A Threat to the Khyber Pass: An Extended Portrait of Mangal Bagh Afridi
A Threat to the Khyber Pass: An Extended Portrait of Mangal Bagh Afridi
Coming from obscurity, Mangal Bagh Afridi rose to power and notoriety by controlling Lashkar-e-Islam (LI- the Army of Islam), the biggest and most influential militant group in Pakistan’s Khyber Agency. Khyber Agency is the most strategically important of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan. The area is known as the gateway to South Asia due to the historic Khyber Pass, which traverses through the Agency and connects Kabul with Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP-formerly North West Frontier Province or NWFP). The Khyber Pass took on an important new role over the last decade as a conduit for logistical supplies to NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan as well as a major trade link between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Agency shares a border in the north, west and south with Peshawar, which is the biggest urban center of the Pakistani Pashtuns. Stability in Peshawar is closely tied to peace in Khyber Agency.
Mangal Bagh comes from the Sipah sub-tribe of the Afridi Tribe. The Afridis are the dominant tribe in Khyber Agency and one of the biggest and most influential tribes of FATA. Bagh is a resident of Bara tehsil (sub-district) of Khyber Agency. He claims to be in his late 30s, though locals say he could be in his late 40s. [1] Bagh comes from a humble background, having served, according to some reports, as a truck cleaner (The News International, April 18, 2008), while he himself admitted to have owned some vehicles plying on various destinations in Pakistan. He was also in the business of buying and selling vehicles. [2]
Bagh is believed to be illiterate, having never attended school. He learned about Islam through attending congregations of various clerics in Khyber Agency from time to time. [3] In his youth, he maintained association with the Awami National Party (ANP), a secular Pashtun nationalist political party in the KP and FATA, before joining the diehard firebrand cleric, Mufti Munir Shakir, sometime in 2003. In terms of religious beliefs, Mangal Bagh is a Panjpiri by sect. [4] His organization, Lashkar-e-Islam, was launched in 2005 by Mufti Shakir, an ardent Panjpiri cleric who belonged to Karboogha village in KP’s Hangu district. In the beginning, Shakir claimed his movement to be a reformist one, which believed in the “purification” of religious beliefs of the people. It preached against “superstitious” practices and termed the “Piri-Mureedi” (mentor-disciple) as shirk (un-Islamic). In a religious sense, the Afridis respect Syeds, Pirs, Sufis (mystics) and their shrines. This outlook intellectually aligns them with the Barelvi (Sufi) Sunnis, the antithesis of pro-Taliban Deobandi, Panjpiri and Wahhabi groups.
Mangal Bagh’s Ascent to Power
Mufti Shakir started his religious drive by delivering sermons Dars-e-Quran (Urdu- Quranic Lessons) through his pirate radio station. This put Shakir in direct confrontation with Pir Saifur Rahman, who was popularly known as “Pir Da Bare” (Pir of Bara). The confrontation went deadly when the Mufti Group and Pir Group started arming themselves. Gradually the confrontation turned violent and several armed clashes took place between followers of the two clerics. Subsequently, both of the leaders were banished in March 2006 from Khyber Agency in order to maintain peace. Mufti Munir Shakir, on his expulsion, left behind a well-armed group in the shape of LI. Haji Amir Gul succeeded him as its head, but resigned after ten days, and was succeeded by Haji Gul Shah Kukikhel. Kukikhel then faced criticism on account of his alleged inefficiency and laziness, and subsequently resigned. Finally, Mangal Bagh became the new head of LI (The News International, November 26, 2008).
Later, Mufti Munir Shakir was arrested from Karachi in May 2006 while trying to fly to the Persian Gulf and was subsequently jailed (The News International, April, 30). After his release in August 2007, Shakir attempted to enter Khyber Agency, but Bagh considered him a threat to his power and did not welcome his return to the Agency. Pir Saifur Rehman was succeeded by Qazi Mahboobul Haq, who established Ansarul Islam (AI). A violent struggle between the two groups ensued even after their respective mentors had left Khyber Agency. Subsequently, AI shifted its base to the Maidan area of Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency, while the Bagh-led LI firmly established its control over the Bara and Landi Kotal tehsils of the Agency. The LI however, was unable to establish its grip over Jamrud tehsil due to opposition from the local tribes, especially the Kokikhel tribe in the area.
