A Profile of Chechen Militant Commander Aslambek Vadalov: The Rising Star of Chechnya’s Separatist Movement

A Profile of Chechen Militant Commander Aslambek Vadalov: The Rising Star of Chechnya’s Separatist Movement

Chechen rebel commander Aslambek Vadalov (a.k.a. Amir Aslambek), who was briefly named as the leader of the North Caucasus rebels this past summer, is becoming a rising star of the Chechen separatist movement due to his military exploits inside Chechnya. Rumored to be the architect of the August 29, 2010 assault on Tsentoroi, the home village of Chechen strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov, Vadalov has emerged as a key figure to watch among the nationalist wing of the Chechen separatist movement. Little known outside of Chechnya, Vadalov was named as the head of the Caucasus Emirate succeeding Doku Umarov this past summer. Umarov temporarily resigned this past summer for unexplained reasons, naming Vadalov as his replacement. However, in a bizarre twist of events Umarov later reneged on his decision shortly after making this decision. Since then Vadalov has become increasingly viewed by North Caucasus observers as a major rival to Umarov among the groups of Chechen commanders still waging guerilla war against the Russian-backed government of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Aslambek Alimsultanovich Vadalov, an ethnic Chechen, was born in the village of Ishkhoy-Yurt of Chechnya’s Gudermes district in 1971. Wanted by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Chechnya section, Vadalov is accused of the following crimes under Russia’s Criminal Code: banditry (Article 209), illegal arms production (Article 223), violence against authorities endangering their lives or health (Part 2, Article 318), and the theft or extortion of weapons, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices used by an organized group (Part 4, Article 226). In sum, if captured, he faces a total of 25 to 48 years in prison that, in the Russian context can actually be replaced by life imprisonment. [1]

Vadalov started his military career in the ranks of the armed forces of the de facto independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) during Russia’s first military campaign against his homeland from late 1994 to 1996. In the course of both the first and second Russo-Chechen wars—the latter started in the fall of 1999—he fought in military units controlled by Shamil Basaev, one of Chechnya’s most important military commanders who morphed into an ardent Islamist. An alternate version of Vadalov’s background published by the Sweden-based Kavkazcenter news agency on August 3 which claimed that Vadalov served under the late Amir Khattab, a Saudi-born Islamist guerrilla fighter, is untrue.

In terms of his personal political views, Vadalov was closer to the team led by late President of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov than to the radical pan-Islamists who had adopted the ideology of revolutionary global jihad well outside the narrow bounds of purist Chechen ethno-nationalism. That is why he cultivated sympathy and support among former Maskhadov followers represented by the late commander of the Presidential Guard, Ahmad Avdorkhanov who was killed in September of 2005. It was not surprising that after the death of Avdorkhanov, Vadalov assumed the most important post of commander of the South-Eastern Front that included Chechnya’s Gudermes and Nozhay-Yurt districts and parts of the Kurchaloy and Vedeno districts. However, it would be misleading to brand Vadalov as a leader who embraces the tenets of Western democracy. Quite contrarily, he sees the future of Chechnya in the construction of an Islamic state but with some national attributes particular to Chechen culture. This means that he is certainly not one of the staunch supporters of the notion of the Caucasus Emirate who suggest simply modeling the future of Chechnya along the lines of an Islamic caliphate. It is worth noting that unlike many of their comrades-in-arms, Vadalov and his closest allies have not swapped their Chechen names for Arabic noms de guerre, such as Sayfullah, Abu Usman etc. Even in this nuanced matter, they have preferred their own vision, which is closer to the point of view of those fighters falling more on the nationalist side of the emerging leadership schism.

Relevant news agencies disseminated information on August 2, 2010 about the voluntary resignation of Doku Umarov, the militant leader of the entire Muslim North Caucasus region, who had assumed this post in 2006. After supposedly retiring for health reasons, Umarov nominated his deputy, Amir Aslambek Vadalov, as his successor. [2] Vadalov maintained his new position for just a week. The very fact that Umarov appointed Vadalov as his deputy a day before the latter’s elevation to the supreme post may have indicated indirectly that Amir Aslambek had been Umarov’s guest for weeks before his anointment—the fact of the matter is that Amir Aslambek should have been in a completely different part of Chechnya at the moment—and the decision on Umarov’s resignation had been the result of long deliberations under pressure from three leading field commanders—Amir Aslambek, Amir Hussein Gakaev and Ingush rebel leader Amir Tarkhan Gaziev, and likely not without ideological support of Amir Mukhanad, leader of the Arab fighters.

