White Paper Increases Securitization of Hong Kong
Executive Summary:
- From the mainland’s persepctive, Jimmy Lai’s sentencing marked a significant moment for Hong Kong’s security, as shown by the timing of the new White Paper’s release. Past publications have aligned with legislation that tightened the mainland’s grip over the Special Administrative Region (SAR).
- The new White Paper celebrates the Hong Kong government’s use of polical, legislative, and educational initiatives to advance national security, and outlines new areas of focus, such as economic and international issues. This signals the possibility of mainland-style sanctions and renewed transnational repression efforts in the future.
- Beijing now recasts past Hong Kong political mobilizations as national security threats, even including those that were seen as legal under the Basic Law at the time, providing justification for its hardline turn.
On February 10, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released a white paper titled “Realizing National Security Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Hong Kong” (“一国两制”下香港维护国家安全的实践) (Xinhua, February 10). This marks the third white paper focused exclusively on the “one country, two systems” framework since President Xi Jinping took office. Previous documents were issued in 2014 and 2021, each responding to major institutional developments and subsequent political crises in the Special Administrative Region (SAR). Although the 2025 white paper on PRC national security referenced Hong Kong within a broader strategy, the 2026 document provides a more systematic and historically grounded articulation of Hong Kong’s role in safeguarding PRC national security (Xinhua, May 12, 2025).
The 2026 white paper on Hong Kong articulates an official discourse designed to legitimize and rationalize the PRC’s national security policies toward Hong Kong. It does so by providing a framework for localized political and ideological mobilization, and signals to local officials, pro-establishment actors, and Hong Kong society at large the strategic priorities and future direction of Beijing’s governance approach.
Timing of White Papers is Symbolic
The timing of the 2026 white paper’s release is significant. The first Hong Kong-focused white paper under Xi Jinping, titled “The Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” was released amid intensifying debate over universal suffrage (State Council Information Office [SCIO], June 10, 2014). Issued just 12 days before pro-democracy activists held an unofficial referendum as part of the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (和平佔中) campaign, the document was widely seen as a warning. It emphasized the central government’s “overall jurisdiction” (全面管治权) and asserted that local administrators, including judges, must be loyal to the Party-state. In doing so, it redefined autonomy under “one country, two systems.”
The second white paper, published in 2021, followed the first Legislative Council (LegCo) elections after Beijing overhauled Hong Kong’s electoral system under the principle of “patriots administering Hong Kong” (爱国者治港) (SCIO, December 20, 2021) The redesigned framework effectively eliminated meaningful opposition participation through stringent political vetting. The 2021 document argued that the PRC—not the British colonial administration—had advanced Hong Kong’s democratic development, that national security is a prerequisite for democracy, and that “anti-China” actors would be excluded from governance.
The 2026 white paper was released one day after media entrepreneur Jimmy Lai was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment on national security charges (BBC News, February 9). Long portrayed by authorities as an “anti-China” figure with foreign ties, Lai is the only convicted individual explicitly cited in the white paper, underscoring his symbolic significance within the broader crackdown.
At nearly 19,000 Chinese characters, the 2026 white paper follows established narratives on “one country, two systems” and national security. It presents a state-centric historical justification for imposing the national security framework, outlines the central government’s supervisory role, details Hong Kong’s legislative and policy measures, reviews claimed achievements since 2020, and identifies future priorities for aligning Hong Kong society with the PRC’s national security objectives.
Beijing Rewrites Hong Kong Narratives
The 2026 white paper endorses the narrative that Hong Kong posed a national security threat to the PRC well before the 2019 anti-extradition movement. Under the emphatic section heading “An Unrelenting Fight for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong” (香港维护国家安全的斗争从未停止), the document asserts that the origins of this threat can be traced to resistance against the proposed Article 23 national security legislation in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, July 1, 2003; China Brief, July 15, 2003, July 29, 2003, March 1, 2024). From the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) perspective, the failure to enact that legislation created structural vulnerabilities that enabled subsequent waves of mass mobilization. [1] The white paper links the 2003 setback to later protest movements, including the 2012 campaign against national education, the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the 2016 “Fish Ball” unrest, and the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests.