Taliban-Style Islamic Law Enforced in Khyber
Soon Mangal Bagh introduced Taliban-style Islamic laws in Khyber Agency. In April 2008, he gave an interview to Roznama Khabrain in which he laid down Lashkar-e-Islam’s 26-point agenda for implementation in Khyber Agency: [5]
1. Eradicating all shirk [polytheism/idolatry], bid’at [innovation in Islam] and all un-Islamic practices from Khyber Agency;
2. Permitting only Islamic-style graves;
3. Enforcing a total ban on the activities of local and foreign terrorists in Khyber Agency;
4. Providing [only] justified assistance to the security forces [of Pakistan] deployed in the area;
5. Banning any kind of bribe to and from the mujahideen of Lashkar-e-Islam;
6. Punishing any activity disturbing the peace without Lashkar-e-Islam permission; punishment will be as per tribal norms;
7. Committing to defend the geographical and ideological frontiers of Pakistan;
8. Committing to prevent crime and punish criminals;
9. Enforcing a total ban on the sale of wine, on gambling, on counterfeit currency, on heroin factories, etc;
10. Enforcing a total ban on paid killers and kidnappers in the region;
11. Enforcing a ban on thieves, theft, and stolen cars;
12. Abolishing interest/usury in business transactions;
13. Forcing fugitives who reside in Khyber Agency to behave properly and to be accountable to the local residents;
14. Rehabilitating all mosques in Khyber Agency.
15. Committing to protect teachers, male and female students, doctors, and ulema;
16. Committing to resolve land disputes and ensure no land goes uncultivated.
17. Enforcing a total ban on non-shari’a practices such as magic, charms, etc.
18. Committing to ensure absolute peace;
19. Committing to ensure that women are modestly dressed according to Islamic norms when attending school, and to spread education among the people.
20. Committing to ensure collective prayers are offered after the azaan [call for prayer] is sounded.
21. Protecting of womens’ rights and resolution of marriage-related matters as per shari’a or tribal practices.
22. Committing to total eradication of un-Islamic practices during marriage ceremonies, such as music and celebratory firing into air.
23. Banning women from going to mountains to collect wood for fuel; violators will be fined 10,000 Pakistan rupees.
24. Banning women from going to doctors or hospitals unaccompanied by a male relation;
25. Enforcing the compulsory wearing of caps, according to tribal traditions.
26. And banning the sheltering of rapists, and totally banning homosexuals in Khyber Agency.
To enforce his agenda, Mangal Bagh established Amn Committees (Peace Committees). LI also acted like police, enforcing prayers five times a day and meted out punishment to people accused of prostitution and other vices. The locals were barred from wearing rings (AFP, July 27, 2009). Likewise, LI made it mandatory for men to grow beards and wear hats. If locals under LI’s jurisdiction failed to conform, LI would dole out beatings or impose a fine ranging from 500-1,000 Pakistan rupees (approx. $6-12 USD) (Nawa-e-Waqt, January 20, 2009). Heavy penalties were also imposed on crimes such as adultery and drinking liquor. Similarly, 5000 Pakistan rupees (approx. $60 USD) was fixed as penalty on owners of video shops and cable operators. The decree stated that a murderer would pay a fine of 500,000 Pakistan rupees (approx. $8,299 USD). While anyone possessing a satellite-dish would pay 50,000 Pakistan rupees (approx. $830 USD) as penalty. [6] Similarly, LI was also accused by the Pakistani government of attacking NATO supply convoys in the Khyber Pass as well American troops in Afghanistan (AFP, July 9, 2008).
