Exceeding Expectations: An Assessment of Taliban Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada
Exceeding Expectations: An Assessment of Taliban Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada
On June 9, the Taliban announced a three-day ceasefire with Afghan forces (Pajhwok, June 9). This was the first time since the group was ousted from power in November 2001 that the Taliban has called for a ceasefire. Since then, although violence on the ground in Afghanistan has surged, the Taliban has engaged in two rounds of direct talks with the United States as well as in international negotiations hosted by Russia. Its new peace overtures have raised questions regarding its commitment to a negotiated settlement to the conflict and the capacity of its chief, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, to enforce a settlement on its fighters.
In May 2016, when Akhundzada, a religious cleric with little military experience, was declared Taliban chief following the death of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a drone strike, he was widely perceived by outside experts to be a weak leader. Thirty months after his ascension to the top post, it does seem that Akhundzada was “underestimated.” [1] He has managed to hold together a fragmenting Taliban. Indeed, the fortunes of the Taliban are on an upswing. The Taliban that the U.S. is engaging now at the negotiating table and on the battlefield is stronger than it has ever been over the past 17 years.
Background
Born in the late 1960s in Kandahar’s Panjwai district, Akhundzada came from a family of religious teachers. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, his family relocated to Baluchistan in Pakistan. He pursued religious studies there under the guidance of Afghan ulema (Islamic scholars). Akhundzada is reported to have participated in the Islamist resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. During Taliban rule (1996-2001), he worked at the Kandahar provincial court, where he came into contact with Mullah Omar, and then went on to head military courts in Nangarhar and Kabul until the fall of the regime (Afghan Analysts Network, May 27, 2016). His verdicts were harsh and reflected the Taliban’s extreme reading of Islam (Express Tribune, May 25, 2016). Akhundzada advised Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s founder-leader, on religious matters and enjoyed his trust (Afghan Analysts Network, May 27, 2016). When Mullah Mansour succeeded Mullah Omar, Akhundzada served as his deputy.
Why Akhundzada?
On May 25, 2016, the Taliban declared Akhundzada as its new chief. The decision was reportedly unanimous. Unlike the controversy and conflict that accompanied Mullah Mansour’s ascension, Akhundzada’s appointment to the top post was met with little resistance. Various Taliban commanders pledged allegiance to the new leader (Daily Outlook Afghanistan, May 29, 2016).
The decision of the Taliban shura (supreme council) to appoint Akhundzada as the chief was driven primarily by “concerns at that time over the insurgent group’s possible fragmentation.” Mullah Mansour’s leadership had been divisive—powerful military commanders like Mullah Rasoul had even broken away and taken with them many fighters. Akhundzada was seen as a person who would unify the Taliban. As the new chief, Akhundzada—who belongs to the Nurzai tribe—was expected “to placate the large number of Nurzai fighters in the Taliban and breakaway factions, who had been alienated by Mansour’s rule.” [2]
Scholar not Soldier
Unlike both his predecessors, Akhundzada lacks battlefield management experience. However, this does not seem to have weakened the Taliban’s capacity to carry out deadly attacks on high-security installations in Kabul or capture and hold territory. This is partly because Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network and a deputy of Akhundzada, has rich battlefield experience and provides the Taliban with military leadership. [3]
Besides, the Taliban insurgency is highly decentralized. “Taliban military commanders are empowered to make decisions regarding operations independently and with consultation sometimes of the military commission rather than the supreme leader. Akhundzada’s approval is not required in most cases.”[4]
Akhundzada’s biggest asset is his impressive knowledge and experience in Islamic law. He was a religious teacher to thousands of Taliban fighters—including the sons and grandsons of its leaders—during the winter months when there was a lull in fighting. He thus has their respect, acceptance and obedience. [5]His esteem surged when his son carried out a suicide attack on the “Sangorian group,” a government-backed anti-Taliban militia. [6] Akhundzada may not be charismatic but “his low-profile persona” has made him less controversial. [7]
As Taliban chief, Akhundzada has managed to unify the Taliban and keep it intact. Indeed, several Taliban leaders such as Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir and Mullah Baz Mohammad, who fell out with Mullah Mansour, “have returned to the fold and accepted Akhundzada as the new supreme leader.” [8]
Internal Challenges
Although Akhundzada’s leadership has arrested the fragmenting of the Taliban—which grew to serious proportions under Mansour—there are simmering tensions that could erupt in the future. Members of the Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council) from the southern provinces, for instance, are opposed to Haqqani’s prominence in the Taliban leadership. Issues of contention include appointments, areas of operation, distribution of resources and funding from other countries. Apparently, Haqqani is “receiving [a] significant amount of resources from Iran,” and leaders like Akhundzada and Gul Agha—head of the Taliban’s finance commission—resent Haqqani for not sharing it with them. [9]
Akhundzada does not face any serious challenges to his leadership at this point. However, Pakistan’s recent release of former Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Biradar “could insert a new element into the Taliban leadership situation.” Biradar has rich battlefield experience and by being close to Mullah Omar he had established his high status in the Taliban. His return from eight years in Pakistan’s custody will see him “catapulted to a still higher position.” His membership in the Rahbari Shura is likely to be revived. He could be “the frontrunner as the Taliban’s next leader if something happens to Akhundzada.” However, it is unlikely that Akhundzada would be replaced to make way for Biradar in the near future; no Taliban supreme leader has been replaced hitherto and is unlikely to happen in Akhundzada’s case. [10]
Calculated Risks
Under Akhundzada, the Taliban has adopted a rather fluid approach to jihadist groups. Relations with al-Qaeda remain strong but Akhundzada seems to be seeking some distance from the group, perhaps on account of Haqqani’s strong ties to the group. [11] Although Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri expressed allegiance to Akhundzada, the latter is yet to publicly acknowledge Zawahiri’s pledge.
