Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space

Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space

Executive Summary:

• The military conflict in Iran is having a major impact on the countries of the former Soviet space, creating new winners and losers and thereby transforming the relationships these states have with each other and with the rest of the world.
• This transformation is not because of direct attacks on these countries or other military moves but because the conflict has closed Iran as a transit corridor, boosted oil prices, and forced these countries to take sides.
• Some of these consequences will end when the conflict does, and others are likely to continue long into the future. As a result, many of the countries in the former Soviet space are currently discussing how they can continue to benefit from the conflict or mitigate their losses.

The military conflict in and around Iran is creating new winners and losers among the countries of the former Soviet space, transforming their relationships with one another and with the rest of the world (RITM Eurasia, March 3). Iran appears to have launched drone attacks on Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan (Akcent, March 5; Caliber, March 7). Tehran has also restricted the flow of food northward to some countries in the region (Stan Radar, March 5). Broader transformations stem, however, not from direct effects on these countries, but rather from the conflict closing Iran as a transit corridor, boosting oil prices, and prompting Iran’s neighbors to take sides in the conflict (Cronos Central Asia; Stan Radar, March 3; Bugin.info, March 6). Some of these consequences are likely to end when the conflict does, but others may continue long into the future. As a result, many governments in the region are now discussing how to benefit from the fallout if they find themselves on the winning side, or how to reduce their losses if they have suffered from the conflict itself (Stan Radar, March 7).

The effects of the Iranian conflict on the former Soviet space have led to discussions of how the conflict will affect Russia. Discussions have focused on how the conflict is helping Russia in the short term but may have more negative consequences in the long term, and on how it is affecting Ukraine and its resistance to the Russian invasion both now and in the future. In the view of many, Russia has been a major beneficiary in at least three ways. First, the rising price of oil has helped the Kremlin refill its depleted coffers and continue its war against Ukraine (Izvestiya, March 10). Second, violence in Iran and the Straits of Hormuz has increased attention to and interest in using Russia’s Northern Sea Route in the Arctic for trade between Europe and Asia (Fontanka.ru, March 1; URA.ru, March 7). Third, the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran have allowed Moscow to play up what its propagandists call the moral equivalency of what the United States and Israel are doing to what Russia is doing in Ukraine (see EDM, March 9; RIA Novosti, March 10). At the same time, other commentators have suggested that the U.S.–Israeli move and its success so far have highlighted Moscow’s failure to come to Iran’s aid, thus raising questions about its commitments elsewhere. They have also highlighted the West’s willingness to act against a Russian partner and thus against Russia itself, as well as the already obvious weaknesses of the Russian army in the field in Ukraine (see EDM, March 2).

As far as Ukraine is concerned, many observers have suggested that the U.S. focus on Iran will lead Washington to be even less supportive of Kyiv. This focus could possibly slow arms deliveries further and leave Ukraine at risk of new and more successful Russian attacks, forcing Kyiv to accept Russian conditions for a peace accord (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 9). Such views may not prove to be true. Ukraine has provided military assistance to the U.S.–Israeli moves against Iran and thus may be in a better position to get more aid and continue to resist the Russian invasion, all the more so because Moscow has verbally and possibly more substantively supported Tehran against the United States and Israel (Novaya Gazeta Baltiya, March 6). That is certainly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, many Ukrainians, and many of Ukraine’s supporters hope for.

In Belarus, some commentators are discussing how the Iranian conflict may undermine longtime dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has bet heavily on developing cooperation with Tehran. The conflict in Iran, similar to the events in Venezuela earlier, has shown how the United States is willing to decapitate the government of a country whose leaders do not cooperate with it (Charter97, March 7). Fear of a similar fate could drive the Belarusian leader even closer into Moscow’s embrace, or prompt him to change course and seek a rapprochement with the West for his own protection.

Central Asian countries have been focusing less on the loss of food supplies from Iran than on the implications of the closure of a trade corridor through Iran (Stan Radar, March 5). While some are worried that Tehran may help restart an Islamist threat to their countries, most others, especially in Kazakhstan, see this rerouting as a way to increase their power and influence in the region (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, March 2; Cronos Central Asia; Stan Radar, March 3; The Times of Central Asia; ASIA-Plus, March 5).

The conflict in Iran has reshaped the external relations of all three South Caucasus states, although far less so in Armenia and Georgia than in Azerbaijan (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 1). Armenia’s response has been the most restrained of the three. Yerevan has long counted on Iran’s support for the maintenance of Armenia’s sovereignty over the Syunik region and the Zangezur corridor, but now finds itself at odds with Tehran over the U.S.-supervised Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (see EDM, July 29, 2025). Recently, its government has become more cautious in sustaining its ties with Iran, lest it antagonize the United States or the West (Armenian Weekly, March 5).

Georgia, where Iranian influence has been growing, has sought to limit perceptions of its associations since the Iran conflict began (see EDM, March 9). Tbilisi is possibly signaling that it may be distancing itself not only from Iran but also from Iran’s supporter, Moscow. [1]

Azerbaijan, in contrast to its two South Caucasus neighbors, has been affected by the conflict in Iran far more directly. Relations between Baku and Tehran have long been strained because as much as a third of the population of Iran is Azerbaijani Turkish, and some Azerbaijanis would like to annex the region where their co-ethnics live. Tensions between the two countries have flared, and on occasion, up to and including major military maneuvers, have been a feature of life there for some time. The Azerbaijani government has sought to limit the expression of such views and earlier this year promised that it would not allow Azerbaijan to be the base for any attack on Iran (Anadolu Agency, January 30). Consequently, Baku was outraged by a drone attack on Nakhchivan apparently launched from Iranian territory, pulled its diplomats out of Tehran, and threatened retaliation after pointedly welcoming U.S. support for its hard line in response to the attack, with some Azerbaijanis even saying Baku is ready to go to war against Iran itself (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 5; Svobodanaya Pressa; The Caspian Post; Caliber, March 7 [1], [2], [3], [4]). Tehran has now said it will not attack any country in the region that does not attack Iran and denies that it had any role in the drone attack on Nakhchivan (Anadolu Agency, March 8). That may have reduced tensions, but it has not ended them.

The Iranian conflict has caused many countries in the former Soviet space to mobilize their focus on its effects, something all those concerned with that region and the place of those countries within it in the broader world need to pay the closest possible attention to.

Note:

[1] On the growth of Iranian influence in Georgia, see Hudson Institute, March 3; on the recent investigations over the report, see JAM News, March 9.