Taking the Reigns of AQIM: A Profile of Jamal Oukacha
Taking the Reigns of AQIM: A Profile of Jamal Oukacha
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) confirmed the death in mid-June of one of its most senior leaders Abd al-Hamid Abu Zeid. Abu Zeid was a key commander on AQIM’s North Africa branch who was killed while fighting against French-led forces in northern Mali (Jeune Afrique, June 16). AQIM leadership has since named Jamal Oukacha as his replacement. Oukacha (a.k.a. Yahya Abu al-Hammam) is a 35-year-old from Reghaïa, Algeria (for more details on his personal history see Militant Leadership Monitor, April 2013). Oukacha is a close aide of AQIM chief Abd al-Malik Droukdel. Oukacha became amir of the southern region in October 2012 even though he had never been in charge of a katiba (brigade), signaling the great confidence Abd al-Malik Droukdel had for him. In his new role, Oukacha is responsible for AQIM operations in southern Algeria and northern Mali.
A Comparison with Abu Zeid
Oukacha can be considered part of a new generation of jihadists: born in the late 1970s. He was only a child during the 1980s when many Algerian militants left the country to join the international anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan (a key period for many international Jihadists in general and for Algerians in particular, as many of them would then be active in the country during the civil war of the 1990s). Although very young, Oukacha soon joined radical organizations, and was jailed in 1995 for about 18 months (Jeune Afrique, April 9). His presence in the Algerian jihadist panorama became more apparent during the 1998 split of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) from the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), although Oukacha did not have positions of particular relevance within either organization (Afrik.com, March 25). He is considered to be extremely close to formal AQIM leader Droukdel and believed to be much more focused on pure jihad—with some tactical flexibility—than on making money from illegal activities (Le Courrier d’Algérie, March 26).
In the first period of his militancy, the declining period of the GIA, Oukacha served in the northeast of Algeria, where he strengthened his relationship with Droukdel. Oukacha started operating in the Sahelian regions only after 2003, a period that marked the beginning of the geographical shift for Algerian terrorism that culminated ten years later in the takeover of northern Mali and the ensuing French intervention. Oukacha is considered a rather pious militant with a calm demeanor and yet particularly resolute in his support of jihad. He is widely considered particularly skilled in action, being a good marksman and widely respected as a leader capable of managing ethnically and nationally heterogeneous groups.
His predecessor, Abu Zeid was born in the late 1950s (although some sources date his birth to the mid-1960s). Zeid joined the Fronté Islamique du Salut (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) in the late 1980s and became one of the key figures of the so-called “Southerns”—those jihadists originally from southern Algeria and whose theater of action has generally been the wider Sahelian area. The path that led Zeid to terrorism makes him unique from other Algerian militant leaders; generally, terrorists of the 1990s were trained in Afghanistan, while Zeid spent his entire career in Algeria. He turned to smuggling out of necessity and found in jihad a narrative to express his disaffection and rage against the Algerian state.
Zeid was born in the area of Azouz Touareg, in the eastern region of DebDeb, Algeria in the wilaya (province) of Illizi, near the intersection of the borders of Tunisia, Libya and Algeria. As a teenager, Zeid worked as a shepherd.
In the late 1970s, Zeid started smuggling goods to al-Oued, Algeria from Libya out of necessity. He was not very keen to smuggle illicit goods such as cigarettes, but his encounters with the Algerian security forces radicalized his resentment against the state. A mixture of antipathy for the government of Algeria and the death of his father in 1989 pushed Zeid to embrace radical Islamist ideology, joining the ranks of the FIS in the late 1980s, then the GIA in the early 1990s and then becoming one of the key supporters of GSPC in the late 1990s.
The GSPC was rebranded in late 2006 as AQIM and shifted its focus to contraband activity in 2008 with a lesser focus on minor jihad. [1] Zeid was the driving force behind this operational shift. Zeid was a major ally of Droukdel during the 1990s and his appointment as a major commander in the south demonstrated the confidence Droukdel had in him. His knowledge of and attachment to the region as well as his money-driven attitude prevented Zeid from being just an envoy of Droukdel in the region. Zeid operated comparatively independently, mixing organized crime and minor jihad.
Oukacha is different. Although he has strong knowledge of the region, he was not born there: he started operating in the southern regions where AQIM is present over the past ten years, thus it is likely that he does not enjoy the geographical and social depth that Abu Zeid had in the area. Oukacha’s relationship with the AQIM leadership in the Kabylie (a region in the north of Algeria) is stronger. Oukacha also tends toward pure jihadist activity more than illegal economic activities. Contraband activity is fundamental for the overall functioning of the organization, but under Oukacha it will likely become less central to the operational core of AQIM.
