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Abu Obaida: Assassination of Qassam Brigades Spokesman is a Major Blow to Hamas’s PR

media Publication Militant Leadership Monitor Israel Volume 16 Issue 8

12.02.2025 Hadeel Oueis

Abu Obaida: Assassination of Qassam Brigades Spokesman is a Major Blow to Hamas’s PR

 

Executive Summary:

  • Abu Obaida’s assassination removes Hamas’s most influential wartime communicator, whose celebrity-like persona unified Arab audiences and projected a powerful pan-Islamic narrative unmatched by other militant spokesmen.
  • His death leaves the Qassam Brigades without a credible replacement capable of delivering operational messaging, undermining morale and weakening Hamas’s information warfare against Israel.
  • Abu Obaida’s absence exposes a growing strategic vulnerability for Hamas, which must now rely on fragmented, non-official media channels that cannot replicate his role in both public and military communications.

Israel claimed to have successfully assassinated Qassam Brigades’ (Arabic: كتائب عز الدين القسام) spokesperson Abu Obaida (Arabic: أبو عبيدة) on August 30. Abu Obaida was a fundamental pillar of Hamas’s (Arabic: حماس) PR in the Arab world, a military spokesman with nearly universal appeal and celebrity status. His televised appearances, distinct for the red keffiyeh (Arabic: كوفية) covering all but his eyes that earned him the nickname al-mulatham (Arabic: الملثّم, “the masked one”), transformed him into a superhero-like icon of “armed resistance.” His masked visage flooded social media platforms and was rebroadcast on mainstream Arabic-language channels. Abu Obaida’s persona projected a pan-Islamic, anti-Israeli narrative that transcended sectarian lines, accomplishing something no other armed group in the region was able to do. 

Abu Obaida helped make Hamas a pan-Arab champion in a way uncommon for militant groups in the region. Unlike most other militant organizations that regularly rotate spokespeople, the Qassam Brigades’ insistence on their messaging being conducted by a single, mascot-like figure has given their organization further notoriety and credibility. While public sympathy toward Iran-backed militias like Hezbollah (Arabic: حزب الله) experienced a significant decline in the Arab and Sunni Muslim world, Hamas has maintained far greater respect among Sunni Arab communities than its Shiite counterparts, while still attaining respect and popularity in Shia areas of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Abu Obaida has even been controversially referenced at pro-Palestinian protests in the United States and elsewhere in the West, an added testament to his symbolic reach (Anadolu Ajansı, August 14, 2016; Anti-Defamation League, February 27, 2024). 

Abu Obaida’s absence over the past three months and the failure to find a replacement is a sign of a struggling Qassam Brigades. It would have been exceedingly difficult to appoint a competent replacement to an externally beloved figure with a two-decade-long career. His absence is a sign of decline as Hamas and the Qassam Brigades’ image takes further setbacks amid plans for a ceasefire and the impending threat of disarmament.

Rise of a Symbol

Hudhayfa al-Kahlout (Arabic: حذيفة الكحلوت) was born in Gaza in 1985. His family descends from the depopulated Ni’ilya (Arabic: نعليا) village near Ashkelon (Hebrew: אשקלון) in southern Israel, and his family fled to Gaza during Israel’s 1948 War of Independence. He first emerged as a public figure in 2002 during the Second Intifada as a field commander within the Qassam Brigades, where he was interviewed as part of a Hamas broadcast (X/@Bin_S_aeed, November 4, 2023). He adopted the nom de guerre Abu Obaida, likely a reference to one of Muhammad’s companions and military commanders, Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah (Arabic: أبو عبيدة بن الجرّاح). His first press conference, held on October 2, 2004 at al-Noor Mosque (Arabic: مسجد النور) in northern Gaza, announced a series of retaliatory attacks under the “Days of Rage” (Arabic: أيام الغضب) banner (Telegram/@الرسالة, Oct 2, 2023; X/@osSWSso, February 14). Following Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, the Qassam Brigades officially appointed him as its spokesman (Al Arabiya, August 31).

His prominence reached unprecedented levels during the 2014 Gaza war. The 55-day conflict elevated him from a militant communicator to a national figure (YouTube/Aljazeera Mubasher, November 13, 2014). He was received at public events and cheered by crowds like a celebrity, where he was introduced by fellow Hamas officials as “the word’s rocket” (Arabic: “صاروخ الكلمة”). Abu Obaida’s messages, often relayed from undisclosed underground locations, conveyed messages to and about Qassam militants in the tunnels, to Gaza’s civilian population, and to the broader Arab world and supporters of anti-Israel militancy. His July 20, 2014 announcement of the capture of Israeli soldier Oron Shaul’s (Hebrew: אורון שאול) body, which Hamas hoped to use for prisoner swaps, became one of the most watched broadcasts in the region (YouTube/AlJazeera Arabic, July 20, 2014). Delivered by Abu Obaida in a defiant tone, the message signaled Hamas’s attempts to match Israel militarily and psychologically while reveling in Hamas’s alleged upper hand—reshaping Arab perceptions of Hamas’s operations.