Apart from running 12 FM radio stations, in February 2009 LI launched its own now defunct website www.tli-pk.org thereby highlighting the activities of the organization. With a black flag inscribed with ‘Tehrik Lashkar-e-Islam’ on the top right corner and two cross swords and its logo on the top left corner, the website was in English (The News International, January 4, 2009). Bagh also claimed he had 120,000 armed volunteers in his organization (Jang, September 1, 2009). Contrary to Bagh’s braggadocio, Islamabad estimates of LI’s manpower vary somewhere between 5,000 to 10,000 followers in Bara (Geo News, April 18, 2008). In terms of finances, Bagh’s LI is funded by tapping into the decades old conduit of smuggling, drug cultivation and trafficking. Bagh extorted 5,000 to 10,000 Pakistan rupees from thousands of trucks which pass through the Khyber Pass on daily basis, thereby generating millions of rupees in finances (Geo News, July 24, 2010). Similarly, he raised taxes through imposing heavy fines on locals as well as jizya on non-Muslims in Khyber Agency. At one point, he stated that his outfit owned 70 pick-up trucks donated by pious and wealthy tribesmen for use of his men. Similarly, Bara shopkeepers used to pay the LI a monthly fee that they previously gave to a bazaar committee for providing security to them (The News International, May 11, 2009).
The establishment of Amn Committees brought Bagh into conflict with the Pakistani government. Islamabad saw his actions as tantamount to establishing a parallel administration in Khyber Agency. Earlier, the government had turned a blind eye to Bagh’s activities (Daily Times [Lahore], June 28, 2008).
Three reasons could be attributed to such a policy:
• LI’s reformist agenda aimed at purging Khyber Agency of criminals served the government’s interest, since the Agency was a den for outlaws, criminals and kidnappers.
• LI disassociated itself from the Taliban and stood against the latter’s encroachment into the Agency.
• LI openly advocated that it would not confront the government militarily or otherwise. LI’s strategy could be explained by the fact that it was preoccupied with fighting against Ansarul Islam (AI) and did not want to divert its attention or have Islamabad turn its guns on LI.
Gradually, Bagh extended his activities into adjoining Peshawar by kidnapping for ransom. One such deadly assault in March 2008 by Bagh’s fighters was on a Sufi shrine belonging to Abu Saeed Baba in Bara Sheikhan village, in which at least 18 villagers lost their lives. Similarly, activists of rival Ansarul Islam were also kidnapped from Peshawar and persecuted in Bara. In another incident on June 22, 2008, LI fighters kidnapped Christians from Peshawar, charging them with being involved in the sale of alcohol (The Statesman [Peshawar], June 23).
Military Operations Against Mangal Bagh
On June 29, 2009, the government announced the proscription of LI as a terrorist outfit (The News International, June 30, 2008). The same day, Islamabad launched its first military operation named “Sirat-e-Mustaqeem” (Arabic – The Right Path) against Mangal Bagh in Khyber Agency. During the 13-day operation, 10 compounds, including the Bagh’s, were dynamited. Most of these compounds served as regional headquarters for the LI and were abandoned by the group soon after the launch of the operation (The News International, July 28, 2008). However, interjection of a 35-member tribal jirga of the Afridi tribe led to the signing of a written undertaking, under which Mangal Bagh and his LI fighters were banned from entering Bara. The LI agreed not to enter or patrol Peshawar. It also agreed to hand over 36 men as ‘Bramta’ to the political administration of Khyber Agency. [7] Similarly, tribesmen and LI fighters were barred from displaying arms in the Bara area. Mangal Bagh’s spokesman, Misri Gul, however, denied any such deal stating, “We never entered into any such agreement” (The Frontier Post [Peshawar], July 28, 2008). Bagh, however, flouted the agreement and returned back to Bara and Jamrud by September 2008.
In order to bring an end to LI’s continuous vigilante activities in Khyber and Peshawar, another military operation named “Daraghlam” (Pashto for “Here I Come”!) was launched in Khyber Agency in December 2008. The operation came to an end in January 2009 without achieving much result. Mangal Bagh, on the other hand, remained defiant and continued his vigilante activities even after the end of the operation.