Not long after many had adjusted to the surprising news, the supposedly-retired Doku Umarov issued a new statement a few days later annulling his resignation as the leader of the Caucasus Emirate and declaring that the previous statement on his alleged retirement was “fabricated.” [3]

Amirs Hussein, Tarkhan, Mukhanad and others, now under the command of Amir Aslambek, who had already deserted Umarov’s faction, announced in response that they refused to recognize Umarov as their leader. The breakaway commanders were particularly incensed at the word “fabricated.” [4] A short while later, the anti-Umarov commanders, who represent perhaps as much as 90 percent of all Chechen rebel leadership, selected from among themselves the new Chechen rebel leader. Amir Hussein, a longtime friend and associate of Amir Aslambek, subsequently assumed the position. In the meantime, after his brief and unsuccessful tenure as the Amir of all the North Caucasus’ Muslim rebels, Amir Aslambek remanded himself back to the sidelines, supposedly, in order to avoid being accused of seizing power (Kommersant, August 10, 2010).

Trying to find supporters to counterbalance Amir Aslambek and turn the situation around to work in his favor, Umarov reorganized the structure of the Nokhchiycho, or Chechnya, wilayat (Islamic province, alternately spelled vilayat) within the context of the greater Caucasus Emirate. [5] Having failed, he demoted all of the dissident commanders, first and foremost Amir Aslambek and his closest associates, (Lenta.ru, September 22, 2010) and blamed Amir Mukhanad, who is an Arab national of uncertain origin, for the schism within the rebel ranks.

Believed to have organized at least three major attacks on villages in Chechnya, Vadalov, a surviving veteran of the two Russo-Chechen wars, is today considered as one of the most skilled and daring commanders across the North Caucasus region, making him a role model and authority figure among young people.

The most notorious operation Vadalov perpetrated was in his native village of Ishkhoy-Yurt in the Gudermes district in 2004. Gunmen blocked the road leading into the village and began firing on everyone who displayed a police officer’s identification card to them.  In total, ten officers were killed in the assault (Kommersant, August 3, 2010). Another page in his biography was an attack on the village of Benoy-Vedeno in the Nozhay-Yurt district in 2008.  In this operation, Vadalov’s men killed three people and burned five houses and several cars owned by law enforcement officers. In all likelihood, the attack on the village of Tsentoroi this past August was organized if not directly by Amir Aslambek rather than by one of his subordinates like Amir Zaurbek Avdorkhanov. It is worth noting that in the winter of 2007, Chechnya’s law enforcement agencies incorrectly boasted that Aslambek Vadalov was killed in a successful special operation.

Though Chechnya’s rebel leadership appears divided at present between Islamist-influenced nationalists, operating within a strictly localized Chechen framework, and pan-Islamists, pan-Caucasian jihadis, for which Chechnya is but one fragment of a much wider struggle. A strong personality has emerged in Aslambek Vadalov as he looks to become a significant counterweight to Doku Umarov’s authority. The future of the Chechen rebel movement as a whole looks increasingly uncertain, as its leadership has become more fissiparous in recent months after a gulf of personal and ideological disputes has widened among them. It is a notable development in the Chechen resistance movement that has long-lacked big names since the March 2005 death of ChRI President Aslan Makhadov, the head of the Chechen rebels more traditional, nationalist wing.

Notes

1. To view the Russian Federation’s criminal code, see (Russian) www.uk-rf.com.

2. To view the video statement made by Doku Umarov on his succession with the rebel movement, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE17R5guzSc.

3. To view the video statement made by Doku Umarov, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLt5KwLrmig&feature=related.

4. To view the video statement by Amir Hussein Gakaev, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uvGypr8Odo. 

5. To view the video statement made by Doku Umarov, seehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGSJARg_RDQ&feature=player_embedded.