Somalia’s Militant Spin-Doctor: A Look at al-Shabaab Military Operations Spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis abu Musab

Somalia’s Militant Spin-Doctor: A Look at al-Shabaab Military Operations Spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis abu Musab

Despite losing major ground — or maybe in response to recent losses — Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, better known as al-Shabaab, has increasingly used propaganda to inspire fighters and gain support for its insurgency in southern Somalia.

Senior leaders of al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa, have often employed deception to portray the African armies fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia’s southern jungle as weak and incapable of defeating the group. Despite this claim being untrue, sections of Somali Muslims have continued to believe this spin, backing the terror group and its activities.

At the center of this orchestrated messaging are senior al-Shabaab hardliners. Chief among them is Abdiasis abu Musab, al-Shabaab’s designated military operations spokesman. Musab works closely with Ali Mohammed Rage (a.k.a. Ali Dheree), who is the overall spokesman for al-Shabaab (Radio Dalsan, January 6, 2017).

Background

Abdiasis abu Musab’s — his name has appeared variously as Abdiaziz abu Muscab or Abdiasis abu Musa’b — is a Muslim cleric, earning him the title Sheikh. The cleric is believed to be a hardliner with good military training, experience that qualifies him well for his role as military spokesman.

Although Musab’s exact age is not verifiable using open sources, he is believed to be in his late 30s or early 40s — like most of the al-Shabaab members. Musab hails from the Darod clan, one of the main Somali clans that inhabit southern parts of the Kismayo Port area and southwestern Gedo region near the Somali border with Kenya. His sub-clan is the Marehan, which is the largest within the Darod clan. The sub-clan occupies southern parts of Somalia, northern Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Generally, Musab has proved to be effective and tactful when propagating the militant ideology and framing the group’s progress on the battlefield. He has played down losses on the battlefield, inflating reported kill counts in favor of al-Shabaab and reducing numbers when the militant group has incurred major loses.

Through his statements, Musab has successfully portrayed the militant group as a force capable of confronting any conventional army, even when the jihadists have been routed in the battlefield. His demonstrated skill as military spokesman makes Musab a great asset to al-Shabaab.

Ascension Within al-Shabaab

According to analysts, the leader is a home-grown jihadist who has evolved with group since the emergence of al-Shabaab from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006.

His rise is believed to have started during the reign of Sheikh Ahmed Godane, the al-Shabaab Emir who was killed in a U.S airstrike in 2014. Godane — who wanted to extend his terror campaigns beyond Somalia —included Musab in a team he had assembled to steer the militant group into the future (Relief Web, June 26, 2014). [1]

His activity as a military spokesman can be traced to around 2010, when he claimed al-Shabaab’s responsibility for an attack on the Mona Hotel in Mogadishu. This was a high-profile attack in which six members of parliament were among the 30 people killed (Capital FM, August 25, 2010). However, some sources suggest he was officially named as military spokesman in 2013 when Godane carried a reshuffle of governors and senior leaders of the group. The reshuffle had followed a successful putsch (Relief Web, June 26, 2014).

Musab publicly claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Shabaab while delivering al-Shabaab’s narrative of a clash between the militants, Somalia’s army and Ugandan AMISOM peacekeeping forces. He depicted the mujahedeen fighters as skillful and superior, having taken several of the defensive positions of the “apostate government” and the invading Christians supporting them. Musab claimed the militants killed many soldiers and took control of the last stronghold held by the two armies (Hiiraan Online , August 25, 2010).

The Kenya Defense Forces’ (KDF) incursion into Somalia in 2011 helped to create the conditions leading to Musab’s advancement within al-Shabaab. Analysts say that since the Kenyan military had a spokesman, the militants wanted a spokesman of their own in order to appear to be at par with other armies, including AMISOM.

Al-Shabaab saw the benefits of having a military spokesman when the KDF attacked the port city of Kismayo in a 2012 amphibious operation codenamed “Operation Sledge Hammer.” Despite the militants losing ground and fleeing from the city, Musab moved quickly to spread a message indicating that al-Shabaab was winning the battle.

Musab said the militants were still fighting the KDF on the beaches where they had landed and that retaking Kismayo would be easy for the militants. He also hinted about the possible start of suicide attacks, asserting that the al-Shabaab was spread all over and the battle had just started (The Star, September 29, 2012).

With al-Shabaab taking responsibility for the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi in September 2013, Musab asserted that the group had nothing to fear in terms of reprisals, charging that Kenyan President Kenyatta had no power to threaten them (The Standard, September 22, 2013).

After the Garissa University College attack in 2015, Musab told news channels that the militants had released Muslim captives, and there were many bodies of Christians inside the building. This appeared to underline the group’s hardline stance against non-Muslims who it considers to be kafirs (non-believers) (eNCA, April 2, 2015).

Joining Islamic State

Despite his illustrious career as al-Shabaab’s military operation spokesman, emerging information suggests the cleric may be on his way to join the Islamic State (IS).

Abu Musab is believed to have been disgruntled by a “cleansing exercise” that the al-Shabaab launched in March to rid the group of alleged spies.

Reports suggest that in the purge, several foreign fighters — the majority of which were Kenyans — were beheaded because they were thought to be spying for the KDF and Somali National Army. In total, five Kenyans and four other foreign fighters were executed through a firing squad in southern Somalia (Daily Nation, April 23, 2017).

The information is allegedly contained in a confidential audio intercept in which Musab is recorded condemning the executions and pledging allegiance to Islamic State (IS).

According to reports, Musab urges al-Shabaab members to join an al-Shabaab faction called Dini ya Kiislamu Super Power (DKSP), which is headed by Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin, the leader of the IS in East Africa (Daily Nation, April 23; Daily Nation, September 3, 2016)

Mumin declared allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2015 (Mogadishu Center, October 24, 2015). His faction is believed to have about 1,000 followers from Kenya.

Conclusion

Despite reports of Musab’s discomfort with al-Shabaab’s recent purge and the associated killings, he still serves as the group’s military operation spokesman. In early May, Musab’s continued affiliation with al-Shabaab was confirmed when he emerged commenting on the killing of one U.S Navy SEAL and injuring of another two in Barii, about 60 kilometers west of Mogadishu. Musab said the U.S forces had “run away” after a fight, leaving behind weapons, ammunition and blood stains. He claimed al-Shabaab had inflicted heavy casualties, without giving figures. (The Star, May 5, 2017).

As al-Shabaab’s war in Somalia gets more complicated with each passing day, the militant group will increasingly depend on the services of militants like Musab. The cleric has shown himself to be a great asset to the group as it pursues its Islamist agenda. He has played an important role as the link between the fighters on the battlefield and the public, helping to frame the group’s activities in a way that will attract public support.

However, his removal or departure from al-Shabaab would leave a huge gap inside the militant group, potentially benefiting the counterinsurgency efforts in the country. If he joined IS, the new group he is alleged to have urged his fighters to join, the action would weaken al-Shabaab and greatly boost the Puntland based cell, giving IS a boost in its struggle to gain a foothold and support in the war-torn country.

NOTES

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_413.pdf