensive against Uvira, a strategic town along the DRC–Burundi border, capturing it from Congolese and Burundian forces and allied militias (Agence France-Presse, December 10, 2025). These advances—occurring even after a U.S.-brokered peace agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali—highlight the structural, operational, and political limitations of regional intervention mechanisms in containing a well-organized insurgency.
The East African Community (EAC) established the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in response to M23’s renewed territorial expansion, marking the regional bloc’s first multinational military deployment. Comprising troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan, the force emerged from the second phase of the “Nairobi Process” and was initiated by EAC heads of state in March 2022 to address the escalating conflict in eastern DRC (EAC, June 20, 2022). Following the DRC’s accession to the EAC, the EACRF deployed in November 2022 with a mandate to “contain, defeat, and eradicate” armed groups operating in eastern Congo. In coordination with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC), the mission was tasked with conducting joint military operations while also supporting humanitarian stabilization efforts (ACCORD, March 4, 2025). As subsequent developments would demonstrate, however, the force’s mandate, political constraints, and operational posture limited its effectiveness against a resurgent and increasingly capable M23.
Almost from its inception, the EACRF was undermined by mandate ambiguity, internal political frictions, and resource constraints that limited its effectiveness against M23. Disagreements quickly emerged among contributing countries over how to confront M23, with the force’s principal contributors—Kenya and Uganda—adopting a largely non-confrontational posture toward the group. This approach drew public criticism from DRC President Félix Tshisekedi, who accused the regional force of ineffectiveness and reluctance to engage in direct combat with M23, eroding political confidence in the mission and laying the groundwork for its expulsion in 2023 (The East African, May 10, 2023). While the EAC envisioned EACRF as a mechanism to oversee M23’s withdrawal and enforce the December 2022 ceasefire, these objectives quickly proved misaligned with realities on the ground. Despite the initial deployment producing limited gains—most notably ceasefire commitments from 53 of more than 100 armed groups operating in eastern DRC—the mission’s failure to translate diplomatic progress into deterrence against M23 exposed significant enforcement weaknesses (Monitor, December 7, 2022).
EACRF suffered from fragmented operational priorities that reflected the divergent security interests of its contributing countries rather than a unified assessment of the M23 threat. Ugandan forces focused on targeting positions held by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—an Islamic State (IS)-linked group—rather than confronting M23 directly. Kenyan troops focused on areas of North Kivu where they maintained a presence under the UN peacekeeping framework, constraining the mission’s ability to adapt to M23’s territorial expansion and evolving front lines. Burundian forces—the first to deploy under the EACRF banner—operated primarily in South Kivu, battling the RED-Tabara militia along the DRC–Burundi border, while a small South Sudanese contingent targeted remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Haut-Uélé (International Crisis Group, August 25, 2022). This compartmentalized deployment structure diluted early warning signals about M23’s territorial consolidation and prevented the force from mounting a coordinated response to the rebel group’s rapid advances.
Despite limited early gains, the EACRF quickly found itself on the defensive as M23 expanded its territorial control across North and South Kivu, including areas where regional forces were already deployed. This reinforced Tshisekedi’s perception that elements of the EACRF were tacitly enabling M23’s advances (France24, December 3, 2023). These claims were rooted less in evidence of direct collusion than in a fundamental misalignment over the force’s purpose. While Kinshasa viewed EACRF as an offensive instrument to roll back M23’s gains, contributing countries framed the mission primarily around stabilization, ceasefire monitoring, and regional diplomacy—treating direct confrontation as a last resort (The Great Lakes Eye, September 5, 2023). This divergence came to a head in February 2023, when the Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly asserted that the EACRF’s mandate was “unequivocally offensive,” directly contradicting the force’s own description of its mandate, highlighting the absence of a unified operational framework from the start (RDC Affaires Etrangères, February 5, 2023).
EACRF efforts to halt M23’s advance and disrupt its territorial control proved largely ineffective, contributing to growing public dissatisfaction in eastern Congo. As M23 continued to exercise de facto authority in parts of North and South Kivu—including the collection of taxes from local populations—confidence in the regional force steadily eroded (The North Africa Post, April 28, 2023). Public anger intensified after at least 56 civilians were killed in Goma on August 30, 2023, prompting Congolese civil society organizations to organize a “dead city” protest demanding the withdrawal of both the EACRF and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO) (Peoples Dispatch, September 6, 2023).
Persistent funding shortfalls, affecting both troop support and overall mission capacity, critically undermined the EACRF’s operational effectiveness. This challenge was publicly acknowledged by Kenyan President William Ruto, who assumed leadership of the EACRF from his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta—the principal architect of the force’s creation (African Arguments, February 2, 2025). President Ruto argued that the mission’s viability depended largely on external financial support, particularly from Western partners (The EastAfrican, February 18, 2023). During the initial deployment phase, contributing countries were responsible for financing their own troops, expecting supplemental funding from Western partners, including the United States and the European Union, to follow. When this support did not materialize, funding gaps quickly emerged, placing disproportionate pressure on smaller and less-resourced contributors and undermining the force’s operational sustainability (The Elephant, June 16, 2023).
