A Profile of Abdul Ghani ‘Ghneiwa’ Al-Kikli—The Leader of Tripoli’s Abu Salim Central Security Force
A Profile of Abdul Ghani ‘Ghneiwa’ Al-Kikli—The Leader of Tripoli’s Abu Salim Central Security Force
Almost six months into the conflict initiated in April by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) against the UN-backed Government of the National Accord (GNA) to win control of Tripoli, the military situation in western Libya remains in a stalemate (See Terrorism Monitor, April 5). As of the end of September, however, fighting on the ground and in the air has again begun to intensify. Both sides are attempting to reinforce their military grip on the territory, in order to increase their bargaining power ahead of the planned peace conference that Germany will host this autumn (Libya Herald, September 22; The Libya Observer, September 12). As military operations regain momentum, social media in Libya started heating up again, as part of the online propaganda war for Tripoli (The Daily Star, April 19).
Pro-GNA supporters on social media have often mentioned the name of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, a.k.a. Ghneiwa, calling him and others to defend Tripoli and Libya. Al-Kikli is one of the four prominent militia leaders of Tripoli, alongside with Haithem al-Tajouri (Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigades, or TRB), Abdel Rauf Kara (Radaa – Special Deterrence Force) and Mustafa Qaddur (Nawasi). Al-Kikli is the commander of the Abu Salim Central Security Force. The Abu Salim area originally became well-known for the infamous prison the former Libyan authoritarian leader Muammar Qaddafi used to imprison and torture political dissidents, and which was home to one of the worst massacres in the recent history of Libya. Approximately 1,200 prisoners were killed in the summer of 1996 (Human Rights Watch, June 27, 2006).
Al-Kikli is a particularly important figure of the current conflict in Libya, not only because he is one of the crucial leaders supporting the GNA, but also because there have been rumors that he might flee the country, fueled by regional media. In mid-September, a Saudi newspaper reported that al-Kikli was negotiating with the army his for immunity after he reportedly transferred his money and investments to Morocco (Asharq Al-Wasat, September 15). The article did not elaborate on which “army” al-Kikli was negotiating with—as in Libya, there is no real, functioning army. Notably, since the beginning of the Tripoli war in April, rumors and reports suggesting that militias’ leaders and other actors were ready to escape, or shift camp, emerged often. In many cases, these reports were merely part of a broader “information war,” so reports such as these should be taken with a grain of salt. True or not, however, al-Kikli remains one of the crucial actors in Tripoli’s security architecture and one of the big militia names associated with the GNA.
Personal History and Relevance in the Libyan Theater
Al-Kikli was born in Benghazi, eastern Libya, and soon moved to Tripoli with his family. He allegedly dropped out of school at a very young age and joined his father to work in a bakery called al-Nasr in the Abu Salim district, the area where he had spent his entire life. One source reported that, before the revolution broke out, he was a fruit seller living in the same area (Al-Araby, August 17, 2018). However, other sources reported that he was still in jail at the time of the revolution, specifically the Jadida prison in Tripoli. Libyan sources said that he was arrested years before after a quarrel with a group of narco-traffickers. Despite being described as a “good, well-mannered guy,” he was seemingly a part of a gang, and when he got into a dispute with one of the narco-traffickers, al-Kikli stabbed him. Citing security reports from Muammar Qaddafi’s security services, al-Kikli was sentenced to 14 years in prison, and he left jail only once the regime began to collapse in 2011 (Afrigate News, September 20, 2018).
Al-Kikli is now the leader of what is considered to be the second-largest armed force in Tripoli (though some sources rank it third), consisting of around 1,300 fighters. The group controls the areas of Abu Salim, parts of the airport road, with its camps mostly located in the areas of al-Farnaj and Ain Zara. According to documents leaked in 2016, his formal role in Tripoli is that of “Senior Director of the Tripoli Security Directorate” (Akhbar Libya 24, September 22).
Immediately after the revolution, he was one of the many commanders fighting in the anti-Qaddafi forces, and he was one of the many local militia leaders who only controlled the areas in their immediate neighborhood. Immediately after his release from jail, he organized a local military council in Abu Salim and started providing basic services to the local population. In 2017, his militia opened an office to deal with complaints from the general public of Abu Salim, concerning thefts and seizure of public and private property. The militia held the ambition to eventually expand the office to take claims from all of Tripoli (Libya Herald July 17, 2017). The militia has also been active in fulfilling other roles, from dismantling prostitution networks to dealing with electricity and local governance issues (Afrigate News, August 4, 2018).
