Executive Summary:

The arrest of Mali’s General Abass Dembélé appears to be part of a purge of the nation’s civil and military leadership by General Assimi Goïta, who took power in a 2021 coup d’état. Dembélé has been an unusually competent commander and a key figure in Mali’s counterinsurgency efforts.
Discontent is growing in Mali’s military leadership over the role of unaccountable Russian military contractors. Dembélé’s criticism makes him a target for pro-Russian stakeholders in the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and government. One of the nation’s most popular and patriotic soldiers, Dembélé is now accused of working with various hostile factions (French operatives, separatists, jihadists).

The August arrest of Malian General Abass Dembélé by the military regime of General Assimi Goïta represents a concerning development for the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in their multi-front struggle against insurgents. Factional struggles within the FAMa are a major factor in its operational weakness, and Dembélé’s arrest comes along with the indefinite detention of some of Mali’s most accomplished military leaders on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the Goïta regime.

General Dembélé is a Western-trained counterterrorism specialist. He is one of Mali’s leading commanders in its deadly 14-year battle against forces of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Tuareg separatists. Dembélé is the son of Colonel Koké Dembélé (d. 2013), a leading member of the National Order of Mali, the country’s highest honor. The elder Dembélé was a commander of the FAMa from 1982 to 1986 during the presidency of General Moussa Traoré (1968–1991) (Tama Media, August 19). Unlike most of his African-trained comrades in Mali’s officer corps, the younger Abass Dembélé received military training in France and the United States, specializing in counterterrorism (L’Express, February 20, 2013). As a major in 2012, he was commander of the 61^st Infantry Regiment at Sévaré (in central Mali) at the time of the Islamist takeover of northern Mali (Exclusif.net [Dakar], August 15; Tama Media, August 19). The Islamist occupation of the country’s north followed the eruption of an insurgency across northern Mali in January 2012. This led to a coup d’état two months later and two major French military operations—Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane—between December 2012 and November 2022.

2012 Coup

Factional struggles within the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) are a major factor in its operational weakness. In March 2012, the army’s pro-junta “Green Berets” overthrew the democratically elected Ahmadou Toumani Touré (2002–2012), a former “Red Beret” (member of the 33^rd Paratroop Regiment). The country’s Red Berets rescued the president and mounted a failed but bloody counter-coup, followed by a Green Beret-led purge and dispersal of those paratroopers allowed to continue in service. The remains of some 30 Red Berets were later found on the grounds of the Kati military base outside Bamako after having been tortured and murdered by their military rivals (see Terrorism Monitor, February 22, 2013).

Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo (of the Sénoufo people), an American-trained “Green Beret” regular officer, led the March 2012 military coup against Touré (d. 2020). Though the putschists claimed their coup was in response to Touré’s military failures in the north, all three regional capitals in northern Mali—Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu—were lost within days of Sanogo’s takeover, as insurgents took advantage of the army’s disarray.

Commando Leader

After the collapse of the FAMa under Tuareg and Islamist assaults in early 2012, it became clear that urgent measures were required to prevent the spread of the insurgency into heavily populated central and southern Mali. The insurgents were well-armed with Libyan weapons that had flowed south after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. In September 2012, Colonel-Major Didier Dacko (later Malian chief of staff and commander of the G5 Sahel Joint Force) created the Groupe Commando Volontaire (GCV), recruited from the army, air force, military engineers, and the Garde Nationale (the “Brown Berets”) (L’Essor [Bamako], February 28, 2013). Command was given to Dembélé, a former intelligence colleague of Dacko’s, who described the new formation as “a 100% Malian product” (L’Express, February 23, 2013). With the army shattered by repeated defeats at the hands of jihadists and divided into loyalists and putschists by the 2012 coup, Dacko and Dembélé recruited this new force from soldiers still eager to take the fight to the Islamists.

GCV training took place at an isolated location, rather than the Sévaré military base. Mopti Region in central Mali was chosen in order to prevent recruits from being “contaminated” by the rampant corruption and defeatism present in the FAMa. Training focused on creating an aggressive and disciplined attitude among the troops. Dembélé said of the company’s training regimen:

Here, you arrive on time. Here too, you respect your leader. It’s not a question of equipment, but of self-sacrifice. I’ve made it a credo… It’s the only company you can ask to be on site, in the middle of the night, in fifteen minutes. Everywhere else, you'll always have someone looking for their shoes, whose socks aren't dry, who's at their aunt's funeral... (L’Express, February 20, 2013).

Unlike the rest of the army, morale was high in Dembélé’s GCV. One French legionnaire observed that in the commandos’ eagerness to come to blows with the jihadists, they often entered the fight without helmets or bulletproof vests (L’Essor [Bamako], February 28, 2013). Unfortunately, the creation of a competent elite unit created further friction within Mali’s regular forces.