As the EACRF phased out its deployment in eastern DRC, Kinshasa had already begun reorienting its security strategy toward the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Southern Africa regional bloc deployed the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) on December 15, 2023, with the objective of supporting Kinshasa’s efforts to defeat M23 and restore state authority in eastern DRC. The mission comprised troops from several SADC member states—including South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania—operating alongside the DRC military forces (SADC, January 4, 2024). Established under the framework of collective self-defense outlined in the SADC Mutual Defense Pact, SAMIDRC marked a deliberate shift in regional intervention strategy (Efficacy News, January 6, 2024). Unlike the EACRF, the mission was granted an explicitly offensive and counterinsurgency mandate—positioning it as a more forceful response to M23’s continued battlefield gains, and addressing perceived shortcomings of earlier regional deployments (ISS, March 20, 2025).
SAMIDRC’s deployment followed earlier SADC-led intervention efforts in eastern DRC, most notably the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which operated alongside the MONUSCO for over a decade. The decision to launch SAMIDRC also reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the EACRF’s inability to stem M23’s advances—an assessment strongly shared by the Congolese president, who formally invited the Southern African bloc to intervene in the DRC (ISS, May 19, 2023). SADC’s decision to deploy SAMIDRC with an explicitly offensive mandate against M23 constituted a significant political win for Tshisekedi, particularly amid increasing electoral pressure ahead of the December 2023 presidential elections. While SADC’s broader strategic motivations remained opaque, South African officials framed the deployment as fulfillment of obligations under the SADC Mutual Defense Pact, citing the need to respond to external aggression against a member state (SAIIA, May 26, 2024).
SAMIDRC faced significant operational and tactical constraints in its efforts to contain M23, despite deploying with a clearly articulated offensive mandate. Access to eastern DRC continues to be severely restricted by the presence of more than 100 armed groups, complicating troop movements and heightening the risk of clashes with militias operating under shifting alliances (UN News, February 6, 2025). This fragmented security environment limited SAMIDRC’s ability to concentrate its forces against M23 and weakened operational focus. At the same time, M23 has undergone a significant transformation since its 2013 defeat, evolving from a loosely organized insurgency into a disciplined, increasingly sophisticated force capable of coordinated, sustained operations (SAIIA, May 4, 2023).
SAMIDRC’s deployment was further hampered by persistent logistical shortfalls that limited its capacity to deploy, sustain, and protect its forces in eastern DRC (African Union, March 9, 2024). These constraints delayed force deployment and reduced the mission’s ability to concentrate sufficient combat power to carry out its mandate. Inadequate logistics and equipment further weakened force protection, contributing to multiple fatalities among SAMIDRC personnel during clashes with M23—losses partly linked to gaps in mobility and defensive capacity (SADC, April 8, 2024). Additionally, the mission fell short of its original troop deployment targets, which called for roughly 5,000 troops backed by air, maritime, and artillery support (Defence Web, June 26, 2024). Troop contributions were lower than pledged—particularly from South Africa, the largest contributor—and critical support, including air assets, failed to arrive, widening the gap between SAMIDRC’s offensive mandate and its operational capabilities (Military Africa, July 9, 2025).
Joint FARDC–SAMIDRC offensives—supported by air and artillery assets—repeatedly failed to dislodge M23 from key positions in Rutshuru, Masisi, and parts of Nyiragongo. During these engagements, M23 demonstrated significant tactical adaptability, leveraging difficult terrain, localized intelligence networks, and coordinated maneuver tactics to blunt SAMIDRC advances. These advantages were compounded by weak coordination between SADC troops and the FARDC, which contributed to declining morale, operational friction, and the erosion of mission cohesion—factors that ultimately culminated in the mission’s suspension (Kivu Avenir, April 29, 2025).
The mission faced severe financial constraints: annual costs were estimated at $500 million, with South Africa contributing roughly $100 million and Kinshasa pledging $200 million, leaving a substantial funding gap that undermined deployment and operational readiness. South Africa’s involvement also carried reputational risks, as SAMIDRC became entangled in a de facto coalition with the Congolese government’s allied Wazalendo militias; armed groups implicated in human rights abuses and illicit economic activity while operating outside formal command structures (SAIIA, May 26, 2024). The fall of Goma to the M23 in January 2025 marked the decisive turning point that prompted SADC to withdraw its SAMIDRC forces from eastern DRC. The loss of this strategic city not only highlighted the mission’s inability to halt the rebel advance despite an offensive mandate but also reinforced the conclusion among SADC and EAC leadership that diplomacy, rather than continued military engagement, offered a more feasible path to peace and stabilizing the region (The Uganda Post, May 1, 2025)
Taken together, the EACRF and SAMIDRC interventions underscore persistent regional shortcomings in eastern DRC, where forces are rotated without resolving deeper strategic, political, and operational weaknesses. While the EACRF was undermined by an ambiguous mandate and limited coercive authority, SAMIDRC sought to address these gaps by adopting a clearly defined offensive posture. Both missions were undermined by insufficient resources, poor coordination with the FARDC, fragmented command structures, and overly ambitious assumptions about the capabilities of regional forces. Consequently, M23 consolidated its territorial control. The failures of both missions underscore that without sustained funding, coordinated command structures, and a viable political process, regional military deployments are unlikely to achieve lasting security improvements in eastern DRC.