On February 2009, Mangal Bagh’s fighters attempted to kidnap Fahim Khan, then nazim (mayor) of Bazidkhel village in Peshawar. The attempt failed and nine of Bagh’s fighters were killed in the attack. Subsequently, Bagh continued to attack the Bazidkhel village every now and then, including a car bomb attack on Fahim in February 2009 (The News International, February 18, 2009). A series of meetings of the village elders of Matani, Badaber, Adezai, Bazidkhel, Sheikh Mohammadi, Mashokhel, Mashogagar, Shahabkhel, Ahcar, Bahadar Killay and several other villages in Peshawar were held which decided to raise volunteer tribal militias known as lashkars to bring an end to LI activities by patrolling the area and preventing kidnappings and terrorist attacks (The News International, February 5, 2009). On February 23, 2009, Bagh barely survived a helicopter gunship attack by Pakistani security forces in the Bara area of Khyber Agency (The News International, February 24, 2009). The LI, however, continued its vigilante activities outside Khyber Agency. In April 2009, the terrorist outfit sent a warning letter to Pabbi Union Council in the Nowshera district of KP, asking them to expel the female employees of an NGO or face the consequences (The News International, April 26, 2009).
In June 2009, Bagh went a step further by imposing jizya (a punitive tax exacted on non-Muslims) on 400 Sikh and 57 Hindu families living in Khyber Agency. According to Bagh’s spokesman, Misri Gul, “Jizya is according to Islamic Sharia. We will provide them [physical] protection in exchange for this [tax]” (AFP, July 27, 2009). The tax amounted to an annual amount of 1,000 Pakistan rupees (US $12) per individual. The imposition of this tax saw the exodus of non-Muslims from Khyber who settled in Peshawar and other parts of Pakistan.
In order to thwart Mangal Bagh’s activities, a third military operation named Bya Daraghlam (Pashto- Here I Come Again) was launched in Bara in September 2009. Around 50 houses were razed, while 35 LI fighters were killed and over 100 arrested by Pakistani security forces. However, the authorities failed to arrest or kill Mangal Bagh or other leaders of the LI. Around 50,000-80,000 local people were also internally displaced as a result of the operation (The News International, October 3, 2009). The operation saw a strategic shift in LI’s policy of non-confrontation with the government, when Mangal Bagh ordered his fighters to launch attacks against security forces. In an address on his illegal FM radio station in September 2009, Bagh announced, “The young [LI] volunteers should attack security forces if the latter continue razing our houses and targeting our people, while the aged people, who cannot fight, should prepare themselves for suicide attacks” (The News International, September 6, 2009). Similarly, around 1,000 local tribal police, known as khassadars, stopped performing their duties after Mangal Bagh threatened them with severe consequences such as paying a fine of one million Pakistan rupees and demolition of their houses in the Agency (The News International, September 11, 2009).
Earlier, Bagh also threatened to allow the Taliban from other areas to enter Bara if the operation was not halted immediately (The News International, September 5, 2009). In the end, the military operation remained unsuccessful, and was described by security analysts as half-hearted and incomplete (The News International, December 7, 2009). In November 2009, the Pakistani Army launched a third operation named Khwakh Ba De Shum (Pashto- I will teach you a lesson). The operation continues even today, and while it has weakened the group considerably, most of its rank and file largely remains unaffected.
Relations with Other Militant Groups
Lashkar-e-Islam’s (LI) relations with Ansarul Islam (AI) have remained hostile since 2006. Both groups continue to fight and eliminate each other from the Agency. In July 2008, efforts were made by Maulana Fazlur Rehman-led Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) to effect a peace agreement between the two militant outfits. However, negotiations broke down after AI’s head Qazi Mehboob agreed to peace terms only if they were in accordance with Sharia. Mangal Bagh on the other hand did not pay much heed to the jirga efforts (The News International, July 23, 2008). Some unconfirmed reports also pointed to the involvement of a former Afghan Taliban commander, Ustad Yasir, in resolving the dispute between LI and AI, which was also unsuccessful (The News International, May 11, 2009).
