The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’s Limits of Leadership from Tahir Yuldashev to Usman Ghazi

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’s Limits of Leadership from Tahir Yuldashev to Usman Ghazi

Introduction

Succeeding from the Adolat (“Justice”) movement, which aimed at implementing Islamic law in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s, Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani established the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1998 with the intention of overthrowing the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, and establishing shariah law in the country (CISAC, August 2018). Both founders have since been killed in 2009 and 2001, respectively. [1] A series of leaders followed, who oversaw a relatively decentralized group, fractious internal disputes, and near-fatal strategic decisions that marginalized the IMU. Furthermore, structural constraints, including reliance on host support of the Taliban and funding difficulties, limited the group’s operating capabilities, which, even with a compelling leadership, would have made it difficult for the IMU to survive. However, a compelling leadership is something the IMU has long lacked.

IMU’s Decentralized Model of Militancy

After succeeding Usman Adil to the leadership of the IMU in 2012, Usman Ghazi went on to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State (IS). [2] Ghazi’s fealty to IS was not accepted by all IMU militants, nor was Ghazi’s leadership itself (RFE/RL, August 23, 2015). Indeed, at least one IMU faction pre-empted Ghazi’s move, which was an expression of IMU’s decentralized nature. The Faryab-based faction of IMU pledged allegiance to IS in February 2015. [3] This was eight months before Ghazi announced his allegiance to IS’s caliph Abubakar al-Baghdadi in August 2015 (RFE/RL, August 4, 2015).

Ghazi had, however, expressed support for al-Baghdadi in September 2014, but stopped short of loyalty. The pre-emptive declaration on the part of the Faryab-based faction showed that IMU members in IMU-branded propaganda felt it acceptable to make significant statements about their group’s loyalties without the presence or explicit support of their leader. Even once Ghazi had pledged IMU’s loyalty to IS, not all IMU militants went along with him. Some, for example, continued to fight alongside the Taliban, while others, after biding their time, publicly stated the IMU would continue as an independent, but Taliban- and Al-Qaeda-aligned, group. [4] This split within IMU, was not the group’s first; in fact, it was merely the latest rupture of many.

Already in 2002, IMU fighters broke from the group to form the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and declared an intention to attack a wider range of targets than the IMU at the time permitted. In 2012, following the accession of Ghazi as emir of IMU, another displeased faction departed IMU ranks to establish Katibut Imam al-Buhari (KIB), most of whom soon left Afghanistan to fight in Syria (UNSC, March 29, 2018; RFE/RL, August 23, 2015). These offshoots and start-up groups show how little centralized command IMU leaders had over their forces, despite that they retained links with IMU (UNSC, May 27, 2020).

Among the current claimants to leadership, at least before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August, Jaffar Yuldash was considering aligning IMU once again to IS. However, another leader, the Tajik ‘Ilhom’ Usmoni Khon, was considering making the IMU part of a new supergroup of all Tajik militants in Central Asia (UNSC, July 21). No one can deny either Yuldash or Ilhom their IMU credentials, as both are representatives of the group, but both have different visions of what the group should do next, with no central authority to exert control either of them.

IMU’s Mantra: Don’t Offend the Host

The IMU operates with a more decentralized system than other stronger militant groups, not because of a conscious strategic decision, but due to the group’s reliance on its Taliban hosts for financing and shelter. Moreover, in rugged terrain over large distances, militant leaders have difficulty controlling the actions of their fighters spread across the full area of operations. In recent years, the IMU has been operating as little more than an auxiliary force for the Taliban in Afghanistan and helping facilitate the traffic of opium through Central Asian routes (Gandhara, May 12, 2015; Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 26, 2013). As an essentially foreign movement sheltering mainly in Afghanistan with the consent of the Taliban, IMU’s leaders have had to tread a fine line between not ruffling their host’s feathers, while continuing to act as an independent militant group with its own aims. For example, when Ghazi switched IMU’s loyalty to IS, his fighters and he were quickly tracked down and slaughtered by Taliban ‘special forces’ (Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 24, 2015). [5]

When the IMU does follow the Taliban’s line now, the group faces marginalization and restricted access to funding (UNSC, July 21). The Taliban regulate the content IMU produce on social media, censoring what the Taliban view as harmful to their own propaganda line. [6] IMU leaders have even been arrested by the Taliban for leaving locations without authorization (UNSC, May 27, 2020). While the IMU shelters in Afghanistan, it does not matter what any IMU leader wants; it is what the Taliban wants for the IMU that matters.

Conclusion

Originally the iconic brand in Central Asian militancy, the IMU now faces major competition from disrupters. Central Asians flocked in relatively high numbers to militant groups involved in the Syrian civil war, eschewing the closer and more established IMU. Some went to ‘regional’ groupings, such as the IMU offshoot KIB, but many others joined IS. Ghazi and subsequent leaders have shown little capacity to attract these potential recruits and new sources of funds to IMU, and were outcompeted by a more technologically adept rival in IS. Short on funding and marginalized by the Taliban, Ghazi attempted a merger with IS, but Ghazi’s reckless attempt did little beyond show the weak state of IMU. With the territorial demise of IS and the Taliban’s destruction of Ghazi, former fighters and new IMU members from Central Asia may have their own ideas and thoughts about how to revive the group or operate in a newly Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

New life may also be forced upon the IMU should former IS fighters or new IS-inspired recruits swell the ranks of IMU, with ideas of global jihad. But a movement like this poses its own challenges: if the Taliban take a ‘NIMBY’ approach to international jihadism – preventing Afghanistan being used as a base for launching attacks whilst supporting the policy in other territories – then any group with such aims of sheltering in Taliban territory is likely to be destroyed, or at the very least, heavily restricted. It would take a remarkable leader to overcome IMU’s myriad of constraints, but such a strong leadership has not characterized the IMU.

In sum, the IMU has stumbled on, not because of, but despite of, its leadership.

Notes

[1] Namangani was killed following the 2001 invasion by US-led forces, and Yuldashev was killed by a US drone strike in Pakistan, where Yuldashev and most of his group were sheltering.

[2] Adil, who had helped the group spread back into Afghanistan and other areas in Central Asia following their earlier move to the tribal areas of Pakistan, was killed by a US drone strike.

[3] For details see, Damon Mehl, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel, June 2015, Volume 8, Issue 6.

[4] For details see, Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan faction emerges after group’s collapse,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 14, 2016.

[5] For an account of the ‘special force’s’ offensive against IMU militants, see, Fazelminallah Qazizai, “The Special Units Leading the Taliban’s Fight against the Islamic State,” Newlines, September 03, 2021.

[6] For details see, Uran Botobekov, “UN Security Council: Taliban continues to patronize Central Asian Jihadists,” Modern Diplomacy, March 6, 2021.