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MohammadDaleel-693316

A Look at the Refugee Turned Ansbach Bomber – Mohammad Daleel

Terrorism Publication Militant Leadership Monitor Europe Volume 7 Issue 7

08.02.2016 Meghan Conroy

A Look at the Refugee Turned Ansbach Bomber – Mohammad Daleel

Meghan Conroy

Introduction

On July 26, the Islamic State’s (IS) online newsletter, al-Nabaa, published a profile of a 27-year-old jihadist who had allegedly belonged to the organization since 2013. [1] This publication was disseminated in the wake of that jihadist’s claim to fame – a suicide bombing outside a musical festival in the Bavarian city of Ansbach, Germany, just two days earlier. The explosive device killed the attacker and wounded 15 bystanders (Deutsche Welle, July 27). There has been speculation that the attacker detonated the explosive prematurely, evidenced by a phone conversation cut short with an individual assumed to be part of the plot and the low number of casualties (Deutsche Welle, July 27). [2] It took IS’ media arm, Amaq, approximately 19 hours to claim responsibility for the attack (Telegram, July 25). As the investigation of the Ansbach attack progresses and more information is discovered, the attacker Mohammad Daleel’s relationship to IS will hopefully be brought to light: was he an operative disguised as an asylum-seeker planted in Germany by IS, or was he merely an IS-inspired actor with no tangible ties to the organization?

One Man, Two Stories

According to the article in al-Nabaa, Daleel had fought in Iraq and Syria on behalf of both al-Nusra Front and IS, initially opting to fight with Nusra against the Assad regime from 2011-2013, during which time he attacked regime forces with grenades and Molotov cocktails. While fighting for Nusra in Syria, he was reportedly injured by a mortar shell. According to al-Nabaa, Daleel pledged to IS when it split with Nusra. He allegedly assisted the group’s propaganda efforts, namely through the creation of pro-IS accounts on social media. The report also mentioned the three months it took for Daleel to build the explosive that ended up killing him, and the raid on his asylum shelter by German police, who did not find the bomb that he had hidden just moments prior. According to the IS report, God blinded the police, allowing Daleel to continue his preparations. His possession of explosives could suggest previous training and practice with the materials needed to build a bomb and carry out a bombing.

Daleel, reportedly known as Abu Yusuf al-Karrar, was a Syrian refugee whose application for asylum was rejected partly due to multiple prior arrests in his home country; he was awaiting deportation at the time of the attack (YNet News [Israel], July 27; Die Welt, July 27). His application for asylum was rejected a year ago, but he had been residing in Germany since (Spiegel, July 25). While searching his room at the refugee center following the attack, investigators found items such as hydrochloric acid, a can of fuel, wires, and batteries (Spiegel, July 25). Most incriminating, however, was the discovery of a laptop and two cellular phones, both of which showed Daleel had been using encrypted messaging programs such as Telegram, said to be a key means of communication for IS (Die Welt, July 27). The laptop contained images celebrating violence perpetrated by IS (Spiegel, July 25.)

Daleel pledged allegiance to IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a self-recorded video found on his phone by German investigators, titled “Video of Mohammad Daleel the Islamic State Soldier Who Carried out the Attack in Ansbach” (YouTube, July 25; Die Welt, July 27). In the video, he details the operation he is preparing to execute, mentioning how he will use an explosive, and encourages those planning to carry out acts of violent jihad to use explosives as well (YouTube, July 25). Daleel goes on to blame Germany’s actions for the violence he planned to carry out, adding that the drones targeting people in territory held by IS do not distinguish between men, women, or children and that he was acting out of a desire for revenge “in the name of Allah.” He reportedly had been casing the site of the musical festival for days prior to his attack, though he ended up detonating the explosive outside a wine bar nearby (Spiegel, July 27). The explosive was not particularly disruptive, with bicycles parked near the scene of the bombing having remained upright in the wake of the attack (Spiegel, July 25).

Mahmood Mubariz, a fellow resident of the refugee center where Daleel lived, said that he had never seen Daleel pray and was certain that he was not a “fanatic” Muslim but was indeed a “normal” man (Spiegel, July 25). Daleel’s nickname within the center was “Rambo,” for his long hair and muscular physique, and he told fellow residents that he had fled Syria because of the war, which had killed members of his family (Spiegel, July 25; Spiegel, July 26). According to Mubariz, Daleel was the only Syrian residing in the center, with the rest of the refugee population comprised of Pakistani nationals and individuals from various African countries. Mubariz claims that the experience may have been alienating for Daleel (Die Welt, July 25). Additionally, Daleel reportedly had suicidal tendencies and had been receiving psychiatric treatment (Al-Jazeera, July 25).

Conclusion

Attacks carried out by individuals like Daleel are quick to be labeled lone-wolf operations with no broader ties to larger networks. Even after IS claimed Daleel as one of its “soldiers,” the attacker continues to be referred to as a lone-wolf actor by media and analysts. [3] Mischaracterizations lead to misinformation. Despite the prevailing idea that IS claims anything and everything related to attacks carried out in the name of jihad, IS is in fact selective in who it claims as its operatives. It is imperative to delve further into the networks of those who execute such operations in order to avoid missed connections and, ultimately, missed opportunities to prevent attacks.

Meghan Conroy is an Associate at Valens Global.

NOTES:

[1] A safe PDF copy of the Islamic State’s online newsletter can be found via Jihadology: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cal-nabacc84_-newsletter-4022.pdf.

[2] At the time of publication, investigations regarding the individual with whom Daleel was communicating immediately prior to the attack are ongoing.

[3] Jamestown analysts Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr expanded upon this further in a July 26 Foreign Affairs article: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism

Jamestown
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