Similarly, in the initial years, LI did not maintain relations with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or other Taliban groups in FATA. In an interview in May 2008, Bagh denied having any relationship with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban. He said that the TTP leadership had contacted him several times to join their struggle, but he turned down their request saying the agendas of the two movements are different from each other. [8] In fact, both LI and Tariq Afridi-led TTP-Khyber Agency fought against each other over the issue of kidnapping of three Christians by the latter from Orakzai Agency and their subsequent beheadings. The kidnapping occurred after several Christians could not pay this tax to the TTP, which wanted to extract a tax from non-Muslims residing in their area of operations (The News International, July 24, 2010).
Some of the major clashes between the two groups include a suicide attack by TTP on LI in the Akakhel area of the Agency in February 2010, in which at least 30 people, including LI commander Azam Khan, were killed, while around 110 people were injured (ZeeNews, February 19, 2010). In another violent encounter, both groups fought in the Landikotal area in Khyber Agency in June 2010, in which 21 militants, mostly belonging to the TTP, were killed (The News International, June 7, 2010). The most recent clash took place on August 23, 2011, when four LI fighters and one TTP fighter died in an armed clash in Khyber Agency’s Tirah Valley over control of the Seria hilltop (The News International, August 23). Mangal Bagh’s strategy has seen a drastic shift since 2010, As of late it appears he is warming up to the Panjpiri Taliban commanders of the TTP, while maintaining hostility towards Deobandi TTP commanders. The latter also see themselves as ideologically closer to Ansarul Islam, which is a Deobandi militant entity. For example, Mangal Bagh enjoys close relations with Panjpiri Taliban commander Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Gul Zaman, who hail from Orakzai Agency. On the other hand, he is on a warpath with the local Deobandi Taliban commander, Tariq Afridi, who is head of TTP in Khyber and Darra Adamkhel.
The greatest challenge facing Mangal Bagh is the revolt by some of his close LI aides as well as an uprising by some tribes previously loyal to him. In October 2010, some important members of the Central Shura of LI, as well as senior military commanders broke away from LI. These dissident LI leaders are Haji Zarkhan; former spokesman Misri Khan; supreme militant commander of the Zakhakhel tribe, Ghuncha Gul; commander Gulbat Khan and commander Said Noor from the Malikdinkhel tribe; operational commander Wahid; and commander Tayyab Afridi from the Shalobar tribe (The News International, November 29, 2010). These dissidents chose Tayyab Afridi as their new leader and demanded Bagh step down as LI’s leader. These men accused him of violating LI’s manifesto and bypassing Shura on certain important issues. This breakaway faction also opposed Bagh’s policies regarding resistance to Pakistani military operations. They also opposed Bagh’s policies regarding kidnappings and beheadings (Dawn, November 30, 2010). Though reconciliation efforts were made by sympathizers as well as Panjpiri commanders of the TTP, it was a fruitless effort. Commander Ibne Amin, the late military chief of the TTP-Swat, was involved in one such reconciliation effort between two estranged LI groups. He was killed in a CIA drone strike in the Spin Drand area of Tirah Valley in December 2010 (The News International, December 20, 2010).
Similarly, the Zakhakhel tribe uprising in April 2011 dealt a serious blow to Mangal Bagh’s influence in the area. The powerful Zakhakhels upped the ante in April 2011 after the kidnapping and subsequent killing of Maulana Hashim, a popular Deobandi religious cleric of the tribe. Similarly, the holding in captivity of LI Commander Ghuncha Gul, a powerful man of the Zakhakhel tribe and a former close aide of Mangal Bagh, enraged the entire tribe.
Maulana Hashim, who was a religious scholar and a respectable figure of the Zakhakhel Tribe was supportive of the policies of Qazi Mahboobul Haq of Ansarul Islam and was opposed to Bagh. However, he had never openly expressed his feelings. On March 20, 2011, the fighters of LI picked up Hashim, whose body was recovered the following day. The entire incident caused anguish among the Zakhakhels. Earlier, they had approached Bagh soon after the kidnapping of the cleric and had vehemently demanded his release, but their request was denied. [9]
During the same time, another popular figure from the area, Commander Ghuncha Gul was picked up by the fighters loyal to Mangal Bagh. Ghuncha Gul was once the most trusted commanders of Mangal Bagh and LI local amir for the Zakhakhel area. He had developed some differences with the policies of the Bagh but never expressed his views openly.