The inclusion of this narrative signals that mainland authorities now retrospectively characterize the 2003 mass mobilization—when more than 500,000 people protested the proposed Article 23 legislation—as a threat to national security. This reinterpretation stands in tension with the fact that the protests were widely regarded at the time as a lawful exercise of freedoms of expression and political participation protected under the Basic Law.
By framing the 2003 protests as security risks, the white paper recasts Hong Kong’s long-standing democratization efforts and defense of civil liberties as destabilizing forces. Through this revisionist account of post-handover social movements, the document provides ideological justification for Beijing’s hardline turn, which culminated in the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020.
Affirming Multi-Layered Security Governance
The 2026 white paper also articulates a new security governance structure in Hong Kong. The document reiterates that the central government bears ultimate responsibility for national security matters concerning Hong Kong, while the local government maintains jurisdiction over legislative, policy, and educational initiatives. However, it also promotes and celebrates alignment between central and local authorities.
The white paper asserts that the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, together with the 2021 electoral overhaul, effectively suppressed destabilizing forces and restored stability. It also sees Hong Kong’s legislation, judicial enforcement of security laws, and expanded national security education as strengthening security governance. Key milestones provided are the LegCo passing the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance in 2024 and the promulgation of two subsidiary pieces of legislation in 2025, the “Safeguarding National Security Regulation” and the “Safeguarding National Security Order” (GovHK, May 13, 2025). These last two instruments formally incorporated the operational authority of the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS)—an agency directly accountable to the central government—into Hong Kong’s domestic legal framework. [2] This development marked a significant step in embedding mainland security institutions within Hong Kong’s legal system. It underscores that, rather than leaving security governance solely to the SAR under the rubric of “one country, two systems,” the central authorities intend to retain a decisive—and increasingly operational—role in national security matters concerning Hong Kong.
The white paper further commends the Hong Kong government’s approach to enforcing national security laws, adjudicating related cases, and expanding national security education. Taken together, these elements suggest that legislation, law enforcement, judicial action, and ideological education will continue to function as a coordinated mechanism to ensure societal compliance with the national security framework (The Guardian, November 24, 2023).
Ongoing censorship and the criminalization of independent voices have reinforced this architecture. Judicial decisions imposing severe penalties on journalists for publishing materials deemed “seditious” have further narrowed the space for dissent (Reporters Without Borders, February 9). These developments collectively facilitate an environment in which the state can promote its national security directives and reshape historical narratives with limited bottom-up resistance.
Outlining New Battlefields for Safeguarding Regime Security
The white paper calls on the Hong Kong government to further strengthen coordination across both traditional and non-traditional domains of national security, encompassing internal and external dimensions. It also emphasizes the need to refine institutional arrangements and enforcement mechanisms in safeguarding national security. Within this forward-looking agenda, two new elements stand out.
First, the document signals an escalation in its approach toward opposition forces, extending the focus from domestic containment to action beyond Hong Kong’s borders. The document says that “attention must remain focused on ‘soft confrontation’ under the slogans of ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘human rights,’ and the reverse flow of agitator activities from overseas to Hong Kong must be closely monitored” (严防打着所谓“民主”“自由”“人权”口号的“软对抗”，严防海外反中乱港活动倒灌香港) (Xinhua, February 10). The link between so-called “soft confrontation” to the promotion of universal values effectively aligns Hong Kong’s security governance with the mainland framework (Hong Kong Free Press [HKFP], June 30, 2025). This framing expands the scope of perceived risk from overt protest activity to ideological influence.
The document also signals heightened concern over cross-border information flows, particularly those connecting Hong Kong with overseas communities. Implicit in this language is growing attention to the expanding Hong Kong diaspora formed in recent years. Like other communities, segments of the Hong Kong diaspora—often in collaboration with Western political actors—have become increasingly vocal in criticizing Beijing’s policies and countering the PRC’s influence abroad.
