Abu Baker al-Husseini Brings Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi Affiliate Back to Center Stage

Abu Baker al-Husseini Brings Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi Affiliate Back to Center Stage

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI—Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyyah), an umbrella organization for terrorist groups in Iraq including al-Qaeda in Iraq, suffered a blow when it lost its two top leaders in U.S. raids. These leaders were Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his most senior aide Abu Hamza al-Muhajer (a.k.a. Abu Ayub al-Masri). Both were killed in a raid in western Iraq on April 18, 2010 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 20, 2010). 

Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajer led the ISI during some of its most turbulent times. From 2007-2008 Al-Qaeda in Iraq suffered major setbacks at the hands of the Sunni Sahwa councils (Awakening councils). The group that once controlled vast swaths of land across Iraq saw its presence diminish significantly with a Sunni majority in central and western Iraq.

Areas that had become no-go zones for Iraqi Shiites, like the vast Anbar province and the strategic highway that links Iraq to Syria and Jordan, were secured by coalition forces. This allowed freedom of movement for people from every sect of society all around the country. Upon the formation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), al-Qaeda’s members proclaimed the announcement in a public parade in the main street of the city of Ramadi, the capital of al-Anbar, with men and women hailing them on the side roads and buildings. Less than a year later, in September 2007, al-Anbar was secure enough to be visited by President George W. Bush when he met with local officials and the prominent leader of the Sahwa movement in al-Anbar, Shaykh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who was killed a few days later by a suicide attack claimed by al-Qaeda. 

With the death of al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajer in April 2010, the ISI and AQI were presented with a deficit in leadership. The ISI announced the unanimous selection by a body called the Shawra council of the ISI, which is equivalent to a general assembly of its new leader, Abu Baker al-Husseini (a.k.a. Abu Du’a; Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri) (Almaqrezy.net, May 15, 2010). [1] Al-Husseni was also appointed successor to al-Baghdadi in the AQI leadership. 

While it is not traditional for the leaders of AQI and the ISI to be the same person, it has been a part of al-Qaeda’s strategy to emphasize the superiority of the role of the leader of the ISI. Dr. Aymen al-Zawahiri once corrected a question he was asked by a fellow al-Qaeda member saying that there is no al-Qaeda in Iraq but an Islamic state of Iraq. Declaring the ISI as a state gives it political legitimacy and existence. 

The appointment of yet another hitherto unknown figure to lead AQI brought criticism from within the Sunni community. After the announcement and in order to quell opposition, ISI supporters announced on online jihadi forums that al-Husseni was a devout Muslim, worthy of the leadership of AQI and explained that the real identity of the leader of both AQI and the ISI was hidden for security reasons: 

The U.S. State Department has listed him on its Rewards for Justice site by one of his alternate noms de guerre, Abu Du’a. It describes the AQI/ISI leader as having been born in Samarra in 1971. The entry describes him as a “senior leader” who is “in charge of overseeing all AQI operations.” [2] 

Al-Husseini took the helm of the the ISI while the group was on the verge of reviewing its strategy. The question of leadership was at the center of recommendations submitted in a report published on a jihadi website under the name “Strategic Plan to Consolidate the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq.” [3] The communiqué stressed the necessity of creating symbolic leaders for the organization: 

Among other recommendations, the Strategic Plan called for having multiple leaders at the head of the ISI, announcing in the same statement the appointment of a deputy leader, Abu Abdullah al-Hasani, to the the ISI and AQI. Under al-Husseini, AQI consolidated its position as one of the main regional branches of the mother organization. 

When Osama bin Laden was killed in a U.S. raid on his hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, al-Husseini was one of the first of al-Qaeda’s regional leaders to eulogize him. In an online statement issued by al-Husseini, he also threatened a series of revenge attacks as he addressed Bin Laden’s second in command, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the other leaders of al-Qaeda’s central organization: “You have in the Islamic State of Iraq faithful men who will keep walking their righteous way and will not give up. I swear by Allah that it will be blood and blood, devastation and devastation” (Hanein.info, May 9, 2011). 