Oukacha’s Mission: Rebalancing AQIM
The decision to appoint Oukacha as the amir of the south in late 2012 and to subsequently appoint him as the new leader of AQIM in the Sahel, is a signal of the formal leadership’s desire to regain influence on the strategic orientation and actions of the organization and rebuild AQIM’s power structure in a more coherent and effective way. The Southern Brigades substantially acted independently, partially harming the actual aims of the organization. As seen during the Islamist occupation of northern Mali, AQIM’s Sahelian commanders largely ignored the suggestions of Droukdel, whose primary aim was to avoid an external military intervention, knowing this would destabilize AQIM and make it more difficult to ultimately achieve the long-term goals of the organization. Moreover, as shown by the deep disagreements expressed by the Algerian leadership of AQIM on building a Shari’a-based state in northern Mali, the concerns of the central leadership were primarily focused on how the southerners accelerated the project and the tough top-down way in which it was implemented. Generally, the establishment of a Shari’a-centered state in Northern Mali can hardly be considered a strategic priority or even a success for AQIM. Historically, the primary focus of AQIM and its predecessors was Algeria. Despite the greater focus on the Sahelian space, northern Mali remains simply a geographical platform for training and organization, a major source of income and a region of jihadist socialization with non-Algerian fighters, but nothing more.
In this context, it is likely that one of the tasks awaiting Oukacha will be trying to establish more meaningful and functional contacts with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his splinter group, al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam. Although Belmokhtar was proclaimed dead by the Chadian military, he apparently escaped to southern Libya, resurfacing to claim responsibility for the In Aménas attack in Algeria that occurred between January 16-19 and the May 23 suicide attacks in Niger (RFI, March 5; Ansar1.info, January 16; Jeune Afrique, April 16; al-Arabiya, May 24). Although of great impact from a symbolic and strategic point of view, the attacks at In Aménas and in Niger do not seem to serve the more long-term interests of AQIM; rather, the actions provoke a reaction from the regional governments and their external supporters. The increasing independence of action Belmokhtar enjoyed over the past few years was a problem for the Algerian-based leadership; the increasing role of Zeid in Algeria was a first attempt to contain or at least to balance the role of Belmokhtar. However, Zeid’s firm roots in the Sahelian and Saharan environment and his money-driven attitude made him a much more independent actor than initially thought, mixing cooperation and conflict in his relationship with Belmokhtar, which is characteristic of interactions between local Jihadist groups. Another major task for Oukacha will be recreating the operational profile of AQIM, making money-driven activity a function of the long-term strategic aims of the organization without being an aim in itself.
Contraband activities have been increasingly important for AQIM since 2008 but the war in northern Mali has caused a major change to AQIM’s operations. The war caused a regional dispersion of militant groups and completely disrupted the trafficking of drugs, weapons and migrants in the region, ruining the transit networks built over past years, thus pushing traffickers to find new routes. Consequently, AQIM’s movement has changed as well, which bears some strategic consequences, as it will increase the vulnerability of some Sahelian and Maghreb states—Libya, Niger and Mauritania climbing to the top of this list—where regional narco-jihadists will likely move in order to carry out their mix of smuggling and jihad. The major task for Oukacha will be to make this greater focus on jihad and lesser focus on illegal economic activities functional to the specific purpose of carrying out jihad against the near enemy (Algeria, local regional governments) and the far enemy (France and the United States).
Conclusions
The personal history of Oukacha and Zeid differs substantially. These differences will likely emerge in the new operational developments and strategic directions of AQIM, although some specific geographical and strategic constraints will moderate the impact of this change. It is likely that Oukacha will try to make AQIM’s southern fighters more functional to the overall aims of the organization than they have been over the past years. The shift is intended to reinforce the power hierarchy, thus reinstating the Kabilye-based leadership’s strategic control over the southern katiba-s while at the same time, strengthening relations with other regional jihadist groups and players. The war in Mali caused a major change in the geo-strategic regional environment and AQIM has to readapt. Oukacha will be a major driver of this reorganization.
Dario Cristiani is a PhD Candidate in Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London. Previously, he has been a teaching fellow in Political Science and Comparative Politics at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” and a political analyst with the Power and Interest News Report (PINR).
Note
1. Minor jihad refers to physical struggle. Major jihad is a personal struggle to purify and better oneself.
