Iraq’s Powerful PMU Commander: Hadi al-‘Ameri
Iraq’s Powerful PMU Commander: Hadi al-‘Ameri
On July 29, Iraqi Prime Minister Hadier al-‘Abadi revealed that the predominately Shia volunteer force known collectively as al-Hashed al-Sha’abi (PMU, Popular Mobilization Units) will take part in the imminent military operations to push out Islamic State (IS) from its stronghold in the city of Tal ‘Afar, Nineveh province, approximately 70 kilometers (km) northwest of Mosul (al-Sumaria, July 29). Given the important role the PMU continues to play in Iraq, it is worth examining one of the top PMU commanders. Hadi al-‘Ameri is a central figure in Iraqi affairs not only because he is the commander of the strongest and most popular PMU group, the Badr Brigade, but also because of his role as the secretary general of the Badr Organization party. He is one of the most popular, and certainly most powerful, politicians in Iraq today.
Early Life
Hadi Farhan Abdullah al-‘Ameri—usually referred to as Abu Hassan al-‘Ameri or Hajj Hadi by his followers and Iraqi media—was born in 1954, to a middle class family in the eastern Iraqi province of Diyala, some 90 km northeast of Baghdad. His conservative Shia upbringing had an important influence on him. In his early teens, al-‘Ameri participated in Shia religious-political activism. Later, he moved to the Adhamyiah neighborhood north of Baghdad to attend the University of Baghdad, graduating with a bachelor’s degree in statistics in 1976 (al-Arabiya, June 10, 2016; al-Jazeera, February 28, 2016).
Religious and Political Involvement
The concept of Taqlid (to imitate or to follow) carries special significance in Islamic legal terminology, especially for the Shia sect. Put simply, it requires ordinary Muslims to follow the commandants of a higher religious authority, known as Mujtahd or Faqih, based on original judgments that the Faqih have derived, grounded in years of study and exploration of a subject (Center for Islamic Shia Studies). In his early religious activism, al-‘Ameri was a Muqlid (follower) of the highly distinguished Shia scholar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, founder of the Islamic al-Da’wa Party, led currently by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (al-Arabiya, June 10, 2016). The late Baqir al-Sadr, who was the father-in-law of influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and cousin of Muqtada’a father Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was murdered, along with his sister Bint al-Huda, by the regime of Saddam Hussein in April 1980 (al-Qanoun Press, April 9, 2016). The brutal murders followed al-Sadr’s fatwa (religious pronouncement) in the late 1970s prohibiting his followers from joining the Ba’ath party (Iraq Center.net).
Saddam’s regime was also targeting Baqir al-Sadr’s followers. As a result, al-‘Ameri had to flee to neighboring Iran in early 1980s, out of fear for his life. There he allied with Saddam’s fiercest opponent — the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. In Iran, he helped to establish, with the Iranian government’s support and funding, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was then led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the late uncle of Iraqi cleric and politician Ammar al-Hakim (al-Arabiya, June 10, 2016).
SCIRI’s main mission was to fight and ultimately topple the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad. For that to happen, it had to join forces with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), through SCIRI’s military wing, the Badr Corps or Brigades, which drew membership from Iraqi exiles, deserted soldiers and prisoners of war known as Tawabeen or those who renounced their membership in Saddam’s military and the Ba’ath party. During the I980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Corps took part in various attacks against Iraqi forces, such as the Kerbala II operation in Kerda Kou Mountain in the mid-1980s (al-Ghad Press, January 21, 2016).
Al-‘Ameri’s himself is reported to have played a key operational role in the war. For example, in a 1987 interview with the war correspondent for Iranian television, al-‘Ameri is heard describing, in Persian and Arabic, Badr’s heroism in the Gilan e-Gharb battle in 1987. Badr fighters, acting on the orders of Imam Khomeini, he said, fought for four consecutive days to “defend against the enemy [Iraqi army] and the hypocrites [presumably fighters from the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, better known as Mujahedeen e-Khalaq Organization]” (YouTube, September 12, 2015). Moreover, al-‘Ameri was also the Badr official in charge of planning operations inside Iraq, which took the form of guerrilla warfare, particularly in the marshes region in southern Iraq (al-Arabiya, June 10, 2016). Such operations were mostly by the Mujahidi al-Ahwar (Mujahedeen of the Marshes), which could refer to either Badr members who covertly entered Iraq to carry out the operations or local members of secret Badr cells.