The Battle of Konna

Dembélé made a name for himself at the Battle of Konna. Konna is a town in Mali’s central Mopti Region, which serves as a buffer between the extremely arid, rural, and insurgency-racked north and Mali’s population centers (including the capital, Bamako, in the south. In Konna in 2013, the FAMa and jihadist commander Iyad Ag Ghaly came to blows in a decisive battle to prevent the passage of jihadist forces into the south. Leading elements of Ag Ghaly’s Islamist Ansar al-Dine movement, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJWA) met government forces outside of Konna on January 7, 2013, expecting an easy rout of FAMa troops based on their previous encounters (for more on Iyad Ag Ghaly, see Militant Leadership Monitor, February 29, 2012).

Stiff resistance led by Colonel-Major Didier Dacko surprised the jihadists, who called for reinforcements. Malian Special Forces and Garde Nationale units held up the jihadists for 48 hours in one of the conflict’s most important engagements. Playing a vital role in the battle as commander was Dembélé, who stood firm with his commandos despite being wounded by shrapnel on the second day of the battle (L’Aube [Bamako], January 28, 2013; Jeune Afrique, January 30, 2014).

With the help of French air support, Konna was back under full government control by January 18, 2013. In the months following the battle, Dembélé became an inspiration in the dispirited army for standing fast in battle despite his wounds (Tama Media, August 19).

Arrest of Amadou Sanogo

After the return of civilian rule with the election of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in September 2013, Sanogo (the Malian Green Beret leader of the anti-Touré coup) was charged with the torture and murder of 30 Red Berets at the Kati military base. Sanogo’s own Green Berets mutinied at Kati that month over the cancellation of promised promotions, leading to the brutal intervention of Malian Special Forces. Five of the mutineers were later found bound and buried alongside the heads of five crocodiles (see Terrorism Monitor, June 13, 2014).

Much of the chaos in the army was blamed on Sanogo, who was still trying to exert influence in Mali’s political realm even after the transition to civilian rule. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Dembélé led the team that arrested Sanogo on November 27, 2013. This occurred after Sanogo refused to respond to a summons issued by a judge investigating his role in various abuses of power (AFP/Reuters, November 27, 2013).

The arrest was a demonstration of Dembélé’s loyalty to civilian rule and was followed by a series of appointments and decorations for him, including membership in the National Order of Mali in February 2014. Further military training in France led to his graduation from the École de Guerre in late 2015. Dembélé then became director of the National Staff College in Koulikoro before his appointment on September 17, 2017, as commander of Mali’s 5^th military region (Timbuktu) (Studio Tamani, September 19, 2017; Tama Media, August 19). In January 2020, he joined the team of the High Representative of the Head of State for Central Mali, led by former President Dioncounda Traoré, with the mission of contributing to the pacification of a region plagued by violence (Exclusif.net [Dakar], August 15).

Governor of Mopti

In August 2020, Mali suffered another coup, ousting President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and replacing him with military rule once again. Among the insurrectionists was Colonel Assimi Goïta. Displeased with the government after a transition to civilian rule, the colonel led a second coup in May 2021, installing himself as president and promoting himself to Général d’Armée (French: General of the Army, the highest rank in the FAMa) in October 2024. Goïta and the new junta sailed past the promised date of a return to civilian rule in March 2024 before dissolving all political parties in May 2025. The self-appointed general was granted an additional five years of power by his cronies, renewable "as many times as necessary."

In the meantime, the newly promoted Colonel-Major Dembélé was appointed governor of Mopti Region in December 2020. All went well at first, but shortages of water and power that saw electricity available for only two to three hours a day prompted large public protests against the governor’s rule in June 2022. Repressive measures failed to quell discontent, and Dembélé was eventually forced to flee Mopti, although he continued to serve as its governor (Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], June 20, 2022).

In June 2024, Dembélé was promoted to Brigadier General. His reputation was enhanced through his skillful use of social media and humanitarian gestures, though in Mopti, he was accused of being an “absentee governor” (RFI, August 10; Medium.com [Lagos], August 16; L’Essor [Bamako], August 19). Ultimately, Dembélé was dismissed as governor in May after demanding an investigation of charges that the FAMa and a Dozo tribal militia massacred 23 Fulani cattlemen in Diafarabé (Mopti Region) on May 12. This was believed to have been driven by a desire to avenge a March 27 ambush of FAMa and Dozo fighters by jihadists thought to include members of the largely Fulani Katiba al-Macina group, allied to al-Qaeda (Al Jazeera, August 15).

