Russia Demands Georgia Restore Rail Traffic Through Abkhazia
Russia Demands Georgia Restore Rail Traffic Through Abkhazia
Executive Summary:
- Moscow once again demanded that Tbilisi consider resuming rail traffic from Russia through Abkhazia to Georgia, Armenia, and Iran. Russia has raised this issue for more than 30 years, since the end of the conflict in Abkhazia in 1993.
- The ruling Georgian Dream party refuses to discuss this project, fearing political repercussions. Reopening traffic through Abkhazia would force Tbilisi to recognize the border between Georgia and Abkhazia as a “state” border for customs clearance purposes.
- Russia has returned to discussing a railway through Abkhazia, likely in response to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—a route connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia—that threatens to weaken Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus.
On February 12, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk told reporters that the Russian government is considering restoring rail links with Georgia via the territory of occupied Abkhazia (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 12). He underlined that restoring the route is important for addressing the “major task” of “strengthening transport and logistics in the Caucasus,” which is “critically important for the peace, stability, and economic prosperity of the peoples of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Türkiye, and Russia.” He added, “We expect constructive cooperation from all regional states in addressing this important shared task” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 12)
The announcement caused public resonance in Georgia. The Georgian government remained silent for 24 hours. On February 13, Georgian Railways stated that no discussions are underway regarding the resumption of rail traffic between the two countries. In the statement, Georgian Railways said, “It is entirely unclear to us why this matter has been placed on the agenda” (Netgazeti.ge; Interpressnews, February 13)
Davit Avalishvili, from the independent resource Nation.ge, said in his February 12 interview with this author that the Abkhaz section of the Georgian railway is 160 kilometers (100 miles) long. During the Soviet era, it was used for passenger, not freight, transport. Train service was interrupted in August 1992, when armed conflict broke out in Abkhazia. In September 1993, unknown terrorists blew up a railway bridge on the Inguri River, which divides Georgia and Abkhazia. Avalishvili stated, “This bridge is still in ruins. The railway line in Abkhazia, south of the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, is completely destroyed, and restoring this transport communications requires multi-billion-dollar investments” (Author’s Interview, February 27).
Moscow has been demanding that Georgia restore rail traffic through Abkhazia since the 1990s. Georgian politician and diplomat Irakli Menagarishvili, who headed the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1995 to 2004, noted in his February 28 interview with this author that former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s administration often demanded that Georgia open the Abkhazian section of the railway to Armenia and Iran. Menagarishvili stated, “We have never refused to discuss this project, but President [Eduard] Shevardnadze and I have constantly linked this topic to the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity and the end of the Abkhazian conflict” (Author’s Interview, February 28). Russia, however, not only failed to help Georgia resolve the Abkhazia problem but also occupied this territory and recognized its “independence” on August 26, 2008 (Civil Georgia, August 28, 2008).
Most Georgian experts are confident that Overchuk’s February 12 statement reflects a calculated geopolitical move by the Kremlin. Georgian politician and former member of parliament, Teona Akubardia, stated in her February 27 interview with this author that, first, “Moscow aims to secure an alternative South Caucasus transit route and reassert control over regional connectivity projects amid expanding EU-backed corridors.” Akubardia went on, saying, “Moscow seeks to restore and strengthen its leverage over Armenia as Yerevan continues to distance itself from Russia’s security framework.” She emphasized, “Most importantly, this is a tool of geopolitical pressure on official Tbilisi—signaling Moscow’s readiness to entrench the occupation further and challenge Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” (Author’s interview, February 27).
Roman Gotsiridze, an economist and the former president of the National (Central) State Bank of Georgia, agrees that Russia has only political, not economic, goals in lobbying for this project. He pointed out in an interview with this author, “Russia owns the Armenian Railway, although that railway only carries a very small amount of cargo within Armenia.” He further said, “By launching the Abkhazian Railway, Russia is breaking the ‘regional deadlock’ and opening the way to Iran, which is Moscow’s strategic ally today. In addition, it is trying to integrate Georgia into the Russian transport space and is harming Georgian ports with unfair competition” (Author’s Interview, February 27).
Paata Zakareishvili, the Georgian state minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality from 2012 to 2016, also drew attention to Moscow’s geopolitical intentions. In an interview with this author, he stated, “The Russian government is losing its positions and influence in the South Caucasus with the launch of the ‘Trump Road’ [the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)]”. [1] He added, “Armenia and Azerbaijan are becoming regional partners of the United States. In addition, Türkiye has noticeably strengthened in our region. Therefore, Moscow is trying to open transport corridors.” He is sure that this reflects Moscow’s desire more than reality, because after the TRIPP is completed, transporting goods via the Abkhazian railway will lose all economic sense. Armenian goods will likely go to Russia via the Azerbaijani railway (Author’s Interview, February 27).
Just as in the 1990s, Tbilisi will face numerous political problems even if they attempt to comply with Moscow’s demands. “The main question is: where will customs be located, and which country’s customs will clear the cargo?” independent expert Tengiz Ablotia asked rhetorically in an interview with this author. He emphasized that if Georgian customs inspects cargo in Russian railcars not at the Russian–Georgian border near the Psou River (the Russian–Georgian internationally recognized border) but on the Inguri River, which separates Georgia and Abkhazia, it would constitute “treason” and would lead to grave consequences for the ruling Georgian Dream party (Author’s Interview, February 27).
In Abkhazia, the railway project is considered only on the condition that Abkhazia participates in it as an equal, independent entity. Abkhaz journalist and expert Inal Khashig, commenting on Moscow’s long-standing attempts to resume rail traffic to the South Caucasus through Abkhazia, stated that the resumption of road and/or rail transit from Russia to Georgia through Abkhazia was actively discussed in 2018. A compromise was reached, which entailed engaging the Swiss company SGS to conduct customs controls on cargo turnover on both the Russian and Georgian sides. The process progressed to the point that Moscow and Tbilisi signed corresponding contracts with SGS. Khashig concluded, “Abkhazia was not involved in these agreements in any way, and this was one of the main reasons why the project was ultimately never implemented” (Georgian-Abkhaz Context, May 28, 2025).
The near future will show whether Moscow intends to use its leverage over Tbilisi to at least partially restore its position in the South Caucasus, and whether modern Georgia will be able to resist this pressure amid growing economic and political dependence on Russia.
Note:
[1] The TRIPP is a U.S.-brokered infrastructure project aimed at establishing a 43-kilometer (27-mile) rail and road corridor through Armenia’s Syunik province. It connects mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and Türkiye, bypassing Iran and Russia, with the United States holding 99-year development rights.