Al-Husseini did not wait for too long before fulfilling his threat. The ISI set a goal of launching 100 attacks to avenge Bin Laden. A 2011 propaganda video, released to mark the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the the ISI included some of those attacks, which targeted an Iraqi government building and Iraqi security forces. In some of the videos the suicide attackers appeared—allegedly before heading to their targets—greeted Bin Laden and stated that they were going to revenge his killing. [4] 

Another confirmation of the ISI involvement in broader al-Qaeda issues was al-Husseini’s endorsement of al-Zawahiri’s post-Bin Laden succession. Al-Husseini’s statement after the killing of Bin Laden clearly showed his preference for who should be the successor: 

After the retreat the ISI suffered between mid-2007 and mid-2009, the group returned to the scene with waves of attacks primarily targeting Iraqi government buildings. The return of the ISI occurred at a significant transition between the Sahwa councils and the Iraqi government. Many Sunni fighters were disappointed by the fact that the Shia-led government of Nouri al-Maliki was not willing to fully integrate them into its security forces. The ISI has since attacked both mosques and churches and in no way appears to have actually halted attacks on Iraqi civilians (see Terrorism Monitor, November 24, 2010; AFP, August 28, 2011). 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was one of the first insurgent groups in Iraq to prepare for the post-U.S. withdrawal environment. One of the main aspects of its strategy was to focus its attacks on the Iraqi government, its security forces and the Sahwa councils. 

The ISI’s declaration was costly for al-Qaeda in terms of its relations with the Sunni community in Iraq. The ISI designated its “territory” to be the areas populated by a Sunni demographic majority. As the religious minority that has provided the Iraqi state with all of its rulers in Iraq’s post-colonial history until the 2003 invasion, Iraqi Sunnis believed in a hierarchical political order marked by a highly centralized governing structure in Baghdad, which put them at the top. 

As Sunni resentment to the al-Maliki government led to a sea of change in their political primacy, local government officials in the Sunni majority governorates of al-Anbar and Salahuddin (and later Diyala) declared their intention to form autonomous regions not unlike the three governorates that comprise the Kurdistan Regional Government (AFP, December 20, 2012). It was interesting that one of al-Qaeda’s primary reasons behind forming the ISI was its prediction that the Sunnis would embrace the federal system and abandon centralism years before it happened. Due to Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, Iraq’s constitution allows for possible federalized regions outlined in Article 119. 

The ISI’s Strategic Plan explained that the reason behind the timing of the ISI’s October 2006 declaration was al-Qaeda’s concern that other Sunni factions might seek autonomy and enjoy the fruits of the insurgency (Hanein.info, February 20, 2010). 

In line with a growing trend within al-Qaeda, the ISI has become more vocal about its claim that it would not target civilians, a tactic that had marked the bloody al-Zarqawi era in Iraq, even spilling over into Jordan with the November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, which killed 60 people. Although AQI and the ISI had avoided claiming responsibility on such civilian attacks over the years, they also did not clearly deny responsibility. The ISI is disseminating propaganda that the United States is actually behind civilian attacks in order to vilify AQI, thereby feeding conspiracy theories inside Iraq. 

Under the leadership of al-Baghdadi and al-Husseini, the ISI has applied a new strategy and tactics. The main strategy the group is employing under al-Husseini is to concentrate its efforts on two main targets: the Iraqi government and its forces and the Sahwa fighters who had allied themselves with the American-led coalition. The ISI was one of the first insurgent groups to prepare their insurgent strategy for the post-American period. The Strategic Plan communiqué drew that strategy clearly. As the last American troops leave Iraq, the confrontation between the ISI and its indigenous enemies is very likely to intensify. 

Notes 

1. The long version of his name is Abu Baker al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurashi. Al-Baghdadi refers to the fact that he is from the Iraqi capital Baghdad. Al-Husseini refers to the fact that he is a descendant of Prophet Muhammad. Al-Qoraishi refers to his familial ties to the Qurash, Muhammad’s tribe in Arabia.

2. See: https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=dua.

3. See: https://hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=158433&page=1.

4. References to the video appear on jihadi forums like hanein.info, November 9, 2011. The video was later removed from YouTube.