A Snapshot of Osama Juneidi: Commander of the Syrian Opposition Farouq Brigade

A Snapshot of Osama Juneidi: Commander of the Syrian Opposition Farouq Brigade

Osama Sayeh Juneidi (a.k.a. Abu Sayeh) is the general military commander of the Syrian Islamist armed opposition group, the Farouq brigade (Kata’ib al-Farouq). He also serves on the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army (SMC-FSA), a major Syrian armed opposition command organization, for which he is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for the Central Region in central-western Homs governorate. [1] The Farouq brigade is part of the opposition alliance Jabhat Tahrir Suria al-Islamiya (Syrian Islamic Liberation Front), which is aligned with the SMC-FSA. As overall military commander of the Farouq brigade, Juneidi is the head of one of the most organized, powerful, active and widely established opposition groups inside of Syria.  

A native of the village of Tal Shur in the suburbs southwest of the city of Homs, Juneidi was a lawyer prior to the Syrian revolution. Juneidi asserted in an interview that he joined the armed opposition for the same reason that the Farouq brigade was formed: to protect peaceful demonstrators and the people of the area around Homs from attacks by the Syrian military (al-Jazeera, June 17). 

After joining the Farouq brigade he was active in the fighting in and around the city, particularly in the contested neighborhoods of Khalidiyyah and Baba Amar. Juneidi was named the general military commander of the Farouq brigade in October 2012. He was promoted after the Farouq brigade’s Shari’a Board stripped the previous commander, Abd al-Razzaq al-Tlass, of his command due to lewd sexual behavior related to a private Skype conversation with a Turkish journalist. The young, popular and charismatic Lieutenant’s purported Skype activity was subsequently leaked to the public, causing embarrassment for the leadership of the Farouq brigade, leading to his removal from command. [3] 

Juneidi has a reputation for being an advocate for the respect of human rights. [2] Juneidi has said that after the removal of the Assad government from power, he would go back to working in law and would suggest the demobilization of the Farouq brigade under a new, post-Ba’athist Syrian military (al-Jazeera, June 17).  

Receiving far less attention from the foreign and Syrian opposition press than the military defector al-Tlass, Juneidi is less of a folk hero and more of a technocrat and administrator, leadership qualities that better fit the Farouq brigade as it attempts to transition into a more effectively organized and strategically cohesive national opposition fighting force that can lead the fighting in the Syrian revolution.  

His critics, however, accuse Juneidi of coming from a family with ties to Syrian intelligence and of being a better politician than military commander, asserting that he displayed poor military leadership in battle, such as the neighborhood of Baba Amar in the central-western city of Homs which the Syrian armed opposition was forced to flee in March 2912 following a fierce, month-long seige of the district by the Syrian military and paramilitary forces. The capture of Baba Amar was a symbolic blow to the armed opposition at that point in the conflict. Juneidi has also been accused of participating in attacks on armed opposition brigades formerly aligned with the Farouq brigade that split from the organization in the area of Homs (Must’mal [Mansoura], March 2). 

Juneidi has periodically made himself available for public comments, such as for a press conference organized by the Farouq brigade in Turkey in February and for a long interview with al-Jazeera in June. At the February conference in the southern Turkish city of Antakya, the group announced that it was formalizing its organizational structure with Juneidi as its leader to clarify the rights and duties of its members and to improve coordination among its constituent fighting groups throughout Syria (Sham Journal [Damascus], February 18). The move was intended to improve cohesion in strategy implementation (al-Jazeera, June 17). [4] 

The Farouq brigade originated in the city of Homs; Juneidi claims that the organization has since raised constituent fighting groups throughout Syria, including in the central-western governorates of Homs and Hama, the northwestern governorates of Idlib and Aleppo on the Turkish border, the central-southern governorate of Damascus and in the northeastern governorates of Raqqa, Hasakah and Deir ez Zor. [5] According to Juneidi, the Farouq brigade is distinct from splinter groups that left it and kept the moniker “Kata’ib Farouq” in their names, such as Kata’ib al-Farouq al-Islamiiya (the Islamic Farouq brigade) (al-Jazeera [Doha], June 17). In terms of its ideology, the Farouq brigade is less militantly Islamist. It also has a greater geographic presence than its splinter groups. The splinter groups share some overlapping areas of operations in Homs, Idlib and Aleppo governorates with the Farouq brigade.  

The Farouq brigade reportedly has tens of thousands of fighters, with more than 5,000 fighters participating in combat in and around the city of Homs. [6] Juneidi claims that the group has seized control of a majority of the border crossings in rebel-controlled areas of northern Syria, which are a lucrative source of revenue for cross-border trade, smuggling and the shipment of arms and material. He also asserts that the Farouq brigade has captured oil fields in northeastern Syria and has been a key combatant in major battles throughout the country against the Syrian military (al-Jazeera, June 17). The Farouq brigade’s funding sources come from the local communities where the group is present as well as from undisclosed foreign sources that also provide weapons. According to Juneidi, the foreign sources were essential to the Farouq Brigade’s operations in the first six months of its existence (al-Jazeera, June 17).  

Though the Farouq brigade seeks the establishment of a government based upon Shari’a in post-Assad Syria, the Farouq brigade has at best tense relations with Salafist opposition groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front) and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham (Movement of the Free Ones of Syria). Juneidi does not agree with their ambitions to establish a caliphate in the Levant and says that to do so does not fit the political and religious reality of the country. He emphasized that the Farouq brigade cedes administrative authority over rebel-held areas of Syria that it has captured to local councils and that it recognizes the political role of the major opposition political organization, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (al-Jazeera, June 17).  

Juneidi’s role as a commander within the Syrian armed opposition is likely to broaden. Few armed opposition groups aligned with the Free Syrian Army’s Supreme Military Council are as powerful, with as large a national presence as the Farouq brigade or as willing to challenge Syrian opposition groups’ goal of creating a caliphate in the country and region. The success of Juneidi’s command and the ongoing restructuring of the Farouq brigade’s operations and strategy are of great importance to the Syrian armed opposition and to concerned anti-Assad foreign actors that are seeking to curtail the influence of militant Salafists in the Syrian armed opposition. Juneidi is an administrator and a fighter, a combination that will be increasingly important as the Syrian armed opposition seeks to win the war and plan for the security transition in a potential post-Assad Syrian state.

Nicholas A. Heras is an independent analyst and consultant on Middle East issues and a former David L. Boren Fellow. 

Notes 

1. “Details of the Outcome of the Antalya Conference to Unite the Forces of the Armed Opposition in Syria.” Free Syrian Army Forum. December 17, 2012. https://syrianarmyfree.com/vb/showthread.php?p=237326.

2. “A Statement Issued by the Political Body of the al-Farouq Brigades.” Kata’ib al-Farouq website. October 6, 2012. https://www.al-farok.com/archives/1264.

3. “A Statement Issued by the Political Body of the al-Farouq Brigades.” Kata’ib al-Farouq website. October 6, 2012. https://www.al-farok.com/archives/1264.

4. “General Military Commander Osama Juneidi Talks about the Functions of the Military Office.” Kata’ib al-Farouq website. February 18. https://www.al-farok.com/archives/2813.

5. Ibid.

6. “Excerpt from the Restructuring al-Farouq Brigades.” YouTube posted by user Homst Tanks. February 16. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnYiY5W4fCY.