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SMAN 72 School Bombing in Indonesia

Executive Summary:

  • On November 7, 2025, a student bombed a North Jakarta high school with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), injuring 96 individuals in an attack stylistically mimicking the 2019 Christchurch shooting.
  • Indonesian authorities classified the act as “memetic violence” rather than terrorism, noting the suspect was driven by the nihilistic True Crime Community (TCC) subculture instead of specific ideological goals.
  • This incident highlights the convergence of non-ideological violent subcultures and extremist ecosystems, which accelerates radicalization and increases the global risk of copycat attacks in diverse cultural contexts.

On November 7, 2025, a 17-year-old Indonesian student bombed his high school, SMAN 72, in North Jakarta. Authorities have not categorized the case as  “terrorism,” but rather “memetic violence.” The authorities based this categorization on the attacker’s apparent non-ideological, but copycat-style, in which he drew inspiration from both far-right extremists—such as the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooter Brenton Tarrant and the 2017 Quebec City mosque shooter Alexandre Bissonnette—as well as several school shooters (Kompas, November 11, 2025). The incident nonetheless illustrates how far-right online ecosystems influence other violent online subcultures.

In this case, the suspect’s involvement in the True Crime Community (TCC)—a non-ideological subculture associated with nihilistic, misanthropy-driven violence—was a significant driver behind the attack (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, May 8, 2025). Although the case replicated FRE violent aesthetics rather than their ideological motivations, it demonstrates how such cross-subcultural interactions can amplify the spread of far-right extremist content. Such content, including the glorification of killers, increases the risk of future copycat attacks in completely different cultural, religious, and ideological contexts.

Emulating Brenton Tarrant?

Similar to Tarrant and Bissonnette, the suspect, identified by police only as FN, chose his school’s mosque as the target of the attack. [1] FN had prepared seven improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and two airsoft guns for the attack, but only detonated four of the IEDs (Indonesian National Police, November 2, 2025). Two IEDs were first detonated inside the mosque during Friday prayers before the remaining two devices were detonated in the school’s waste area, injuring 96 individuals (Indonesian National Police, November 12, 2025). [2]

Police later revealed that FN had relied on online bombmaking tutorials, reportedly using potassium chloride, nails for shrapnel, and soda cans as casings. While the airsoft guns were not used—FN was reportedly immobilised shortly after the fourth explosion—the rifle appeared to be a tribute to Tarrant. For example, it bore white paint-pen inscriptions of far-right attackers’ names, symbols, and phrases, which mirrored those on Tarrant’s weapon (Kompas, November 8, 2025).

Digital Footprints

The far-right influence in this case appears to be limited to aesthetic elements. In contrast, the suspect’s broader patterns of behaviour point more strongly toward the influence of the TCC subculture. Though the attack was not classified as terrorism—due to the absence of a clearly articulated ideological goal—police stated that FN had drawn inspiration from seven extremist figures (Indonesian National Police, November 28, 2025). Indonesian police specifically mentioned Brenton Tarrant, Alexandre Bissonnette, and Dylann Roof, as well as school shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, Vladislav Roslyakov, and Natalie Lynn Samantha Rupnow.

The suspect’s purported TikTok account contained several references that appear in both far-right and TCC online spaces (YouTube/@NusantaraTVOfficial, November 13, 2025). Elements of the former can be seen in the suspect’s repost of Christchurch attack-related memes, as well as Tarrant’s own posts featuring the neo-Nazi Sonnenrad and the ‘OK’ hand gesture associated with “white power.” These memes, however, appeared alongside a variety of content unrelated to the far-right. Notably, the post where FN made the ‘OK’ hand gesture resembles images posted by the Abundant Life Christian School and Antioch High School attackers, who are both venerated within the TCC community. This suggests FN may have intended his attack as a tribute to those two attacks. FN’s primary adherence to TCC is further indicated by his notebook, which was devoid of far-right ideological references and instead filled with expressions such as “List of the things that I hate,” including outgroups often mentioned in far-right ideologies, such as “ni**ers, women (but not entire), religion rapists,” but also referring to general traits, such as “loud people, yappers, edgy people, bullies, cheaters, mankind.” Importantly, other passages in the notebook indicated that the suspect’s primary grievance was his lack of healthy relationships and friendships with other people (YouTube/@NusantaraTVOfficial, November 13, 2025).

Convergence of Violent Online Communities

This case highlights the continued threat posed by non-ideological violent subcultures such as the TCC, which has seen a rise in linked attacks in recent years (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, October 2, 2025). The TCC community tends to revere notorious criminal figures. Although distinct from ideological extremist groups, TCC adherents are nonetheless influenced by ideologically motivated extremists—such as neo-Nazi accelerationists—due to shared nihilistic worldviews, aesthetic repertoires, as well as mutual glorification of past attackers (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, May 8, 2025). 

Following the SMAN 72 attack, FN received both praise and mockery. On TikTok, several self-identified Indonesian TCC users produced “fancam” edits of FN, while others derided his imitation of white nationalists. Conversely, at least one Indonesian far-right account depicted FN as a “saint” using the aesthetics of the neo-Nazi accelerationist “Saints” culture. Further, the attack also inspired new Indonesian-based TCC groups on Telegram. In one group, members searched for far-right manifestos, including those belonging to Anders Breivik, who was behind the 2011 Oslo car bombing and Utøya mass shooting, and Stephan Balliet, who was the 2019 Halle, Germany Synagogue shooter. Members also shared videos of past far-right attacks alongside general gore content. Importantly, several TCC members in the group supported Tarrant’s views, with one Indonesian supporter even mocking other TCC adherents as merely “edgy” people who lacked any real understanding. The group also circulated content of other extremists, including the Islamic State (IS).

Conclusion

Nihilistic violent subcultures and ideological extremist ecosystems converge in online spaces. Both communities venerate mass violence through memes, aesthetics, and ironic posting, naturally exposing TCC members to far-right and IS content. In the case of the SMAN 72 bomber, the radicalization process did not amount to a strong ideological commitment. Repeated exposure to such content, however, can potentially create pathways for some individuals to move from nihilistic gore fascination to explicitly ideological extremism. FN—who is suspected to have only started accessing TCC groups online in early 2025—was driven enough to then search for bombmaking tutorials and plan a multi-phase attack (Kompas, November 18, 2025; Indonesian National Police, November 19, 2025). Both the TCC and far-right ecosystems have, independently of one another, facilitated individuals to become mass attackers. Their intersection increases the risk of such attacks in the future, not only in the West but also in virtually any country worldwide, including Indonesia.

Notes:

[1] The choice of a mosque as a symbolic target or a purely tactical choice remains under investigation, although police reportedly view it as a tactical choice for effectiveness, as most students would have been in the mosque during Friday prayers (YouTube/@NusantaraTVOfficial, November 13, 2025).

[2] Of the 96 injured, around 66 percent suffered from hearing loss, while the remaining 30 percent (29 individuals) had burns and shrapnel wounds (DetikNews, November 9, 2025).

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