Boko Haram’s Radical Ideologue: An In-Depth Look At Northern Nigeria’s Abu Shekau
Boko Haram’s Radical Ideologue: An In-Depth Look At Northern Nigeria’s Abu Shekau
Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau (a.k.a. Abu Shekau) has made clear that he is the sole leader of the northern Nigeria-based Islamist movement called Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad, more commonly referred to as Boko Haram. However, he may be pulling the strings of only the most radical and violent wing of the Boko Haram movement that has evolved since the death of the group’s former leader, Mohammed Yusuf.
Even when Abu Shekau was the Deputy Leader under Yusuf, Shekau reportedly believed that Yusuf was too liberal. Shekau was known then for being the most influential and feared member of Boko Haram and for his uncompromising stance when it came to interpreting the Quran and the Hadith (Daily Trust [Abuja], August 15, 2009). Shekau was more popular among the younger Boko Haram members, while some of the older members saw him as too extreme compared to Yusuf. In fact, it may have been Shekau who, against Yusuf’s better instincts, ordered Boko Haram to attack Nigerian security forces before Ramadan in July 2009—a plan which backfired and resulted in scores of Boko Haram deaths, including Yusuf (The Daily Sun [Lagos], July 24, 2011).
Mohammed Yusuf was captured on the third day of the four-day long battle at Boko Haram’s Ibn Taimiyya enclave in Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern Borno State. Yusuf was then summarily executed by Nigerian security forces on July 30, 2009 (al-Jazeera, July 31, 2009).
Abu Shekau-Back From the Dead
Nigerian authorities initially believed Abu Shekau died on the second day of the confrontation along with scores of other Boko Haram members. They were so confident of Shekau’s death that when a video clip showing Shekau surfaced in July 2010, the Borno State police commissioner, Ibrahim Abdu, dismissed the footage as computer manipulation (Npf.gov, July 3, 2010). There were reports that Mohammed Yusuf himself led the funeral prayer for Abu Shekau and several members of Boko Haram who were killed by Nigerian security forces on the second day of the battle. Other sources said Abu Shekau was captured alive by the military and handed over to the police and killed in police custody just like Mohammed Yusuf.
Yet, unlike Yusuf, whose video footage was widely circulated hours after he was captured alive and killed, the same was not the case with Shekau, where neither photographs nor video footage revealed his status. According to a source at the Nigerian police command, it is possible that Shekau was captured by Nigerian forces, but released after the police failed to identify him as the Deputy Leader (Daily Trust [Abuja], August 15, 2009).
A 25-minute video later surfaced in which Abu Shekau appeared, Kalashnikov in tow, providing a de facto proof of life. The video not only confirmed that Abu Shekau was alive, but that he was intent on aligning Boko Haram’s post-Yusuf agenda with other global jihadi movements. The video was likely shot in or near Maiduguri because the interviewer was picked up there and driven for only one hour before reaching the hideout where Abu Shekau was staying under the protection of his armed guards (Daily Trust [Abuja], July 4, 2010). In the clip, Abu Shekau announced that he, “being the deputy (to Yusuf), stepped in and assumed leadership to continue the pursuit of religious knowledge.” He explained that he was shot in the thigh during the gun battle with Nigerian Security Forces, but that he was rescued by “fellow believers and protected by Allah” (AP, July 2, 2010).
Abu Shekau explained the ideology of Boko Haram, which roughly equates to “Western-style education is sin” in the Hausa language prevalent in much of northern Nigeria. He stated, “We are not fighting Western education itself, what we are opposed to are the various un-Islamic things slotted into it and the system upon which the study of Western education is rested. These are the reasons why we say it’s not permissible to study it.” Shekau justified Boko Haram’s use of guns manufactured by the West, arguing that “Guns are not products of Boko (non-Islamic education)…we also can make guns, we even made and used guns…We get them from where we get them. God said we should get them (weapons), the Holy Prophet said we should get them” (Nairaland.com, July 1, 2010).
Shekau is believed to be in his 50s with two wives (Guardian [Lagos], January 16, 2011). His most recent known hideout was in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State, which borders Borno State. On March 30, 2011 Nigerian forces raided a home in Damaturu suspected of hiding Boko Haram members. When police officers approached the house three of the suspects, including one believed to have been Shekau, they detonated explosives and escaped. Two wives of Shekau’s lieutenant one of whom is Mohammed Yusuf’s younger sister and three children were left behind (Daily Times [Lagos], March 31, 2011).
In contrast to the cult-like mass following that characterized Boko Haram under Mohammed Yusuf, under Abu Shekau it has focused more on short-term violence carried out by clandestine cells. Whereas Yusuf was an imam and a public figure, with Shekau as chief, Boko Haram’s communications have been disseminated through text messages, online videos, phone calls to media offices, posters, and other clandestine methods.