The Masked Identity and Media War

The red keffiyeh that defines Abu Obaida’s image was inspired by Imad Aqel (Arabic: عماد عقل). Aqel was a senior Hamas commander killed by Israel in 1993, who also frequently concealed his face with the same red-checkered scarf (Al Khanadeq, November 24, 1993; X/@خبرني – khaberni, August 20, 2024). Abu Obaida’s adaptation of this imagery turned the keffiyeh into a symbol of martyrdom, secrecy, and continuity between Hamas’s founding generation and its modern incarnation.

Abu Obaida’s statements were disseminated primarily through Telegram and rebroadcast via sympathetic media outlets following his ban on major social media platforms (Wattan News, April 16, 2016). His pre-recorded video and audio statements were often followed by targeted responses from Israel Defense Forces (Hebrew: צבא הגנה לישראל, IDF) Arabic-language spokesperson Avichay Adraee (Hebrew: אביחי אדרעי), who produces Arabic-language counter-messages aimed at discrediting Hamas propaganda (Sky News Arabia, November 13, 2023; YouTube/Al Mashhad المشهد, January 6, 2024). This ongoing media duel highlights the role of Abu Obaida not merely as a militant spokesman, but as a key node in the psychological and information warfare between Hamas and Israel.

Israeli Claims and the Myth of Survival

On September 2, 2025, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz (Hebrew: ישראל כ”ץ) announced that Abu Obaida had been killed during a targeted operation, an assertion that the IDF described as the “elimination of Hamas’s media face” (BBC News, August 31).  This was not the first attempted strike on Abu Obaida’s residence. He has been on Israel’s assassination list for years, as locations believed to be his home were targeted three separate times prior to the most recent strike: in 2008, 2012, and 2014 (Al Arabiya, August 31).

 

Hamas has attempted to create ambiguity and uncertainty around the spokesperson’s death. This strategy mirrors the very essence of how he was originally presented: masked, concealed, and deliberately anonymous. His obscured identity has long served as a symbolic pillar of Hamas’s narrative of resilience and a tool to generate fascination and attention around the movement. 

Israel has long had difficulty identifying Abu Obaida. He was once erroneously identified as online Islamic preacher (Arabic: داعية) Suhaib al-Kahlout (Arabic: صهيب الكحلوت) due to the similarity of their voices. It appears the real Abu Obaida, Hudhayfa al-Kahlout, was likely Suhaib’s close relative (Echorouk, September 2).  The Qassam Brigades even released a video recording allegedly containing a message from Abu Obaida that he was “healing,” although no verification of this claim was made (YouTube/AL Jadeed KSA, September 22). In the two months since the recording’s release, Abu Obaida has not made a public appearance—strongly implying that Israeli claims of his assassination are correct.

Hamas’s official PR strategy must be altered following al-Kahlout’s demise. As it stands, the group exerts strong control over Gaza’s media space, including its network of journalists and media activists (Militant Leadership Monitor, November 29). No figure can replicate the unique role he played in conveying top-down military messages with discipline, conviction, and strategic coherence. His disappearance has created a vacuum in Hamas’s ability to project unity, bolster fighter morale, and counter Israel’s increasingly sophisticated Arabic-language information operations. Beyond his competency as a spokesman, Abu Obaida’s larger-than-life figure’s disappearance creates a vacuum in Hamas’s ability to bolster its supporters’ morale across the Arabic-speaking world, and represents a significant strategic victory in the Israeli campaign to cripple Hamas. Increasingly, Hamas has needed to rely on non-official channels, including in the journalist and influencer sphere, to shape narratives. These channels are excellent for civilian emotional mobilization, but journalists and influencers cannot credibly disseminate operational claims, such as troop movements and casualty counts. Among other communications, Abu Obaida was often tasked with sharing reports of any Qassam Brigades victories in confrontations with the IDF, and the lack of a clear channel to report small gains will likely weigh heavily on Hamas fighters’ morale.

Abu Obaida’s role represented an important linkage between the Hamas Politburo (Arabic: المكتب السياسي لحركة حماس) and the Qassam Brigades. The Qassam Brigades, with its chief military function of attacking Israeli forces, exercises more popular legitimacy than Hamas’ political wing, whose political leadership carries the burdens of administration, allegations of corruption, and internal rivalries (YouTube/محمد قنديل, February 1). With Hamas politicians’ limited popularity, and the strategic challenges of elevating any military figure in the Qassam Brigades—who would then find themselves in even sharper Israeli crosshairs—Abu Obaida perfectly filled the niche of the popular, Qassam-affiliated voice of the Hamas organization, capable of rallying supporters across factional lines as a masked, almost mythical figure. 

Hamas faces the challenge of sustaining its internal cohesion and its external messaging without a spokesman of comparable symbolic power—one it may not be able to reproduce.

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