Shakir Wahib: The Face of the Islamic State in Anbar Province
Shakir Wahib: The Face of the Islamic State in Anbar Province
In the hot summer of 2013, jihadists filmed themselves stopping trucks on the main road linking Iraq with Syria and Jordan. [1] Their leader, wearing a shalwar kameez and wrapped in a military vest, appeared to be interrogating the drivers. The jihadist tested the truck drivers to see if they were Sunni Muslims by asking them how many sajdah (prostration, which is a requirement in Muslims prayers) there are at dawn, noon and during evening prayers. [2] The drivers gave wrong answers, as they were apparently not Sunnis but Alawites. The leader then brutally executed the drivers at a very close distance. This was the first time the world paid attention to Abu Wahib (pronounced wahiyib), whose real name is Shakir Wahib al-Fahdawi. Wahib is one of the Islamic State’s most notorious operatives in Iraq. Wahib, who is based in Anbar, seems to be major player, whether in his military role or as a model for youngsters in those areas. His importance has led the Iraqi government to put a $50,000 bounty on his head and describe him as “dangerous and cunning” (Daily Mail, June 14, 2014; al-Arab, September 15, 2013).
Fashion Boy?
Shakir Wahib has since become the face of the Islamic State in Iraq’s Anbar province. Sympathizers have named him “the lion of the desert,” but more interestingly, he is also known as the “romantic boy of the Islamic State” as well as the “fashion boy.” The latter names are mainly because of his appearance in several videos. He is unmasked—unlike many other Islamic State members—and in different outfits. Wahib is emulating al-Zarqawi’s style by appearing in black clothes, demonstrating his skills in shooting, defying the Iraq government, who had announced his death quite a few times, and finally threatening the Shi’as of Iraq (YouTube, November 11, 2013).
After the Islamic State seized control of Mosul in June 2014, Wahib appeared with other Islamic State fighters in the house of Atheel al-Nujaifi, who was the governor of Ninewah province before the organization seized it. Wahib was wearing a Che Guevara-style hat. The video made it obvious that he enjoys a high status among the fighters, as he seen seated in the middle, chilling and singing (YouTube, July 25, 2014).
Wahib’s appearance seems, according to various reports, to be a deliberate media policy set by the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in order to create a “mysterious and handsome hero” (al-Hayat, July 2, 2014). Such a policy could help attract frustrated youngsters in the Sunni areas in Iraq, who lost hope due to the marginalization of Sunnis by the Shi’a-dominated central government in Baghdad under Iraq’s former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki’s forces were cracking down on Sunni politicians and even ordinary people. [3]
Wahib’s role became obvious in photos and Islamic State videos that showed him in different outfits, positions and places (al-Arabiya, August 17, 2014). However, Wahib obviously also has an operational role, especially in the Islamic State’s Iraqi branch. Wahib’s act in the video mentioned above was justified by Islamic State as it aimed to cut off the supplies for the Syrian regime. Similarly, reports claimed that Wahib was responsible for targeting police stations in Anbar (YouTube, January 28, 2014). These police stations were the jihadists’ top targets in order to pave the way for an Islamic state.
In a booklet that the Islamic State, then the Islamic State in Iraq, published in 2010, the jihadists listed their agenda after the American troops withdrew from Iraq: they wanted to “raise the fear rate among those [Sunni] people who join intend to join [Iraqi Army or Police]… and to achieve that the attacks should be on a large scale” (Terrorism Monitor, August 8, 2014; Terrorism Monitor, April 23, 2010). [4] Targeting police stations in Sunni areas was a way to help split Sunnis off from the Iraqi central government, which helped the Islamic State’s assault on Mosul in June 2014.
The Prison Alumni
Little is known about Wahib’s early life. According to reports, he was born in 1986 and quit his computer science studies at al-Anbar University in 2006, when he was arrested by American troops “due to his al-Qaeda activities.” He was imprisoned at Camp Bucca, which was a U.S.-run prison in southern Iraq until it was closed in 2009. He was then transferred to Tikrit prison, from which he and hundreds of jihadists fled in 2012 in a jailbreak aided by jihadists from outside (Al-Monitor, January 15, 2014).
