Takaichi and Japan Resist Chinese Pressure
Executive Summary:
- Japanese Prime Minister Sane Takaichi is holding firm against Chinese diplomatic and economic pressure, bolstering her domestic popularity.
- Takaichi’s comments regarding Japan’s security in relation to a potential invasion of Taiwan and plans to reform Japan’s defense posture have triggered rare earth export restrictions and clampdowns on tourism from Beijing.
- Effectively efforts to reduce economic dependence on the People’s Republic of China following previous coercive actions are mitigating Beijing’s latest moves.
- Takaichi’s government is deepening security partnerships, including with the Philippines, the United States, and France.
Five months after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began a pressure campaign against Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi over her pro-Taiwan stance, her political standing remains strong and Japan’s economy has proven resilient. Beijing has been unable to diplomatically isolate Tokyo with its accusations of a “new militarism” (新型军国主义) in the country (People’s Daily, March 17). Instead, Takaichi is pressing ahead, convening a panel of officials, experts, and corporate executives in late April to start work on a “fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities” (Asahi Shimbun, April 28).
Chinese sanctions have been unsuccessful in diverting Japan’s national security goals in part because of their limited economic impact. The Japanese economy is expected to grow 1.48 percent in the first quarter, slightly above the rate seen in the fourth quarter of 2025 (NHK World Japan, March 10; Japan Center for Economic Research, April 7). Even the PRC-dependent tourism sector is demonstrating resilience after increased tourism from South Korea and Taiwan (Radio France Internationale, February 23). Takaichi’s newly convened panel also seeks to do more to enhance economic security.
Takaichi’s Gamble Pays Off
Takaichi entered office as prime minister in October 2025 with a strong national security focus, but sought to pursue stable ties with the PRC. Her first meeting with a foreign leader was with PRC President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Gyeongju, South Korea. According to both the official Japanese and Chinese readouts, the two leaders agreed to build “constructive and stable Japan–China relations” (建设性、稳定的日中关系) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, October 31, 2025). Coverage of the meeting by PRC state media had a neutral—if not positive—tone (People’s Daily, October 31, 2025). Fewer than ten days later, the bilateral relationship plunged into diplomatic crisis after the PRC reacted furiously to Takaichi’s comments suggesting that Japan might intervene if Beijing blockaded or attacked Taiwan (The Asahi Shimbun, November 10, 2025).
Chinese state media characterized her comment as driven by Japanese right-wing forces and a revival of militarism. The “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) byline in People’s Daily used for international affairs commentary accused her of “issuing a military threat against China” (对中国发出武力威胁) (People’s Daily, November 14, 2025). PRC media has since provided coverage of Japanese pacifist protests to give the impression that her stance is politically unpopular (Xinhua, April 6).
By not backing down in the face of Chinese pressure, Takaichi has strengthened her political standing. She secured a historic landslide victory in a snap election she called in February, gaining a two-thirds supermajority for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the lower house of the National Diet (UDN, February 10). Though foreign policy was not the top election issue, some voters responded enthusiastically to Takaichi’s national security pledges, which included spending two percent of GDP on defense and reviewing military export rules. In a government poll conducted in late 2025, the Japanese public viewed the PRC as the country’s top security concern, while a record 94 percent of respondents expressed support for Japan’s military (The Straits Times, January 9).
Economic Punishment Fails
The targeted economic punishment imposed by the PRC covered familiar ground that Tokyo has confronted before. Among the punitive measures, a clampdown on tourism caused the number of Chinese tourists to Japan to drop roughly 45 percent year-on-year in December and 60 percent in January (The Mainichi, March 24). While no other market is as large as the PRC’s, visitors from South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States have increased, helping to offset losses (Storm Media, March 18).
The PRC’s blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports imposed in November 2025 seemed poised to deal a harsh blow to Japan’s fishing industry (Lianhe Zaobao, November 19, 2025). Here too, however, Japan had spent nearly two years working to reduce reliance on the Chinese market following a previous ban in 2023. [1] Not all restrictions from 2023 had been lifted by June 2025, limiting the impact of new regulations (PRC General Administration of Customs, June 29, 2025).
Tokyo has similarly been diversifying its rare earths supply chains for more than 15 years. These efforts began after the PRC unofficially banned rare earth exports to Japan in late 2010 for roughly two months due to tensions over the Senkaku Islands (China Brief, April 22, 2011; SET News, December 9, 2025). Since then, Japan has reduced reliance on Chinese rare earths from 90 percent of its supply to about 60 percent, including with a large strategic investment in the Australian mining company Lynas (Lianhe Zaobao, November 24, 2025). To further diversify its supply of critical minerals, Japan has begun deep-sea floor exploration near Minamitori Island (PTS Taiwan, February 3).
Japan Strengthens Security Ties
Takaichi has been unwilling to compromise on her vision of Japanese national security. In her first post-election speech, she warned of increasing coercion from the PRC and pledged to reform Japan’s defense strategy, ease restrictions on arms exports, and strengthen critical supply chains (LTN, February 20). Just as Beijing’s economic sanctions have promoted Japanese economic resilience, Chinese rhetoric and aggression has invigorated Japan’s efforts to deepen security ties with Indo-Pacific partners.
Japan and the Philippines signed an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in January. The bilateral defense agreement allows allied militaries to exchange logistics, supplies, and services for joint exercises or crises, and Philippine Foreign Affairs Minister Theresa Lazaro highlighted their “shared values of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and a commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity” (Inquirer.net, January 15).
Takaichi’s visit to the White House in March resulted in military-industrial support. The United States plans to quadruple missile production in Japan, boost critical mineral supply chain cooperation, and “coordinate in third countries to address challenges posed by strategic competitors and rogue states,” a reference to the PRC and Iran. It was a significant win for Takaichi given that President Trump had reportedly told her last November to soften her stance on Japan–PRC relations (The Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 2025).
Most recently, French president Emmanuel Macron visited Japan, where the two countries agreed to strengthen defense cooperation based on a joint defense “roadmap” agreed to in 2023. This includes joint drills between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and French military forces as well as cooperation in the space and cyber domains. The two also held the first in-person “2+2” meeting of their respective foreign and defense ministers for the first time in seven years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 1).
Conclusion
The PRC is instituting sustained political, economic, and diplomatic pressure against Japan. Despite this, Takaichi’s political standing and the Japanese economy have proven resilient. Beijing’s campaign to depict her as a symbol of resurgent Japanese militarism has had limited influence beyond domestic audiences.
Given the PRC’s uncompromising stance on Taiwan, there is no sign of PRC–Japan tensions easing. Chinese media continues to attack Takaichi, with one recent commentary accusing her of having an “autocratic style” (独断专行) and claiming she is politically isolated within the LDP (Guancha, April 15). A recent state media article entitled “Will Sanae Takaichi resign?” (高市早苗会辞职吗?) illustrates these false projections (Sina, April 14).
Japan is likely to accelerate efforts to reduce economic dependencies on the PRC while strengthening its defense posture. In its Diplomatic Bluebook published April 10, Japan downgraded its description of the PRC for the first time in a decade from “one of the most important bilateral relations” in 2025 to “an important neighboring country” (Japan Today, April 11). This new normal will likely persist for some time.
Notes
[1] The previous regulations on importing Japanese seafood were in protest of Japan’s release of treated radioactive wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (UDN, November 7, 2025).
