The Evolution of Gulzar Imam: a Look at the Leader of the Baloch Nationalist Army
The Evolution of Gulzar Imam: a Look at the Leader of the Baloch Nationalist Army
On November 22, after months of silence, the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA)’s spokesman, Mureed Baloch, confirmed the arrest of BNA leader Gulzar Imam (The Khorasan Diary, November 22). Turkish authorities arrested Gulzar upon his arrival in the country from Iran and then handed him over to Pakistani authorities. Presently, Gulzar is under investigation in Islamabad, where information gleaned from him has assisted the Pakistani authorities in weakening Baloch insurgent networks in Balochistan’s Makran region.
Gulzar founded BNA in January by merging his faction of the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) with the United Baloch Army (UBA) of Sarfraz Bangulzai (Dawn, March 20). As such, his arrest is a tactical setback for the Baloch insurgent movement, but it is unlikely to have a long-term strategic impact. This profile analyzes Gulzar as an insurgent leader, including the factors that pushed him from student politics towards militancy and entry into the BRA, as well as Gulzar’s differences with Baloch Republican Party (BRP) leader Brahamdagh Bugti, which led to Gulzar’s decision to form BNA.
Gulzar’s case and arrest more broadly sheds light on the evolution and future trajectory of Baloch separatism in Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s counter-insurgency campaign against Baloch militants.
Background and Baloch Insurgent Career
Born in Panjgur district in 1978, the 44-year-old Gulzar hails from Balochistan’s Shambayzai tribe and was raised by a middle-class family, which supported his studies up to the twelfth grade from the Degree College Panjgur. In 2002, he became engaged in student politics in Baloch Student Organization Amaan (BSO-Amaan), which is affiliated with the Mengal tribe. Gulzar quickly emerged as a prominent student political leader and remained with BSO-Amaan until 2006 (The Balochistan Post, September 5, 2017). In 2006, three BSO factions merged: BSO-Amaan, BSO-Azad (BSO-A), and BSO-Pajjar. Of these, Gulzar gravitated towards BSO-A and became the president of its Panjgur zone. At that time, Basher Zeb, who later headed his own Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) faction, was the BSO-A leader. BSO-A was, however, subsequently banned by the Pakistani government in 2013 for facilitating the recruitment of Baloch youth into Baloch insurgent groups (The Bolan Voice, April 23, 2013).
Disheartened by BSO-A’s ban, Gulzar realized that participation in student politics alone would not be sufficient to realize Baloch separatist goals. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was the head of the Baloch Bugti tribe, meanwhile, held political ideals and a philosophy that had a deep imprint on Gulzar’s personality (Daily Sangar, August 24, 2020). Bugti’s death in a military operation in August 2006, therefore, greatly perturbed him (Dawn, August 27, 2006). As Bugti’s admirer and follower, Gulzar joined BRA in 2009, which was led by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s grandson, Brahamdagh Bugti. During his tenure with BRA, Gulzar then became the head of the BRA’s Makran region.
Alongside the former head of his own faction of BLA, Aslam Baloch, and Bashir Zeb, Gulzar supported the adoption of suicide terrorism by Baloch insurgent groups. In fact, Gulzar’s younger brother, Nasir Imam, was part of the BLA-Majeed Brigade’s attack on the paramilitary Frontier Corps’ camp in Panjgur in February, killing four militants while one Frontier Corps soldier sustained injuries (Dawn, February 2). Gulzar maintained that self-sacrificing missions would amplify the Baloch separatist struggle and dispel the impression that the ongoing insurgency is a low-intensity conflict. According to him, the more martyrs you have, the richer your struggle, and therefore the stronger the movement’s impact and the more recruits you will attract.
Break with Brahamdagh Bugti
In 2017, intractable differences developed between Gulzar and Brahamdagh Bugti over the latter’s tribal approach to the Baloch separatist struggle and condescending attitude towards local BLA fighters and commanders. Gulzar strongly believed that Baloch separatism required a democratized political approach rather a tribal attitude if it were to have a meaningful impact (The Balochistan Post, April 9, 2020). He stressed that Brahamdagh was living a comfortable life in Europe and had become increasingly divorced from Balochistan’s evolving realities on the ground.