These two incidents provoked the Zakhkhel tribe to resist LI. The tribe launched a formal offense against the militant group in April 2011. The majority of LI fighters stemming from the Zakhakhel tribe switched their loyalties to their own tribe and deserted Bagh. The rest of LI fighters were either killed or expelled from the area. The strongholds of LI in the area like Gugrina, which had been used by Bagh as a safe house whenever there was a military operation against him in Khyber Agency, and others strategic hideouts were occupied by Zakhakhel tribesmen. The houses of people still loyal to Mangal Bagh were demolished. Taking benefit of the situation, Qazi Mahboob-led AI and the government also extended support to the Zakhakhels. The execution of Maulana Hashim even enraged the Afghan Taliban, who threatened to join Bagh’s rival, AI, to avenge the death. This prompted Bagh to seek help from the TTP, which witnessed the arrival of some Taliban fighters – primarily Panjpiris – in the area to strengthen LI’s defenses. The fighting claimed hundreds of lives, besides inflicting huge material losses on both the sides. During the initial days of the clashes, an influential Orakzai Agency TTP commander, Maullana Gul Zaman managed to secure a ceasefire, but failed to reach a formal agreement between them. The ceasefire did not last long and fighting flared up once more. [10]
Fresh efforts by a tribal jirga to negotiate peace between the Zakhakhel tribe and LI broke down after the latter turned down the conditions put forward by the Zakhakhel. The Zakhakhels demanded that the LI hand over three persons, including imprisoned dissident commander Ghuncha Gul and Commander Khan Afridi – who they accused of killing Maulana Hashim – to the tribe. The tribe also demanded that the LI should guarantee that it will not operate in the Zakhakhel area again (The Express Tribune [Karachi], April 6). There are fears that the conflict could conflagrate since involvement of the TTP in the fight could also draw North Waziristan’s top Taliban commander, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who may come to the AI’s aid, which is ideologically akin to his Deobandi beliefs. According to locals, “There will be bloodshed if Taliban factions join the fight … the repercussions will be catastrophic for the entire tribal belt (The Express Tribune [Karachi], April 6).
Conclusion
Against tremendous odds, Mangal Bagh continues to survive. The military operations coinciding with internal schisms have weakened LI considerably. Despite these strains, LI continues to remain active in its Islamist vigilantism. Islamabad needs to calibrate the evolving situation in the Khyber Agency, since worsening security situation there would have a deleterious impact on Peshawar’s security. Khyber Agency could revert back to a den of kidnappers and criminals, thereby further destabilizing adjacent Peshawar, the gateway to Afghanistan.
Notes
1. ‘NEFA Exclusive: An Interview With Mangal Bagh (Lashkar-e-Islam)’, NEFA Foundation, May 1, 2008.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Panjpiri school of thought is one of the recent sects in Islam and is named after a madrassa situated in Panjpir village in Swabi district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The madrassa is run by Maulana Tahir, and Panjpiri adherents falls somewhere between the Deobandi and Wahabbi in their religious beliefs. One prominent example of a Panjpiri group is the proscribed Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM).
5. ‘Pakistan-Based Militant Group Lashkar-e-Islam Vows To Spread Islam Across the World’, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No.1906, April 23, 2008, https://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2738.htm
6. Author interview with Malik Kabul Khan Afridi, Bara, Khyber Agency, August 18, 2011.
7. Bramta is a tribal tradition having constitutional cover in the infamous Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) Act according to which, a party to the dispute would handover a specific number of his men as guarantee to the opposite party.
8. ‘NEFA Exclusive: An Interview With Mangal Bagh (Lashkar-e-Islam)’, op.cit.
9. Author interview with Yousaf Ali, tribal journalist and report of The News and Secretary General of Khyber Union of Journalists (KHuJ), August 14, 2011.
10. Ibid.