Al-Kikli also began running a prison, and was allegedly working to fight “drugs and corruption” in the neighborhood. Interestingly, several sources reported that he started by arresting his friends from his teenage years (Afrigate News, September 20, 2018). The motivations behind this move were unclear. A possible explanation is that it was an act of revenge against those who were part of his gang when he was arrested. Another possible reason is that he wanted to show the people of the neighborhood that he was earnest in his claim to fight drug dealers, and that he started with those he knew, showing that personal connections did not make them safe. The focus on counter-narcotics is so significant that his militia even established a Counter-Narcotics force led by Abdul Hamid (a.k.a. al-Mudghoot), primarily located in the Ain Salah area. However, the modus operandi of this force has created several problems to al-Kikli and his men. Residents of this neighborhood often complained about harassment by al-Mudghoot’s people. In January 2018, these problems led to a small local revolt, with people blocking roads in the area and burning tires and rubbish bins in reaction to the group establishing new checkpoints. This revolt forced al-Mudghoot to remove the checkpoints and scale down the presence of his militia in the area. This incident was not isolated. In several areas of Tripoli, locals often protest against local militiamen and their abuses. This element is essential to highlight. Al-Kikli and other militia leaders in Tripoli emerged as crucial local players at a time when militias from Misrata and Zintan held outsized influence in the city. Al-Kikli and others were trusted by the locals more than these outsiders, given them greater power. However, over the past five years, these episodes of localized rebellions against local militias have increased. Haftar used the increasing tension between locals and militias to justify his military action in the Tripolitania province (Al-Jazeera, May 26).
Becoming a Tripoli heavyweight
Politically and militarily, al-Kikli’s importance increased sharply between 2014 and 2015. Initially, he was among the most significant supporters of the operation “Fajr Libya” (Libya Dawn), supporting Misratan militias against Zintan forces located in Tripoli. The Zinatan forces were at that time closer to Haftar when he launched Operation Karama (Dignity), the military campaign that Haftar launched in 2014 to eradicate “terrorism and extremism” (See Terrorism Monitor, May 30, 2014).
In the following months, he strengthened his military positions within the capital, turning into one of its key players. Following the accords of Skhirat, which paved the road to the establishment of the GNA, he became one of the first supporters of the new government. When GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj moved to Tripoli, al-Kikli joined the coalition to expel Khalifa Ghwell and his National Salvation Government (NSG). The NSG was then supported mostly by Misratans and forces close to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood.
Interestingly, al-Kikli is considered to be, among the militia leaders in Tripoli, the fiercest opponent of both the Brotherhood and Haftar. The fact that many of the forces who are now fighting alongside al-Kikli are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood shows once again how the military operation launched by Haftar against Tripoli has united a coalition of actors who have very little in common, apart from their shared desire to defeat the LNA.
Al-Kikli was very active in the Tripoli war of the late summer 2018 and the ongoing conflict (See MLM, September 2018). Last year, al-Kikli was accused of undermining the ceasefire, as accusations launched by a plethora of very diverse actors: the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) openly addressed al-Kikli in a tweet, asking him to “respect the ceasefire he signed,” but this accusation was echoed by Misratan militia leader Salah Badi and his men, who were fighting against al-Kikli in 2018 after the conflict regained momentum (UNISMIL Twitter Account, September 20, 2018, AnsaMed.Info, September 20, Afrigate News, September 20).
At the beginning of Haftar’s military offensive in west Libya in April, the Military Information Division of the GNA said that al-Kikli was injured during the early clashes in the suburbs of Tripoli. Al-Kikli himself denied these allegations (218 TV, April 5). Over the past few months, Haftar has often tried to target the positions of al-Kikli’s militia, and in August 2019 the LNA attacked the Tripoli zoo, where his Central Security Force had allegedly organized its headquarters.
Intra-Militia Troubles: The Other Dark Side of Tripoli’s Security Environment
Over the past few years, analysts and observers have focused primarily on the military confrontation at the national level: the forces of Tripoli and Misrata, and more recently Zintan, against the forces led by Khalifa Haftar. Undeniably, this is the most critical dimension of the Libyan conflict and one that is likely to define the political and military balances within the country over the coming years. At a more granular level, however, the past two years have witnessed the emergence of a more localized violence between members of the same coalition of militias, or even within the same militias. From this point of view, for the big leaders of the Libyan militias, there is a double dimension of security that they have to take into consideration. It is the fight against their national political enemies, but also the fight against internal players—often friends turned foes—who want to strengthen their position within the ranks of the organization.
Al-Kikli’s militia has suffered from these dynamics. In December 2017, Libyan media said that al-Kikli was allegedly behind the assassination of Mohammed al-Shalabi, for years considered his right arm (Afrigate News, September 20, 2018). In October 2018, other reports suggested that al-Kikli forces were behind the death of Khairy al-Hankoura, another crucial member of his militia. Libyan media report that al-Hankoura broke with al-Kikli’s militia days before he was killed (218tv.net, October 16, 2018).
Conclusions
“Ghneiwa” al-Kikli is more a territorial rather than ideological militia leader. He does not have a precise ideological characterization. His militia has a clear territorial dimension, and unlike other key Tripoli’s militias (Radaa and the Nawasi), does not have any Islamist features. He is allegedly the most anti-Muslim Brotherhood leader among the militia leaders in Tripoli, and in the September 2018 clashes, he was considered one of the most significant enemies of Salah Badi’s forces. This did not prevent him from collaborating with Misratans and other forces allegedly close to the Brotherhood to repel Haftar’s military operations in the West. This dynamic makes al-Kikli a likely recipient of one of the discreet offers to change sides that Haftar sent out, particularly at the beginning of the current war, to several of Tripoli’s militia leaders. Most of those offers failed, and no big name has (yet) changed sides. While media rumors suggest that al-Kikli is assessing options to leave the country, these rumors have thus far not been corroborated. As such, al-Kikli remains one of the most important actors changing Tripoli’s political and security landscape. Both he and his militia will continue to play a significant role into the foreseeable future.