Transnational Aims
Abu Shekau seeks to raise Boko Haram’s profile as Nigeria’s wing in the transnational jihadi milieu. In his July 2010 video diatribe, Shekau addressed his speech to “leaders of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen” and sent “condolences on behalf of the mujahideen in Nigeria to the mujahideen in general, in particular to those in the ‘Islamic State of Iraq, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya Al-Libi, Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir, the Amir of the Islamic State in Somalia, the Amir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Amir of the Mujahideen in Pakistan, in Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and our religious clerics whom I did not mention.” The statement also had a warning to the United States: “Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury.”
Since Shekau took over in 2010 Boko Haram may have made contacts with other terrorist organizations. Boko Haram is yet to receive official recognition from al-Qaeda’s core leadership in the same manner that al-Shabbab were endorsed as the “lions of Islam in Somalia” by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are believed to be seeking or have already established links with each other (AP, August 17, 2011). Boko Haram recruitment networks and safe-havens reportedly extend into Nigeria’s northern border region as well as frontiers with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and possibly as far as Sudan and Somalia. [1] A large portion of Boko Haram’s finances that come from the Middle East are funneled through the informal remittance system known as hawala (Sunday Tribune [Ibadan], July 24, 2011). It is feared AQIM may also be influencing and encouraging Boko Haram’s increasingly pan-Islamic ideology espoused by Abu Shekau.
Nigerians have also reportedly been sighted in AQIM training camps near the Niger-Mauritania border. While there is no proof that those Nigerians are affiliated with Boko Haram, Boko Haram’s connections with AQIM or weapons suppliers abroad may explain the group’s adoption of suicide bombings and the growing sophistication of their attacks. For example, On May 12, 2011 at a joint police and military station, Boko Haram detonated a large explosive that can normally only be located on military installations, such as in Chad and Niger, two countries awash in arms (Elombah.com, June 27, 2011). On June 16, 2011 Boko Haram sent a suicide bomber to blow up his car at the Nigeria police headquarters in Abuja (AFP, June 16, 2011).
The Hostage Mystery
An approximately minute long video released August 3, 2011 depicts two European engineers who were kidnapped in May from their apartment in Kebbi State on the border with Niger and Benin. In the video, the men, an Italian and a Briton, deliver a statement to their respective governments urging them to meet the demands of the kidnappers, who they vaguely state are from al-Qaeda-without mentioning a specific regional franchise like AQIM (AFP, August 3, 2011). While the kidnappers may have been local criminals posing as AQIM (the video did not come from Al-Andalus, AQIM’s media organ), it is a sign that local groups have become aware of the power of affiliation with AQIM. AQIM is known to have penetrated Niger to the north but is not known at present to be operating inside Nigeria. In the worst-case scenario, the video means AQIM is in Nigeria and kidnapped the men, or that local groups with connections to AQIM kidnapped the men and handed them over to AQIM.
Communal Violence
Following a period of dormancy in the wake of Yusuf’s death, the turning point for Boko Haram was the bold attack on Bauchi prison by 50 Boko Haram gunmen on September 7, 2010 (Leadership [Abuja], September 8, 2010). Boko Haram seized new weapons and arms caches and 721 of 759 inmates escaped, including 173 suspected Boko Haram members who were awaiting trial.
More than three months later, on December 28, 2010, Abu Shekau appeared in another video statement. He took credit for a Christmas Eve 2010 church bombings in Jos and Maiduguri, denounced the continued use of the name “Boko Haram” by the media, and reissued the call for holy war. In his statement Shekau said, “We are the ones who carried out the attack on Jos…We are the Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad that have been maliciously branded Boko Haram…Everybody knows about the gruesome murders of Muslims in different parts of Nigeria…Jos is a testimony to the gruesome killings of our Muslim brethren and the abductions of our women and children whose whereabouts are still unknown.” “My message to my Muslim brethren is that they should know that this war is a war between Muslims and infidels. This is a religious war” (Nigeria Politico, June 19, 2011).
Boko Haram’s litany of attacks in the first half of 2011 included the assassination of gubernatorial candidates, cleric, and police officers; bomb attacks against elections rallies, police headquarters, churches, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the aforementioned first suicide bombings in Nigeria’s troubled history.
Boko Haram made its justification for these attacks on flyers distributed to media offices in Borno State in April 2011. Written in Hausa, the flyers were attributed by some sources to Shekau reading: “We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad in Nigeria and our cause is based on the traditions of the Holy Prophet. We would never believe in any system of government apart from the one agreed by Islam because we believe that it is the only way that can liberate the Muslims. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox. That is why we are fighting against democracy, capitalism, socialism and the rest” (Daily Trust [Abuja], April 25, 2011).