Gulzar opposed Brahamdagh’s leadership on basis that the Baloch insurgent movement cannot be controlled remotely from Europe. Further, he dared Brahamdagh and his associates in Europe to return to Balochistan and join the separatist struggle physically. Gulzar maintained that while the local commanders and fighters were showing their bravery and sacrificing their lives, the leaders sitting abroad were taking the credit for their actions (Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, January 19, 2018). In 2016, moreover, Brahamdagh was ready to engage in peace talks with the Pakistani government, which Gulzar vociferously denounced as bogus and meaningless (Dawn, August 28, 2016). Gulzar believed that talks with Pakistan should only be held if the Pakistani troops withdraw from Balochistan and the negotiations were for an independent homeland. Brahamdagh, meanwhile, alleged Gulzar was involved in criminal activities such as kidnapping and extortion, although these are charges that Gulzar has denied (The Balochistan Post, September 5, 2017).
Brahamdagh and Gulzar also had disagreements over the finances that BRA extracted from drug traffickers in the Makran region. Gulzar argued that the drug money should be spent on the BLA, while Brahamdagh apparently used it for his personal expenses in Europe (The Balochistan Post, January 16). Gulzar accordingly accused Brahamdagh of running the BLA like a private militia to secure his tribal influence over the Bugti tribe and to earn money in the name of promoting Baloch separatism. Due to his protracted differences with Brahamdagh, Gulzar was ultimately targeted in a bomb attack in June 2018 near Spin Boldak, which he narrowly escaped. The attack was suspected of being done at Brahamdagh’s behest. In October 2018, Gulzar was expelled from BRA on allegations that he committed extrajudicial killings and extortion.
Baloch Nationalist Army’s Formation
Gulzar advocated for a unified approach to the Baloch insurgent struggle for which alliances between the various Baloch separatist groups were essential. Nevertheless, he parted ways with BRA in 2017 and founded his own BRA faction in 2018, which several senior BRA commanders and fighters then joined (Terrorism Monitor, February 10). Consistent with his advocacy for a united Baloch separatist front, the “BRA-Gulzar” faction was part of a four-group rebel alliance, the Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), which also comprises a “BRA-[Bashir] Zeb” faction, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), and the Baloch Republican Guard (BRG). Gulzar was very active promoting BRAS on Twitter with his handle @GulzarImam3 until his suspension earlier this year.
In a short span of time, the “BRA-Gulzar” faction eclipsed Brahamdagh’s faction. However, lthough Gulzar is a smart and charismatic insurgent leader, he is not a proficient administrator. Therefore, he lacked the organizational acumen and external links to run and sustain a group over a long period of time. Despite enormous success, Gulzar faced serious financial and administrative difficulties in running his BRA faction (The Balochistan Post, September 5, 2017).
In January, Gulzar started fresh by founding a new rebel group, the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), by merging his BLA faction with the United Baloch Army (UBA) of Sarfraz Bungalzai. The statement issued at the time of BNA’s formation noted that it was created “to further expand the national resistance war and to unite the Baloch resistance forces” (The Balochistan Post, January 16). In June, the BNA carried out a motorcycle bomb attack in Lahore’s bustling Anarkali bazaar as a way of announcing its arrival in Pakistan’s evolving militant landscape. The attack left three people dead and 20 others wounded (Daily Times, June 4). BNA’s formation was consistent with Gulzar’s approach of greater cooperation among the Baloch groups, with the goal of making the separatist struggle more influential and widespread (Ekurd Daily, January 23).
Despite his aspirations, since Gulzar’s arrest, the Pakistani security agencies have weakened the insurgent networks in the Makran region where Gulzar and his fighters were active. There has been a decline in insurgent attacks in the Makran region as a result. Indeed, Gulzar’s detention is a setback for the newly formed BNA whose fighters are now joining other groups like the BLA and BLF.
His detention will not necessarily have a negative strategic impact on the Baloch separatist struggle (Voice of America, November 23). Since the insurgency is spread across Balochistan and has a diverse support base, a replacement for Gulzar will be found. For instance, the killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in a military operation in August 2006 re-energized the Baloch separatist struggle. Following his death, Bugti emerged as a new symbol and icon of the Baloch struggle, with several Baloch youths, including Gulzar, driven to insurgency in Bugti’s memory. Likewise, the killings of BLA founder Mir Balach Marri in November 2007 and Aslam Baloch, who was the head of his own BLA faction, in December 2018 did not weaken the Baloch insurgency (Independent Urdu, November 7).
Conclusion
Gulzar and his contemporaries, such as Bashir Zeb and the BLF head, Dr. Allah Nazar, represent a new generation of Baloch separatist leaders. They have successfully transformed the movement from a tribal to a middle-class struggle. The current phase of Baloch insurgency is socially diverse and resilient, with a supporter base whose center of gravity lies within the Baloch youth masses rather than with a specific leader (Independent Urdu, November 7). Hence, while Gulzar’s arrest is a tactical success for the Pakistani counter-insurgency campaign in Balochistan, it will not undermine the broader Baloch separatist militant movement.
