The New Face of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood? A Post-Mortem Analysis of Hassm Leader Mohamed Ashour Dashisha

The New Face of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood? A Post-Mortem Analysis of Hassm Leader Mohamed Ashour Dashisha

A new strand of Islamist jihadism— one more in line with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology than Salafism—has been taking shape in the context of Egypt’s ongoing Islamist insurgency. This developing strand is the byproduct of the violent aftermath of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster from power in July 2013. In the span of a few months, security forces killed over a thousand Islamist supporters of the group in clashes and Islamists themselves perpetrated many acts of violence, specifically against Christians and security forces.

The violence perpetrated by Islamist actors unaffiliated with Salafist-Jihadist ideology first began with a focus on the sabotage of critical infrastructure and some use of firearms between fall 2013 and spring 2014 (al-Masry al-Youm, July 5, 2015; El Shorouk, April 8, 2014). [1] This was largely carried out by so-called “special committees” set up by late senior Muslim Brotherhood leader and Guidance Bureau member Mohamed Kamal (Mada Masr, October 6, 2016). These committees and others evolved into a slightly more armed and organized violent second wave that hit Egypt from summer 2014 through fall 2015, with group names like “Revolutionary Punishment” popping up. [2] By 2016, those left standing from this milieu had developed into hardened fighters, and thus a third generation of armed terrorist groups with names like Hassm (decisiveness) and Liwaa al-Thawra (Revolution’s Brigade) emerged.

The most sophisticated of these new groups has been Hassm, which has carried out nine attacks, including two utilizing vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) (al-Masry al-Youm, October 1, 2016; Atlantic Council, October 3, 2016; El Shorouk, November 4, 2016). Little is known about the group. However, Egyptian authorities have made a number of high-profile arrests, and the government has outlined in investigations thus far its belief that the group is a secret paramilitary wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. [3] The group’s ideology also strongly echoes the Sharia justification for violence outlined in a book authored by a group of Muslim Brotherhood aligned scholars that was directly commissioned by a pro-violence wing in the organization (Foreign Affairs, January 4, 2016). [4] The recent death of one of Hassm’s leaders helps shed some light on the type of individuals that make up these new terrorist groups and seems to provide some support to the government’s theory.

Background

On December 17, 2016, Egyptian security forces raided an apartment in the 6th of October city on the far western outskirts of Giza governorate. A firefight erupted that resulted in the deaths of one suspect and one police conscript. Two days later, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior released a statement clarifying that the suspect was 26 year-old Hassm member Mohamed Abdel Khaleq Farag Dashisha (a.k.a. Mohamed Ashour Dashisha, a.k.a. al-Mufakir al-Der’my). [5] The government claimed Dashisha was specifically responsible for the “Kerdasa Armed Operations Unit.” Kerdasa is the village in Giza from which Dashisha hailed and a known Muslim Brotherhood stronghold. The statement also stated that Dashisha held an Arabic degree from the Cairo University’s faculty of Dar al-Ulum, a prestigious teachers’ training college that instructs in Arabic and Islamic studies.

On December 18, Hassm released a long statement eulogizing the fallen leader—the first such statement released by the group—signifying Dashisha’s prominence in the organization. [6] The statement referred to him by his popular name, Mohamed Ashour Dashisha, and confirmed the government’s account of a firefight. It went on to say that Dashisha was an example of “Hassm’s heroes,” and further confirmed that he went to Dar al-Ulum by referring to him as “Der’my,” which is a nickname used by graduates of the school.  According to Hassm, Dashisha was a hafiz (someone who memorized the entire Quran) and a preacher, likely signifying his possible ideological role in the organization. They also spoke vaguely of Dashisha’s jihadist exploits, saying that they will reveal the details in the future. The statement ended with a vow of revenge and a warning that, “[Dashisha] inaugurated with his virtuous blood a new era of jihad and resistance.”

Social Media Activity

The day Dashisha was killed several social media pages and websites directly affiliated with or sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood claimed that he was simply an innocent youth who had been wrongfully accused by the government. The Freedom and Justice Party’s (FJP) website, the official political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, published a web story claiming that Dashisha was innocent and described him as a “martyr” (Freedom and Justice Party, December 17, 2016). The author of the article provided a screenshot of Dashisha’s Facebook page.

At first glance, the page appeared to be owned by an ordinary person. The handle used was al-Mufakir al-Der’my (meaning a thinker who is a graduate of Dar al-Ulum), a nickname graduates of Dar al-Ulum frequently use. The cover photo showed a picture of Mohamed Morsi, the ousted Muslim Brotherhood president, the dome of the rock, and an unknown male, likely a friend of Dashisha who had died. His bio also showed that he worked as a “Sharia researcher” at an organization called “Ummah Institute for Media, Publishing, and Research,” though no record of such an institute exists online.  According to Dashisha’s brother, he graduated in 2012 and taught Arabic at a school in Giza. [7] Many of Dashisha’s posts closer to the time of his death were oddly about giving advice to students on how to do well in university and showed no hint of his involvement in terrorist activity. This is an example of how, unlike al-Qaeda and Islamic State — who usually boast of their violence or support for it and are thus easier for analysts to track — Egyptian Islamists involved in militant activity with suspected ties to the Muslim Brotherhood go to great lengths to hide their involvement in any such activity.

