Shining Path Counter-Terrorism Operations Revive Peruvian Election-Year Security Discourses

Shining Path Counter-Terrorism Operations Revive Peruvian Election-Year Security Discourses

Executive Summary:

• Remnants of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) remain active in Peru’s Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) zone, but the group now operates mainly as a narcoterrorist cartel rather than a nationwide ideological insurgency.
• The group has proven difficult to fully eradicate despite leadership losses and military setbacks, including the killing of a VRAEM Central Committee member in late March.
• March counterterrorism operations were a feature of national political discourse during the 2026 presidential campaign, and this focus on security ultimately benefited conservative candidate Keiko Fujimori, who secured a narrow electoral victory.

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) remnants remain active in Peru’s Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) zone, which has required the Peruvian army to maintain a security architecture in the region. On May 21, for example, the government extended the state of emergency for 60 days in 12 districts and eight population centers. The government decree stated that the extension was intended to “consolidate” the government’s military intervention in the VRAEM, even as Shining Path’s faction in the zone has largely been reduced to more of a cartel than an ideological network (RPP, May 21).

Shining Path in VRAEM suffered a setback in late March, when security forces killed two of the group’s members. The Joint Command of the Armed Forces claimed the fighters were known by the aliases of “David” and “Ramírez.” The former was described as a member of Shining Path’s VRAEM Central Committee. In addition, the security forces seized a 7.62 mm MAG machine gun and a .22 caliber rifle from them (Perú21, March 30).

The March operation demonstrated that Shining Path no longer resembles the nationwide Maoist insurgency that destabilized Peru throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Now the remnants are exclusively concentrated in the VRAEM zone. Moreover, “David” and “Ramirez” were targeted not because of their ideological activities per se, but because, according to the army, they were traffickers, or ’narcoterrorists’ (Caretas, March 30).

The March operation nevertheless demonstrated that Shining Path—even if now mostly in cartel form—has been hard to fully eradicate. In November 2023, for example, Peruvian authorities announced what they described as a “major blow” against the Shining Path’s Central Committee in VRAEM after the capture of four militants who were suspected to be the top candidates to succeed Víctor Quispe Palomino (alias “José”) and Florabel Vargas (alias “Vilma”) as leaders (Infobae, November 14, 2023). Subsequent reporting emphasized that the faction’s remaining manpower and leadership depth had been reduced, but that Shining Path evidently persisted under “David,” “Ramírez,” and other figures (El País, October 17, 2024).

The March operation impacted Peru’s election-year debate over terrorism and public security. The timing and announcement of the killings of “David” and “Ramírez” led to suspicions from elements of the outgoing government that the security establishment sought to reinforce the need for continued counterterrorism operations in a manner that would benefit right-wing presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori (La República, March 31). Although Shining Path’s remaining presence in the VRAEM is militarily limited and increasingly intertwined with narcotics trafficking, the operation underscored how even small counterterrorism actions continue to shape national political discourse. Security and crime ultimately became defining issues during the 2026 presidential campaign, and Fujimori’s narrow electoral victory on June 7, followed by her official proclamation as president-elect in early July, reinforced the political salience of these themes.