This jailbreak was just one of a series by the Islamic State of Iraq, which in 2012 launched a campaign to release its members in prison. The organization called the campaign “Hadim al-Aswar” (Breaking the Walls). The Islamic State wanted to achieve two goals with these jailbreaks: first, to increase the number of its members and operatives and, second, to shake the legitimacy of the Iraqi prison system. Many Sunnis were complaining about what they called “unjustified arrests” under Article 4 of Iraq’s 2005 Anti-Terrorism Law, which many Sunnis thought was used solely against them by the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad. [5, 6]
On an organizational level, the jihadists in Iraq benefited from their imprisonment between the years 2006 to 2010 by creating strong networks and recruiting more criminals as well as mid-rank Baathist army officers. These prisons generated many leaders who today play a major role in running the Islamic State. The most obvious example is the leader of the Islamic State, al-Baghdadi, who was also in Camp Bucca. [7] There is no evidence, however, that al-Baghdadi and Wahib knew each other in prison. Wahib’s imprisonment played a major role in putting him within the ranks of the Islamic State’s leadership.
Conclusion
Wahib, with his dual roles within the Islamic State as an operative and a symbol, reflects how the political crisis in Iraq has been exploited by the Islamic State in order to expand geographically and establish a caliphate. Wahib, who belongs to the powerful al-Bu Fahad Sunni tribe in Anbar province, has appeared in places where he is benefiting from his tribal affiliation in order to exploit the grievances of Sunni communities in both Iraq and Syria.
It seems to be a media strategy that shows Wahib and other jihadist leaders freely moving from one battlefield to another and enjoying the time when they are not fighting as well as, more importantly, presenting a “hero” for younger generations to aspire to. Militarily, Wahib’s profile and his role in carrying out attacks, overseeing training camps (he has appeared in photos at one of the Islamic State’s well-known training camps in Anbar) and selecting targets help the Islamic State carry out its grand military strategy (Nasher, February 19; Flickr, August 30, 2013). It seems that the Islamic State is trying to use its own operatives—like Wahib—in every possible way to translate its slogan Baqiya wa Tatamaddad (remaining and expanding) into a reality.
Murad Batal al-Shishani is an Islamic groups and terrorism issues analyst based in London.
Notes
1. The video, which is very graphic, can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AsjvdBhPqQ.
2. Sunni Muslims pray five times a day. Each prayer has a number of sujud; al-fajr: (dawn) (2), al-zuhr: (midday) (4), al-‘asr: (afternoon) (4), al-maghrib: (sunset) (3), and al-‘isha: (night) (4).
3. An interview by the author with a displaced Moslawi in al-Khazar refugee camp, in Iraqi Kurdistan, June 30, 2014.
4. Khoutah Istratigyia li Ta’aziz al-Moqif al-Siyasi al-Dawlat al-Islamyiah fi al-Iraq (A Strategic Plan to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq), January 2010. The booklet can be accessed at: https://www.hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=158433.
5. The Article 4 entitled Penalties, reads as below:
- “Anyone who committed, as a main perpetrator or a participant, any of the terrorist acts stated in the second & third articles of this law, shall be sentenced to death. A person who incites, plans, finances, or assists terrorists to commit the crimes stated in this law shall face the same penalty as the main perpetrator.
- Anyone, who intentionally covers up any terrorist act or harbors a terrorist with the purpose of concealment, shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.”
For full details of the law in English see, https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Iraq/IQ_Anti-Terrorism_Law.pdf.
6. An Interview by the author with an anonymous Sunni leader, Erbil July 1, 2014.
7. On the role of the prison, see Chapter Six of Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, Isis: Inside the Army of Terror, (Regan Arts, 2015).