Although the Facebook page was quickly taken down, the author of this article was able to archive posts by Dashisha dating to 2013. Dashisha’s Facebook page remains the only source of information about him outside the statements of Hassm and the government. A careful review of dozens of Dashisha‘s posts outlines his explicit support for the Muslim Brotherhood and likelihood of being a member of that organization beyond the first tier. [8] In several posts, Dashisha posted statements by Hassan al-Banna from Brotherhood aligned social media pages, as well as Imam Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In one post, he referred to Muslim Brotherhood leader Salah Soltan by saying “those are our leaders.” In another post, he told friends to go online and read a message written by Muslim Brotherhood cadres to the leaders and prayed, “May God Guide the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.” In others, he implored Muslim Brotherhood leaders to unite, declared that there is no honor without jihad, and urged them to remember the group’s motto: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” Many other posts focused on his friends or extended family who were arrested or sentenced to prison by authorities. One photo showed Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie behind bars; another showed Dashisha sitting with friends in a mosque reading the Quran; and another was of him holding a sign that reads “What have you done for your brothers in Syria?” Another photo online shows him in Egyptian military fatigues from the time of his conscription, likely prior to 2013.

Alleged Terrorist Activity

Although Hassm did not give details about Dashisha‘s exploits, a popular Facebook page called “Resistance Media” known for its support of Hassm said that authorities were pursuing Dashisha on charges of being involved in a May 2016 attack in Helwan  (al-Arabiya, May 8, 2016). [9] The only issue is that Islamic State also claimed the Helwan attack. The moderators of the page were not far off, however. The Ministry of the Interior’s statement issued a few days later said Dashisha was charged in State Security case no. 79/2016. The specifics of the charges in this case remain closed to the public. The first attack logged in the case was the explosion at an IED factory in Giza in January 2016, caused by terrorists targeting the officers who were raiding it. At the time, both the Islamic State and Revolutionary Punishment (the immediate predecessor to Hassm) claimed credit for the attack, suggesting a possible overlap in operations, but nothing was ever definitively proven (al-Masry al-Youm, January 21, 2016; al-Hayat, January 23 2016; CTC Sentinel, April 22, 2014). Eventually, case no.79 would be referred to in the Egyptian press as the “Mobilization of the Armed Committees,” a name given to what are believed to be the advanced form of the “Special Committees” formed in 2014 by Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Kamal. Further, this name serves as a catch-all for all suspected Muslim Brotherhood-linked violent activities beginning in 2016. If the government was correct in charging Dashisha in that early case, then it would mean he was likely involved in said committees in the lead up of the creation of the more advanced Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra.

Conclusion

Mohamed Abdel Khaleq Dashisha provides an important window into understanding this emerging militant Islamist strand, as he is the first leader to be identified by an Islamist terrorist group with suspected ties to the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013. His biography — a likely Muslim Brotherhood cadre steeped in theology and from a conservative Brotherhood stronghold — is perhaps no surprise, though it provides specific data points that support the hypothesis that there are Muslim Brotherhood cadres who are members of these militant groups. The fundamental question that remains is whether Dashisha and his Hassm compatriots, who were theorizing a new direction for jihad, are operating as the new “Secret Apparatus” for the Muslim Brotherhood or rather a Syria-style “Fighting Vanguard”—technically outside the Muslim Brotherhood but still very much cooperating with elements inside it.  Regardless, it remains likely that more Muslim Brotherhood youth like Dashisha will continue to answer a call for jihad that some in the Muslim Brotherhood appear to have sounded.

NOTES

[1] Mokhtar Awad and Mostafa Hashem, “Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency,” Carnegie, October 2015 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_58_Egypt_Awad_Hashem_final.pdf

[2] The group website of “Revolutionary Punishment” documents its formation and rise. https://el3qab.wordpress.com/

[3] Egypt’s Ministry of Interior video statement, November 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fk9i7An-34w; Press Release of Egypt’s State Prosecution, January 2017, https://akhbar.akhbarelyom.com/newdetails.aspx?sec=%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB%20%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7&g=6&id=316539

[4] Book titled “Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup,” https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/The%20Jurisprudence%20of%20Popular%20Resistance%20to%20the%20Coup.pdf
[5] Egypt’s Ministry of Interior statement, December 2016, https://www.facebook.com/MoiEgy/photos/a.181676241876047.36036.181662475210757/1266591060051221/?type=3&theater
[6] Hassm statement, December 2016, https://hasamegypt.com/?p=229
[7] Author’s interview with Dashisha’s brother, online, January 31, 2017.

[8] Screenshots of the referenced posts plus all other pictures referenced in this article can be accessed here: https://imgur.com/a/Y4piR
[9] Resistance Media Facebook Page, December 2016, https://www.facebook.com/qawem.media2/photos/a.906684259459894.1073741828.906638539464466/1011082979020021/?type=3&theater