This concern was evident in the aftermath of Jimmy Lai’s sentencing, when several Western consulates in Hong Kong were summoned by the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in the city and warned against “interfering” in local affairs. Since 2020, both the PRC and Hong Kong governments have invoked the extraterritorial provisions of national security legislation to target exiled activists and overseas organizations, reflecting an emerging pattern of transnational repression (The Atlantic Council, October 27, 2025). The white paper’s call to forge “a broader united front at home and abroad” (更广泛 … 的统一战线) suggests that such outward-facing security measures may continue to expand. Transnational enforcement and influence strategies will be critical in the next phase of Hong Kong’s security governance (BBC News, February 26; The Independent, March 4).
Second, the document suggests developing a robust approach to safeguarding non-traditional areas of security. These threats range from specific areas such as finance, shipping, and trade to the broader protection of overseas interests. For instance, the white paper highlights the need to improve mechanisms for countering “foreign sanctions, intervention[s], and long-arm jurisdiction” (SCIO, February 10).
This emphasis appears to respond, at least in part, to the recent controversy surrounding two Panama Canal ports previously operated by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison. Amid rising geopolitical pressure from Washington, CK Hutchison reportedly sought to divest its port operations. Beijing, however, intervened and publicly criticized the proposed transaction, arguing that it could undermine PRC national security (The Guardian; RTHK, March 14, 2025). Geopolitical tensions between Panama, Hong Kong and the PRC further escalated as the Panama’s supreme court annulled CK Hutchison’s contracts. This allowed the firm to continue to operate the container ports, while the Panamanian government took control of them (BBC News, February 24). The episode underscores Beijing’s growing sensitivity to the overseas commercial activities of Hong Kong-based enterprises. It suggests that the conduct of Hong Kong businesses abroad is increasingly viewed not merely as a commercial matter, but as an extension of Beijing’s broader national security governance framework.
The PRC possesses several capabilities to improve mechanisms for countering such foreign threats. These could include expanding the extraterritorial application of Hong Kong’s national security laws to cover foreign business entities, reviving efforts to introduce mainland-style anti-foreign sanctions legislation into the SAR, or enacting additional statutes to establish new enforcement bodies and further extend the security apparatus—similar to the expansion seen under the Critical Infrastructure (Computer Systems) Ordinance enacted last year (Xinhua, August 11, 2021; GovHK, January 1).
Regardless of the specific measures adopted, the trajectory is clear: Hong Kong’s economic governance is increasingly being subordinated to national security priorities. Chief Executive John Lee has already announced plans to introduce a “Five-Year Plan” as Hong Kong’s blueprint—an initiative that signals a gradual alignment of the city’s traditionally market-driven model with the mainland’s state-directed economic governance and development framework (HKFP, February 3).
Conclusion
Beyond its propagandistic function, the 2026 white paper makes clear that Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” framework is now firmly subordinated to the PRC’s national security governance. As reflected in both the 2025 and 2026 white papers, the SAR is expected to function as a strategic node supporting the PRC’s geopolitical objectives in the region and beyond.
The new document’s strong emphasis on suppressing overseas opposition forces and ensuring that political power remains “in the hands of patriots” suggests persistent official anxiety about political control, both domestically and beyond Hong Kong’s borders. Legal institutions are not merely neutral arbiters, but instruments to enforce this control. In practice, this risks further instrumentalizing Hong Kong’s legal framework to facilitate censorship, constrain dissent, and monitor both political and economic actors within the city.
The white paper’s deliberate reframing of Hong Kong’s democratization movements and civil liberties struggles suggests that efforts to control historical memory will continue. By recasting past mobilizations as national security threats, the authorities lay the groundwork for sustained restrictions on freedom of expression and information flows. Further state-driven initiatives to promote an official narrative are likely, particularly as next year marks the 30th anniversary of the city’s handover to the PRC.
Notes
[1] Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law would have required the regional government to enact its own laws prohibiting treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the PRC, among other national security-related activities (basiclaw.gov.hk, accessed July 29, 2010). The bill failed to pass due to division in the pro-Beijing camp, but a version of it was ultimately enacted in 2024 under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Hong Kong E-Legislation, July 11, 2024).
[2] Note that the promulgations were announced one day after the State Council released its 2025 white paper on PRC national security.