Forcing Terms of Negotiations
Since June 2011, an Abu Zaid has claimed to be the spokesperson of Boko Haram “appointed by the Amir (Abu Shekau).” To offer proof that he represents the “real” Boko Haram, he submitted to media outlets pre-attack videos and photos of the suicide-bomber who blew himself up at the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja. In July 2011, Abu Zaid attributed to Shekau a statement that said, “It is not the people that live in the town that are fighting the military and therefore why the sudden invasion into the privacy of civilians? We want to warn that if soldiers do not withdraw from Maiduguri within two days, we would confront them. We want to advise the civilians to look safer place and stay” (Daily Trust [Abuja], July 13, 2011).
In July, one month after the Abuja suicide bombing, President Goodluck Jonathan appointed seven people, including the ministers of defense and labor, to a negotiation committee that would act as a liaison between the federal government and Boko Haram and to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram (al-Jazeera, July 31, 2011). If Abu Shekau’s terms were not made clear by the July statement attributed to him from Abu Zaid, then Abu Shekau wasted no time in reminding the government the terms that must met bet before any reconciliation can take place.
In a five-minute clip released on July 24, 2011, Abu Shekau is flanked on both sides by two bodyguards and all three men sit cross-legged wearing military outfits. Abu Shekau says in Hausa that, “We know that in the Quran there are verses where it is said: ‘If you are offered reconciliation, you should accept it,’ but there are verses in the Quran where it is said: ‘If you are offered reconciliation, don’t accept it.” “We know where those verses apply… We know them all; we have read them in the Quran. We are fully aware that in Islam there is a provision for reconciliation, but there are conditions for reconciliation. Only a Muslim knows when to reconcile with a non-Muslim; it is not the non-Muslim who should impose conditions for reconciliation on the Muslim.”
Shekau offered several conditions for successful talks with government in the video, which he claims are justified by ayat (verses) from the Quran. These include the unconditional release of all of Boko Haram prisoners, the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the North-East, particularly Maiduguri, and cessation of all forms of persecution of Muslims, particularly Boko Haram members.
When a clip of President Jonathan appears in the video, Shekau says, “So, why should we be deceived by their utterances and abandon what God has commanded us to do? There is no talk of us abandoning what God says, much less be deceived by their utterances; even they are not really united on what to do with us.”
Shekau closes the video with an appeal to ordinary citizens, perhaps reacting to criticisms of Boko Haram from less violent factions in the movement. He says, “We are just fighting those who are fighting us, soldiers and police and the rest; and anybody, even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the government, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow, in God’s name. That is our way. But the ordinary people in town, we seek your forgiveness; I swear we will not harm you. We are not really seeking your permission, but God’s support. That’s all I wanted to say (Blueprint, July 25, 2011).”
Cracks in the Movement
In July 2011, a sect called the Yusuffiya Islamic Movement (YIM) condemned bombings and killings targeted at innocent civilians, stating, “people with evil motives have infiltrated our genuine struggle” (AP, July 20, 2011). In leaflets distributed July 20, 2011 to various wards, post offices and media houses in Maiduguri, the YIM distinguished itself from “the other group claiming to be fighting a jihad in the North” and “rejected the various labels ascribed to them, such as Boko Haram.”
The flyers also said, “We are concerned that some people with evil motives have infiltrated our genuine struggle with a false holy war that is outright un-Islamic. We call on this evil group to desist, failing which we shall have no option than to expose and hunt them…Finally, we have resolved to temporarily halt our fight against the assassination of our leaders in compliance with the prohibition of fighting in the holy month of Ramadan” (The Nation [Lagos], July 21, 2011). Given YIM’s loyalty to Yusuf’s comparatively more moderate persuasion, it is possible that they are the followers who considered Abu Shekau too extreme when Shekau was still Yusuf’s second-in-command.
Conclusion
Despite disagreements between former followers of Mohammed Yusuf over the use of violence and the possibility of negotiations with the government, Abu Shekau is unlikely to moderate his position. Shekau’s commitment to al-Qaeda-style terrorism has already been set forth in his statements and Boko Haram’s military strategy since he took over. Furthermore, his own life would be at risk from his own followers if he moderated. Abu Zaid said on July 21, 2011 that all members of the sect have sworn to be faithful, and that no member dared undermine the cause of Boko Haram, adding that “if our leader Abubakar Shekau decides to undermine this Jihad we shall not hesitate to kill him” (Nairaland.com, July 21, 2011).
Note
1. See Andre Le Sage, “The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 2011, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-268.pdf.
