Uzbek Fighters in Syria Face Tensions with Al-Sharaa’s Government

Uzbek Fighters in Syria Face Tensions with Al-Sharaa’s Government

Executive Summary: 

• On May 6, Syrian forces carried out a security sweep targeting Uzbek foreign fighters in the Idlib countryside. After gunfire broke out, Syrian security forces arrested multiple Uzbek fighters. 
• This incident has exposed escalating tensions between Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government and the Uzbek foreign fighters in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The integration of Uzbek foreign fighters into Syria’s post-war security structure remains a key issue for al-Sharaa, but efforts so far have been unsuccessful. 
• Islamic State (IS) is attempting to exploit this friction and recruit these alienated fighters, though most have so far rejected the group’s extreme ideology.

On May 6, Syrian forces carried out a security sweep targeting Uzbek foreign fighters in the Idlib countryside. According to Syrian security officials, an Uzbek fighter opened fire—potentially by accident—on the Syrian forces. As a result, multiple Uzbek fighters were arrested following the confrontation (New Arab, May 6). The relationship between the Syrian government of Ahmed al-Sharaa and Uzbek former foreign fighters in Syria under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) remains tense. Following the arrests, a contingent of other Uzbek foreign fighters surrounded police stations in protest, and in the days after, Syrian security officers detained an additional 16 Uzbek fighters (New Arab, May 18). 

The integration of Uzbek fighters into Syria’s post-war security structure remains a key issue for al-Sharaa. In the event of unsuccessful integration, many Uzbeks—who fear retribution if they return to their home country—risk becoming alienated in the “new Syria” (cabar.asia, September 23, 2022). Islamic State (IS) has proven adept at recruiting disillusioned fighters across the region, and has begun to target members of HTS.

IS seeks to exploit the friction between the Uzbek fighters and al-Sharaa’s government. On May 14, for example, IS warned all foreign fighters in an article in its weekly al-Naba newsletter that the new Syrian government would eventually move to eliminate them at the behest of external powers. The article urged them to instead join IS, which, unlike the new Syrian government, would not bow to secularism or infidel nations (X/@MinaLami, May 15).

This does not mean most Uzbek or other foreign fighters are likely to join IS. Many of them reject IS’s hardline ideology, especially its extreme takfiri approach and history of violence against rival jihadists, including in HTS. Indeed, IS also invited foreign fighters to defect during a similar episode of tension last year, but the appeal mostly failed (CTC Sentinel, February 1). It may not have helped that IS regularly mocks the challenges faced by non-IS foreign fighters rather than viewing them as natural allies.

This incident can also serve as a reminder to Central Asian states to continue developing repatriation frameworks for the return of foreign fighters. Potential areas of concern include proportionate legal accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration support. Should their citizens remain in Syria, they risk being recruited by IS or mired in controversies with the al-Sharaa government (X/@SurikaMaps, May 13). Moreover, with IS diminished globally, its threat after returning home is much less than it would have been even half a decade ago.