Muqtada al-Sadr’s Radical Rival: A Portrait of Qais al-Khaz’ali

Muqtada al-Sadr’s Radical Rival: A Portrait of Qais al-Khaz’ali

For most observers, the link between the release of British hostage Peter Moore, held in Iraq for two and a half years and the nearly simultaneous release of Iraqi militia commander Qais al-Khaz’ali by Iraqi authorities was clear and obvious. Al-Khaz’ali, a Shiite cleric, was moved from an American military prison in Baghdad to Iraqi custody in late December. American and British authorities denied the existence of any prisoner exchange deal. Moore, an IT consultant who was kidnapped in Baghdad along with his four bodyguards, was released on December 30, 2009. On the same day, the Iraqi government announced that al-Khaz’ali had been handed over to the Iraqis. A few days later, al-Khaz’ali was reportedly set free by the Interior Ministry, though the Iraqi government’s liaison officer on hostage issues claimed al-Khazali was still in custody facing various charges (al-Manar, January 5, 2010; Reuters, January 5, 2010). 

Al-Khaz’ali is the leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous – AAH), the group that abducted the British men in a raid on the Iraqi Ministry of Finance building. Three of the bodyguards were killed and their bodies were previously traded for the release of other AAH figures. The fourth bodyguard, Alan McMenemy, is also believed to be dead. The American army classifies AAH as one of the “Special Groups”; Iranian-backed Shiite militias that split from the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army – JAM) militia of Muqtada al-Sadr. 

Qais al-Khaz’ali was arrested on March 22, 2007 along with other leaders of AAH. All were accused of being responsible for killing five American soldiers in Karbala (see Terrorism Monitor, June 25, 2009). Currently in his mid-thirties, al-Khaz’ali comes from the southern city of Diwania. In the 1990s, Qais al-Khaz’ali was one of the young clerics who joined the movement led by Muqtada’s father, the late Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (assassinated in February 1999). After the fall of Saddam Hussein, al-Khaz’ali became very close to Muqtada. One of his first posts was heading the regional office of the Sadr movement in al-Rusafa (East Baghdad). The Shiite district of Sadr City, Muqtada’s most important stronghold, was within his area.  

In the second Battle of Najaf between American forces and the Sadrists in the summer of 2004, al-Khaz’ali was a field commander and the spokesman for Muqtada. According to the account of al-Khaz’ali’s deputy, Akram al-Ka’abi, the idea of forming AAH emerged after that battle:  

Al-Khaz’ali and the other AAH leaders avoided appearing in public. They did not issue statements regularly. In the beginning they did not stress their differences with Muqtada al-Sadr and the wider Sadrist movement he leads. AAH does not have an official website but has started to place videos of their attacks on Coalition forces on the Internet. Most of the attacks were carried out through the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). AAH has a sister organization, Hezbollah in Iraq, led by another previous spokesman of Muqtada, Ahmad al-Shaibani. The rhetoric and the attack styles of the two groups are similar.  

AAH has not denied getting support from Iran. Salam al-Maliki, former Minister of Transportation and an AAH figure explained in an interview, “AAH has relations of accord and coordination with Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, influential parties in the Iranian government and Shiite figures from the Gulf. We have things in common, including religion, sect, resisting the occupation and rejecting the American presence in the area” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 10, 2009). 

The capture of Qais al-Khaz’ali did not seem to have any effect on the operational capabilities of AAH, but he did manage to retain his influence as the leader of the organization. At the beginning of 2009 it became known that there were negotiations between the Iraqi government and al-Khaz’ali who was being held in the American detention center at Camp Cropper near Baghdad International Airport. The purpose was to settle the issue of the British hostages in return for the freedom of al-Khaz’ali and his associates (al-Hayat, March 28, 2009). 

Al-Khaz’ali extended his influence inside the prison. He led Friday prayer and made Friday speeches. In one of those speeches he called on the Iraqi government to release the resistance prisoners, offer an amnesty to those who fled the country and reconsider the sentences of death or life imprisonment given to Shiite insurgents (Eljnub.com, May 17, 2009). 

The expanding presence of AAH seems to have upset Muqtada al-Sadr. He denounced AAH leaders and denied that they were affiliated with his movement anymore. The Sadrists also criticized AAH over their negotiation with the government (Roafd.com, June 12, 2009). AAH responded by saying that they were not part of Muqtada’s group but an independent entity (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 10, 2009). 

The Shiite web forums published a letter that al-Khaz’ali wrote to Muqtada. AAH did not deny it and the style sounds authentic. In the letter, al-Khaz’ali points out the following: 

• “The negotiation was with the government, not the occupiers. Yet it was not against Islam to negotiate directly with the occupation.” 
• “Our goal is to release the prisoners, not to end the resistance. That is what happened in Lebanon and Palestine.”
• “We declared a ceasefire to give the government a chance to end the occupation. The international and local circumstances are suitable to end the occupation by peaceful means, while you [Muqtada] declared your ceasefires under unsuitable circumstances.”
• “We were not negotiating under your [Muqtada’s] name. We have our [own] names and figures” (Iairaq.com, October 19, 2009).

Since June 2009, the Iraqi government has started to deal with the AAH as a political group. The release of al-Khaz’ali will support that, though many Sunnis accuse the AAH of being responsible for attacks against civilians. The AAH has always claimed that it only targeted foreign forces. The debate will not end until the facts are revealed through an inquiry. Such a move seems very unlikely as the Americans themselves did not charge the AAH leaders with attacks against their forces. Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki needs any support he can find within the Shiite community. He will have to face a coalition of the main Shiite parties (including Muqtada’s) in the general election next March. Sunni politicians criticized the government’s friendly approach towards the AAH while refusing similar treatment for Sunni insurgent groups. 

The events of the last year have led to the public break of the AAH from Muqtada’s movement. All the indications suggest that AAH has special relations with Iran. The terms of those relations are not clear, but most of the Sunni media label them as controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Throughout the saga of the British hostages, Qais al-Khaz’ali has proved that he has tight control of the AAH. He definitely lacks the political charisma of Muqtada al-Sadr, but the AAH has demonstrated that it possesses very well trained fighters who have adapted various tactics to serve specific goals. The AAH is an example of the effectiveness of a relatively small insurgent group with high quality training and performance, surviving the hardest years of the Iraqi insurgency without losing any of its prominent leaders in the fight or in the courts.