As for the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), in his initial months as Taliban chief, Akhundzada—who was perhaps keen on the Taliban focusing its energies on the Afghan government—called on his fighters to avoid clashes with ISKP. [12] It was only when ISKP continued to attack the Taliban that the latter went all out against the group. This is in contrast to Mullah Mansour, who was relentless in his targeting of ISKP from the start.
In recent months, Akhundzada has taken steps that even his powerful predecessors did not risk. For instance, in June, the Taliban reciprocated a unilateral ceasefire announced by the Afghan government. The move was fraught with risk: Afghan soldiers and Taliban hardliners opposed to the truce could have sabotaged it. That the latter did not indicates that the rank-and-file “continue to obey orders from above.” [13]
On becoming its chief, Akhundzada stated that the Taliban would not participate in “any type of peace talks” (Press TV, May 25, 2016). Indeed, in his statements he routinely describes the Afghan government as American, corrupt, and incompetent and has refused to engage in talks with it unless U.S. troops leave the country. Like his predecessors, he has been demanding “direct dialogue” with the U.S. (Voice of Jihad, August 18).
Akhundzada’s rhetoric on talks makes him seem uncompromising and intransigent. Yet the Taliban under his leadership announced a ceasefire—albeit a short one—and is engaged in direct talks not only with the U.S. but, for the first time, with Russia as well. So is Akhundzada not the hardliner on talks he was thought to be? Is this scholar-leader, in contrast to his soldier-predecessors, likely to lead the Taliban towards peace?
This is unlikely.
Afghan analysts say that the Taliban announced a ceasefire as it “had no other choice.” Had it rejected the Afghan government’s ceasefire, it would have appeared intransigent and unreasonable. This would have helped President Ghani sell the idea to the international community that it was “irreconcilable. As for the ongoing peace talks, the Taliban’s participation is tactical. Haqqani is hoping to secure the release of his brother, who is in American custody, under some deal with the U.S. [14] Clearly, Akhundzada understands well the tactical benefits of ceasefires and talks.
Advantage Taliban
The Taliban is doing well on the battlefield and now controls more land than it ever has in the past 17 years. The Taliban-ISKP competition in Afghanistan is going in the Taliban’s favor and ISKP controls only a few districts in Nangarhar province. The Taliban has managed to gain a degree of legitimacy and respectability with countries like Russia and Iran, which until recently regarded it as a terrorist threat (The Hindu, September 21). Even India has come around to participating in the Russia-led talks with the Taliban, albeit in a non-official capacity (Tolo News, November 9)
Conclusion
As Taliban chief, Akhundzada has exceeded expectations so far. His main achievement was to unify the group. In the two-and-a half years that he has been at the helm, the Taliban has performed well on the battlefield. Whether it will be able to translate these military successes into gains at the negotiating table remains to be seen.
Of course, these achievements cannot be credited to Akhundzada alone. Circumstances have favored him. The Taliban has done well militarily because of the drawing down of U.S.-led forces. Again, U.S. military offensives against ISKP have benefited the Taliban. And fear of ISKP has prompted countries like Russia to support the Taliban. Still, had Akhundzada not held the Taliban together, it wouldn’t have been able to draw advantage from these developments.
Notes
[1] Author Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, Peshawar-based expert on the Taliban, November 6. [2] Author Interview with Indian intelligence official, November 2. [3] Ibid. [4] Yusufzai, n.1. [5] Indian intelligence official, n.2. [6] Author Interview with Hekmatullah Azamy, Acting Head of the Kabul-based Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, October 22. [7] Indian intelligence official, n.2. [8] Yusufzai, n.1. [9] Azamy, n.6. [10] Yusufzai, n.1. [11] Indian intelligence official, n.2. [12] Azamy, n.6. [13] Indian intelligence official, n.2. [14] Azamy, n.6.