Dembélé’s Arrest

In a development that shocked Mali, Dembélé was arrested at the Kati military base on August 10. Three other officers were arrested at the same time, including Air Force Brigadier Nema Sagara (of the Dogon ethnic group), Colonel Baba Dembélé, and military cardiologist Suleiman Diop (TV5Monde, August 16). Sagara, a rare woman in Mali’s senior officer staff, played a leading role in the fight against terrorists and rebels, especially in the retaking of northern Mali in 2013. She is also the daughter of Chief Warrant Officer Mérepein Joseph Sagara (d. 2025), who served in French colonial forces in Algeria and Indochina (Tama Media, August 19). Regime-friendly media claimed after the arrests that Dembélé’s “moment of glory” at Konna was manufactured “by media outlets under the orders of the new occupier [i.e., France], with orders to create a ‘hero’” (L’Essor [Bamako], August 19).

The arrests that began on August 10 continued for several days. The minister of security, General Daoud Aly Mohammedine, took to TV to announce the arrest of “marginal elements of the Malian Armed Forces” who aimed to destabilize the republic “with the help of foreign states” (i.e., France) (RFI, August 15). At least 55 soldiers were arrested, with the search continuing for further accomplices (Al Jazeera, August 15; Jeune Afrique/AFP, August 15; IOL [Cape Town], August 15). Many of those detained were from the Garde Nationale. A good number of those arrested are believed to be close to Defense Minister General Sadio Camara, the first commander of the Garde Nationale (Jeune Afrique/AFP, August 15). Also arrested were members of regular FAMa units and the air force (TV5monde, August 12). Parallel to the military arrests, former prime minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga (in office from 2021 until 2024) and several others were detained as part of investigations into corruption.

Among those arrested was Yan Christian Bernard Vézilier, identified by security officials as a French spy working for the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE). Vézilier was accused of mobilizing individuals dedicated to overthrowing official institutions and undermining Mali’s national stability and security (Bamada.net, August 15). His detention is complicated by the fact that he enjoys diplomatic immunity (Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], August 26).

The Russian Element

Russian troops, first in the form of Wagner Group contractors and now as part of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Africa Corps, have played an increasingly important military role in Mali since the installation of General Assimi Goïta as Mali’s ruler in 2021. Russian independence in operational decision-making and its access to the FAMa’s arms and equipment have helped create dissent in Mali’s officer corps. There has been growing friction within the FAMa provoked by the domineering attitude of Russian military contractors (Jeune Afrique/AFP, August 15). Goïta claimed his crackdown was a response to a meeting held at Kati military base among leading officers, including Dembélé, to discuss grievances related to these and other issues that grew into a larger conspiracy (Reuters, August 27). Both the Russians and FAMa personnel are regularly accused of large-scale atrocities against the civilian population in the course of counter-terrorism campaigns (Human Rights Watch, July 22).

When Dembélé and Sagara complained of the lack of recognition given to Malian troops who fell in the fighting against jihadists, Goïta and his intelligence chief, General Modibo Koné, appear to have acted pre-emptively to prevent a coup. Some Malian media accused Dembélé of having close ties to Tuareg separatists and Islamist terrorists (L’Essor [Bamako], August 19; Tama Media, August 19). Many of the Garde Nationale officers arrested are said to be close to Defense Minister General Sadio Camara, generally regarded as the number-two man in the regime and the prime mover behind Mali’s alignment with Russia (Reuters, August 27). As previously mentioned, Camara came from the Garde Nationale and maintains support there, which helps explain the disproportionate arrests of Garde Nationale members in Goïta’s arrests. Though Dembélé and some other detainees operate within Camara’s orbit, the defense minister has so far avoided arrest—even representing Mali in joint meetings in Moscow between defense ministers of the AES (Alliance des États du Sahel, which includes Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) and their Russian counterpart Andrey Belousov in mid-August (Bamada.net, August 15). The meeting was also attended by Russian deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, commander of Russia’s Africa Corps (see Militant Leadership Monitor, April 18).

During the summit, which coincided with the 80^th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany, Camara praised Soviet sacrifice and expressed his support of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine (APA News, August 14). Perhaps because of his close ties to the Russians, some sources in Mali suggest that instead of an immediate arrest, Camara will be the focus of a “methodical neutralization operation” by Goïta’s security apparatus (FinancialAfrik, August 14).

Conclusion

Dembélé is popular with his troops, so the decision to arrest him cannot have been made lightly. On the contrary, his popularity may have contributed to his arrest, especially if he was no longer fully supportive of the continued deployment of Russia’s Africa Corps within Mali. Whether through a peremptory purge or the elimination of a conspiracy, the arrest of several of the FAMa’s most capable and popular officers can only create further dissent in a demoralized and ineffective army that has already been forced to play a support role for Russian mercenaries who operate outside of the formal command structure.

Abass Dembélé: Mali Arrests General Responsible for Combating Jihadists

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Abass Dembélé: Mali Arrests General Responsible for Combating Jihadists

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