A Post-Mortem Analysis of Wisam al-Zubaidi: The Leader of the Islamic State in Libya

A Post-Mortem Analysis of Wisam al-Zubaidi: The Leader of the Islamic State in Libya

In November 2015, sources in the Pentagon suggested that the United States killed the leader of the Islamic State in Libya, Wisam al-Zubaidi (a.k.a. Abu Nabil al-Anbari). According to American sources cited by Jeune Afrique, al-Anbari was killed in an airstrike carried out by F-15 fighter planes on a small compound on the outskirts of Derna, the stronghold of radical militancy in Libya. An American official likened the attack to the one that killed Mokhtar Belmokhtar this past June (Jeune Afrique, November 15). Similar to the case of Belmokhtar—and as often occurs in these situations—it is not entirely clear whether al-Anbari was killed, given that other sources suggested he was either in Sirte or that he had left the country prior to the attack (See Militant Leadership Monitor, August 2015; Libya Herald, November 15). The Islamic State has also neither confirmed nor denied his death (Libya Channel, November 16). The attack targeting al-Anbari was the first airstrike against an Islamic State leader in Libya, and it occurred just as the Paris terrorist attacks were under way. However, a senior U.S. official was quoted as saying the airstrike on al-Anbari was already in motion as the Paris terrorist attacks were executed, and thus the two events were unrelated (AP, November 14).

His Personal Story

According to Western and regional sources, al-Anbari was a former Iraqi police officer under Saddam Hussein who was jailed by the Americans after the 2003 invasion. During his time in prison, he met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and became radicalized, a pattern shared by many former members of the Iraqi Baathist regime (Washington Post, November 14). While in prison, al-Anbari also started reading more Islamic legal texts and poetry, deepening his overall interest in Islamist narratives (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 19).

However, it is worth noting that starting around the time of the Iran-Iraq War, but particularly after the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein adopted pro-Islamist trappings (The National [Abu Dhabi], July 27). He did so in order to boost his legitimacy after his failed invasion of Kuwait doomed his ambition to be the “leader of the Arabs” and Baathist pan-Arab nationalism was becoming increasingly outdated; Hussein similarly endeavored to control radical groups within the country by reducing their societal support. Although it is not clear when al-Anbari was born, it is very likely that his personal period of intellectual and militant formation occurred during this same period — between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. As such, Anbari’s post-2003 radicalization was likewise facilitated by a significant cultural and intellectual attachment to Islamist narratives.

Al-Anbari was the Islamic State governor of Salah al-Din, a position to which he was promoted after leading an attack that expelled Iraqi government forces and loyalist militants from the cities of Tikrit and Baiji following the fall of Mosul (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 19). Al-Baghdadi then dispatched him to Libya, along with other Islamic State members, later in 2014. They allegedly arrived by boat from Turkey (Libya Herald, November 15). He tasked the others with making contacts in local groups and establishing an Islamic State presence in that country.

Shortly after al-Anbari’s alleged killing, another militant named Abu Ali al-Anbari traveled to Libya. He was considered very close to the Islamic State’s leadership and was one of al-Baghdadi’s key advisers. He is regarded as one of the masterminds of the patronage network the group built in Raqqa. The idea was to build something along those lines in Libya, centered around Sirte (Il Foglio [Rome], December 3). However, according to Kurdish sources, Abu Ali al-Anbari was also killed, specifically in an Iraqi raid carried out near the Iraqi-Syrian border on December 12 (ARA News, December 12).

Why Libya?: The Difference Between al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Establishing Networks

The presence of Abu Nabil al-Anbari (as well as the other al-Anbari) in Libya was the result of a particular logic. In the Islamic State’s bid to become the true hegemon within the global Salafist-Jihadist camp, being able to move beyond the (informal) borders of the self-proclaimed caliphate has emerged as a key strategic necessity for the group. Its rapid rise to prominence, its aggressive social media and propaganda strategies and military successes in Iraq and Syria have provided the Islamic State with a very powerful brand, which has allowed the organization to attract many groups and fighters from all over the world. This dynamic somewhat resembled what happened to al-Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11, when the group shifted from being a single, more or less centralized organization to a more fluid and networked transnational movement, whose primary strength was the appeal—and the capacity of producing fear—associated with its brand.

However, there is a notable difference between these two dynamics. In the case of al-Qaeda, the group’s central leadership relied on local leaders who only needed to pledge their loyalty (bay’ah) to become part of this de-territorialized global network. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) provides an excellent point in case: the group, after years of negotiations, became part of the global network between 2006 and 2007, with its leaders pledging bay’ah to al-Qaeda leaders and by changing its name to AQIM from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2006). AQIM did not change its leadership after the rebranding, nor did al-Qaeda central provide foreign members to run the group and support its old leadership.

Instead, in the case of the Islamic State, it is evident that the organization wants to control, in a more efficient and centralized way, the entire process of establishing its presence across the region. Indeed, this was what the Islamic State did in Libya, and Abu Nabil al-Anbari played a crucial role (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 19). This is for a specific political reason: despite its global ambition, the Islamic State’s main interests remain defined by the Syrian-Iraqi context. As such, establishing a presence in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa should prioritize serving these objectives. Local agendas cannot, at any point, supersede the group’s agenda in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, providing local players too much autonomy and failing to maintain them under a firm and clear central control would have been detrimental to the primary group’s interests. Its wider regional outreach is—more than a goal in itself—an instrument to pursue its interests in Iraq and Syria.

Conclusion

The history of Wisam al-Zubaidi/Abu Nabil al-Anbari follows a pattern familiar to many Islamic State fighters: he was an Iraqi born and raised under Saddam Hussein, and al-Anbari formed his intellectual and militant personality at a time in which the regime was using Islamism to strengthen its legitimacy. After the 2003 American-led invasion, he was jailed as a member of the Iraqi anti-American resistance, and his beliefs were radicalized further in prison. At that time, he also accessed a network of future fellow jihadists that would represent the backbone of the Islamic State. Later, after becoming a rather successful militant leader, he would become one of the organization’s envoys tasked with establishing a presence in Libya. This more centralized control over local, regional branches is one of the key, distinctive differences between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The alleged killing of one of its key members in the North African country will not change the Islamic State’s plans for Libya, and the organization will still try to strengthen and reinforce its local presence. That, however, will always be subordinated to the group’s primary aims in the Syrian-Iraqi context.

Dario Cristiani is an adjunct professor in international affairs at Vesalius College in Brussels and a senior analyst at the Global Governance Institute.