Sa’ad bin Atef al-Awlaki: AQAP’s Most Wanted Leader
Sa’ad bin Atef al-Awlaki: AQAP’s Most Wanted Leader
Executive Summary:- Sa'ad bin Atef al-Awlaki was recently named head of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). An effective leader, al-Awlaki is expected to further entrench al-Qaeda in Yemen, while also positioning himself and AQAP as especially important contenders for leading affiliates within al-Qaeda.
- Little is known about al-Awlaki, though he is likely a distant relative of the late ideologue of AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011. Al-Awlaki has masterminded many operations and appears to be positioning AQAP’s media apparatus to overtake al-Qaeda core’s own outlets in terms of reach and influence.
On July 29, the U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program increased its offer for information leading to the identification or location of the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Sa'ad bin Atef al-Awlaki. The new reward for information on him has reached $10 million, surpassing the previous reward of $6 million (U.S. Department of State Rewards for Justice, July 29). Al-Awlaki is an effective leader of AQAP on account of his hybrid strategy of localized and global jihad, which attempts to balance creating links and support in Yemen to further entrench al-Qaeda there, while strengthening his ties with AQ’s central leadership and posing a continued risk to targets and adversaries outside Yemen. Al-Awlaki’s Enigmatic Emergence On March 10, 2024, AQAP released a video from its official al-Malahem Media Agency featuring the voice of Khubayb al-Sudani (an alias of Ibrahim al-Qosi), a well-known Sudan-born member of AQAP’s Shura Council. [1] Al-Sudani announced the death of the group’s leader, Khaled al-Batarfi, and the selection of Sa’ad bin Atif al-Awlaki (alias Abu Al-Layth) as AQAP’s new leader (Al-Malahem Media, March 10, 2024). Very little is known about al-Awlaki, aside from being a veteran al-Qaeda member who trained in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen. He is a Yemeni citizen born in the town of al-Shu’bah in Wadi Yasbam in Shabwa governorate (Al-Arabiya, March 11, 2024). As his surname indicates, he is descended from the al-Awlaki tribe, likely making him a distant relative of the late ideologue of AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2011. The current AQAP leader al-Awlaki’s exact date of birth is unknown, but the U.S. State Department estimates three possible dates: 1978, 1981, or 1983. He has long been a top leader in AQAP, influencing Sunni tribes in the southern Shabwa province to adopt AQAP ideology. Around 2014, he was promoted to being a member of AQAP’s Shura Council, its premier governing body, and was appointed one of the organization’s “military operations” decision-makers (Mubasher al-Arab, July 5). As a result, he was targeted by a U.S. drone strike in his hometown of al-Shu’bah in March 2017. Al-Awlaki survived, although his brother was killed (Al-Ain, July 29). Al-Awlaki’s Strategy and Media Presence Unlike his predecessor Batarfi, al-Awlaki is an experienced and dynamic leader, having masterminded many AQAP operations (Akhbar al-Aan, July 30). He is considered the architect of al-Qaeda's strategy, which chooses not to target the Houthis—instead exploiting them for arms smuggling between the coasts of Shabwa and Abyan in Yemen’s south on the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, he is known within AQAP for his extreme obedience to the organization’s leadership and hierarchy. Al-Awlaki last appeared in an al-Malahem Media video on June 5. In the 34-minute video, he threatened attacks against the United States, Israel, and other Western countries, and called on all Muslims to join al-Qaeda and engage in jihad. The end of the video included excerpts from footage of various branches of al-Qaeda along with its affiliates and allies, including Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) in the Sahel, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other organizations such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban (Al-Malahem Media, June 5). This revealed how AQAP is maintaining a regional and global vision under al-Awlaki’s leadership, and possibly attempting to position itself as the glue between various affiliates. Similarly, the ambitious messaging and recent videos of AQAP-affiliated al-Malahem Media could be evidence of AQAP attempting to position itself as al-Qaeda’s new seat of propaganda—even replacing as-Sahab, the media outlet of al-Qaeda’s central organization (located in Afghanistan and Pakistan) in prominence. Conclusion Despite counterterrorism pressure from the United States and paramilitary forces of the Emirati-trained Southern Transitional Council (STC), AQAP has been resilient and carried out 26 attacks in the first six months of 2025. [2] Counterterrorism operations, infighting, leadership issues, and the presence of spies have nonetheless reduced AQAP's potential, forcing it to scale back its areas of operation, continuing with guerrilla tactics. Despite AQAP’s difficulties, Yemen has continued to be plagued by a political environment characterized by political instability, weak state control, endemic corruption, marginalized regions, and growing poverty that favors al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. AQAP under al-Awlaki continues to exploit these fertile conditions and has not abandoned its global jihadist propaganda objectives. The group has shown great interest in events outside Yemen, such as the Gaza War, Syria, and throughout Africa, and has continued to issue threats against its enemies, particularly the United States and Israel. AQAP claims nearly four thousand individual members, both active fighters and noncombatant supporters, and operates mainly in the provinces of Hadhramaut, Shabwa, Ma'rib, Al-Bayda, and Abyan, with sleeper cells in Al-Mahra, Wadi Hadhramaut, Aden, and Lahj. [3] Since his appointment as leader in March 2024, al-Awlaki has improved AQAP’s capabilities, restructuring the group, improving the living conditions of his fighters, and limiting counter-terrorist forces’ and rival groups’ infiltration attempts. Many AQAP attacks in 2024 and the first six months of 2025 involved short-range armed drones, small arms, improvised explosive devices, and 12.7 mm anti-materiel sniper rifles. On al-Awlaki’s account, the Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate has also reinforced its media and its ties with AQ’s central leadership, which could help AQAP regain control of some of the provinces of Abyan and Shabwa in the medium to long term. Above all, the key question is whether AQAP’s newest al-Awlaki will follow in his more famous namesake’s footsteps of successfully inspiring and organizing attacks against the United States and its interests. Notes: [1] Al-Qosi is also on the U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice list with a reward of $4 million. https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/ibrahim-ahmed-mahmoud-al-qosi/ [2] For more details, see “Six months of terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Analysis and statistics of AQAP attacks from 1 January to 30 June.” 2025. https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/six-months-of-terrorist-attacks-by [3] According to the recent monitoring report by the United Nations Security Council, published on July 24, 2025.