Career in Post-2003 Iraq
The regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled by the U.S.-led coalition in April 2003. Most of the Iraqi opposition leaders who were in exile, in Iran and elsewhere, had by then returned to Iraq and been appointed to high-ranking positions in the government, especially on the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. Generally speaking, most of the Shia individuals and groups who came to power had lived and/or received training in Iran. SCIRI is the most prominent of such groups; it was, and still is, the most organized and heavily armed group, building on years of experience.
The Badr Corps, SCIRI’s military wing, operated as an armed group for about a year in 2003-2004. In early 2005, in an effort to bolster the rule of law in Iraq, U.S authorities in Iraq began cracking down on groups that operated outside the control of the state. They were allowed to join the political process and/or security forces. Badr accepted, and changed its name to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development, pledging to dismantle its armed membership. As a result, al-‘Ameri became a member of the Iraqi House of Representatives (Parliament), following the results of the 2005 elections. In 2010, he was chosen by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to head the Ministry of Transportation, a position he held until July 2014 (National Iraqi News Agency, December 21, 2010).
Expelling Islamic State
In June 2014, Islamic State launched an unexpected offensive on Iraqi territory, targeting Mosul city in Nineveh province and Tikrit city in Salah al-Deen province. IS then moved on to capture other towns and cities in western and northern Iraq. On June 29, 2014, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of a caliphate that stretched from Raqqa province in Syria to Diyala province in Iraq, the birthplace of al-‘Ameri, which IS captured large parts of during its June 2014 onslaught.
Shaken by the collapse of security forces, al-Maliki turned to none other than Hadi al-‘Ameri to help reclaim territories in geographically strategic Diyala (al-Gharbiya News, July 2, 2014). By mid-2016, al-‘Ameri’s Badr Brigade, with the help of Shia volunteers from other groups that answered the call of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to fight IS, had effectively pushed IS out of large swaths of Iraqi territory. The reclaimed regions included, among others, al-Muqdadiya in Diyala province; Jurf al-Sakhar district in Babylon province; Amerli, al-Dour and Baiji in Salah al-Deen province; Fallujah in al-Anbar province (YouTube, January 24, 2015; al-Sumaria, August 31, 2014 ; al-Alam, October 25, 2014). Al-‘Ameri’s successes against IS led admirers to name him the “Da’esh (IS) Burier and King of Victories.” Even after seeing major successes in the fight against IS, al-’Ameri has not returned to parliament. Today, he continues to command PMUs fighters, clearing and holding Iraq-Syria border areas (YouTube, June 4). For al-‘Ameri, these successes would not have been possible if it weren’t for Iran’s early military assistance in 2014, which helped halt IS advances.
Aside from historical ties dating back to the 1980s, al-‘Ameri’s open relations with Tehran are also motivated by pragmatism. “Iran is the first country that stood by Iraq against [Islamic State]. It quickly sent ammunition and experts to help us with the fight,” al-‘Ameri once said (Noon Post, June 23, 2015). His attitude is also influenced by the fact that the “Islamic Republic [of Iran] supported the toppling of Saddam regime, and [continues to] back us. Without the Iranian support, Baghdad and Erbil would have fallen [to IS],” he added (Shafaqna, March 27). His ties with and positive disposition toward Iran have led some of his critics to label him “Iran’s general in Iraq” (al-Jazeera, February 28, 2016).
Outlook
The Badr Organization maintains almost unequalled political and paramilitary power in Iraq. It also maintains solid relations with other PMU groups and security organizations, especially the interior ministry. Badr Secretary General Hadi al-Ameri is likely to head the National Coalition bloc in the upcoming elections, which could bring him closer to the post of prime minister.
Al-‘Ameri’s leadership in the PMU makes him stronger than ever. If his coalition wins big in May 2018 elections, he could possibly undo some of al-Abadi’s reforms by doing such things as staffing the security apparatus with loyalists, jeopardizing professionalism. The fact that al-‘Ameri is a strong opponent of dismantling the PMUs, often citing the legality of its formation, suggests that Badr Corps is likely to become the basis for new security forces in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Badr Corps remains as it is today if al-‘Ameri were to become prime minister, because it would open the door for other politicians to have private militias, ultimately impacting al-‘Ameri’s political office. He is a pragmatic actor — often more pragmatic than al-Maliki. Al-‘Ameri grew up in religiously mixed Diyala province and has a track record of working with Sunnis, Turkmen, and Kurds, experience that may show its influence in his next phase.
