Moscow Uses Oreshnik for Psychological Pressure 

Moscow Uses Oreshnik for Psychological Pressure 

Executive Summary:

• The use of ballistic missiles against Ukraine on January 8–9 had a demonstrative effect, aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners, as well as at the Russian domestic audience.
• Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter indicate the continuation of terror against Ukraine’s civilian population.
• Russia will most likely continue to combine kinetic strikes—or the use of various military systems—to support psyops against its adversaries.

On the night of January 8–9, the Russian army launched a strike on a critical infrastructure facility in Ukraine’s Lviv oblast. The target was located around 70 kilometers (43.5 miles) away from the Polish border (Radio Svoboda, January 9). Later, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was able to locate and identify fragments of the missile used in the attack. According to preliminary investigation data, it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Oreshnik, which Russia had already used once to strike Ukraine in 2024 (see EDM, November 21, 2024; SBU, January 9). The Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed the strike, stating that the Russian Armed Forces had launched the Oreshnik medium-range mobile ground missile system against critical targets in Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense emphasized that this was a response to the alleged “terrorist attack by the Kyiv regime on the President of the Russian Federation [Vladimir Putin’s] residence in Novgorod oblast, carried out on the night of December 29, 2025” (Telegram/@mod_russia, January 9).

According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the strikes on Putin’s Valdai residence did not happen (see EDM, January 12). In his opinion, the spread of false information by the Russians is a reaction to the successful meetings between the Ukrainian and U.S. sides on the peace process, in particular to his personal meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on December 28, 2025 (Ukrinform, December 30, 2025). For an international audience, Moscow is trying to portray Kyiv as an aggressor disrupting the fragile peace process and unworthy of U.S. support. The absence of an attack on the residence was also confirmed by U.S. intelligence agencies (DW, January 1). Later, Trump himself stated that he did not believe that the attack happened (Reuters, January 5).

Within Russian society, this situation created a demand for revenge at the highest level. Major bloggers and Russian politicians equated the Ukrainian government with terrorist organizations and demanded the physical destruction of Zelenskyy, a “retaliatory strike” on government institutions in Kyiv, and critical infrastructure (BBC-Russian Service, December 30, 2025). This request from the Russians intensified after the U.S. operation in Venezuela against Nicolás Maduro and the arrest of the tanker Bella-1 (formerly Marinera), which took place despite the presence of Russian military ships nearby and the urgent change of the tanker’s flag to Russian for protection. Another important event was the “Coalition of the Willing” summit in Paris on January 6, and the announcement that partner countries were ready to deploy Coalition military forces in Ukraine to support the peace Telegramprocess (President of Ukraine, January 6).

As previously predicted, Russia was expected to intensify its attacks on critical energy infrastructure during the coldest months in Ukraine to enhance the psychological effect of kinetic strikes (see EDM, August 1, 2024, October 16, 2025). According to unconfirmed information from Russian sources, the strike was carried out on an underground gas storage facility in the Lviv oblast (/@wargonzo, January 9). In turn, the city of Lviv’s mayor, Andriy Sadovyi, did not provide any details other than that the strike was on an infrastructure facility in the Lviv oblast (Telegram/@andriysadovyi, January 9).

The time and place of the strike, as well as the target and the chosen weapon system, indicate that this was not purely a military strike but rather a psychological operation aimed at intimidating the people and decision-makers in Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union. Ukrainian experts share this opinion. In particular, Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, deputy director of an electronic warfare equipment company and a former officer of the Ukrainian Air Force, noted that this is a direct signal to Europe. This is especially true given that the missile’s flight time to the EU border is 10–15 minutes. In his opinion, Oreshnik will remain what it really is—“a loud, unjustifiably expensive attempt by Russia to prove its greatness, which is diminishing with each passing day” (Telegram/@ginandtolik, January 9).

The same view is shared by Anton Gerashchenko, former advisor to the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs and founder of the Institute of the Future. He wrote that this was a demonstrative strike that achieved nothing. Ukraine needs maximum support this winter and maximum pressure on Russia (X/@Gerashchenko_en, January 9). Another military expert, Pavlo Narozhnyi, claimed that the strike was instead a demonstration of capabilities rather than a real combat strike. It was a signal to Western audiences because the strike took place near the border with Poland, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country (24 Channel, January 9). Institute for the Study of War (ISW) experts believe the strike was likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to break Western support for Ukraine (ISW, January 9). This is, to some extent, confirmed by the appearance of pro-Russian publications in dubious sources that promote a similar narrative (NoctiLux Analysis, January 10).

Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrii Sybiha claimed “Putin uses an IRBM near EU and NATO border in response to his own hallucinations—this is truly a global threat. And it demands global responses” (X/@andrii_sybiha, January 9). Zelenskyy underlined that the strike was “pointedly close to the borders of the European Union. In terms of using medium-range ballistic missiles, this poses the same challenge for all: Warsaw, Bucharest, Budapest, and for many other capitals as well” (X/@ZelenskyyUa, January 9). The psychological goal of the strike coincides with the previous use of Oreshnik against an industrial facility in the city of Dnipro on November 21, 2024. That strike should also be viewed as an intimidation tactic rather than an attempt to cause real damage or gain military advantage (see EDM, November 21, 2024, February 3, 2025).

The latest Moscow attack with the Oreshnik IRBM on Ukraine demonstrated several trends. Russia is losing its geopolitical weight but is trying to compensate by taking demonstrative actions when it feels unpunished and stronger. Such actions are designed not so much for military effect as for psychological effect—to intimidate external audiences (primarily Ukraine and Europe) and to positively influence its own domestic audience to “sweeten the pill” of the lack of significant results on the front lines in Ukraine. The attack may indicate a continuation of the tactic of terror against the civilian population of Ukraine. According to the Russian authorities’ plan, the ultimate goal is likely to create the conditions for an uprising in Ukraine and the overthrow of the current government to force it to agree to surrender and stop attacks on critical infrastructure.