Abu Zainab al-Lami—The Mastermind Behind the Bloody Crackdown in Iraq

Abu Zainab al-Lami—The Mastermind Behind the Bloody Crackdown in Iraq

The ongoing protests in Baghdad and in the predominantly Shia areas of southern Iraq are unprecedented in both their scale and the degree of violence they were confronted with by the authorities. The Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias and its umbrella organization, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), have been accused of spearheading the crackdown and killing hundreds of protesters and injuring thousands. Abu Zainab al-Lami—the head of the PMU security department—is accused of playing a key role in the campaign to repress the protests. Although the vast majority of the protesters are Shia, the demonstrations were seen by Tehran and its allies in Iraq as being a part of a grand conspiracy against Iran and its allies in the Middle East (Arabi21, October 30).

The Iraqi authorities have responded to the protests with heavy handed policies since the first days of the demonstrations. In order not to surrender key areas in central Baghdad, snipers were deployed on top of buildings and masked men were seen operating within the ranks of the security forces. Both groups were believed to be militiamen who received orders from al-Lami (Independent Arabia, October 17).

Al-Lami’s role was reportedly bigger than the direct involvement of his men in clashes with protesters. In his capacity as head of security in the PMU, he has the power to supervise the activities of powerful militia leaders. This authority has made him into one of the most powerful person within the PMU. His power also comes from his direct link to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander general Qassim Soleimani. It is believed that al-Lami is responsible for the security details of Soleimani whenever he visits Iraq (Aliraqnet, October 8).

Abu Zainab al-Lami’s real name is Hussein Faleh. He is a member of the militia Kata’ib Hizballah in Iraq (KHI), led by Jamal Jafar al-Ibrahim (better known by his nickname Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis). KHI and al-Muhandis were designated  as threats to coalition forces and stability in Iraq by the U.S. Treasury in 2009 (U.S. Treasury Department, July 2, 2009).

Yet when the PMU was formed in 2014, al-Muhandis became its deputy commander of the PMU and al-Lami its head of security. Until the recent protest crisis, al-Lami’s name was rarely mentioned in the media. Unlike other leaders of the PMU groups who publicize their activities, give interviews, and frequently make fiery statements, al-Lami avoided the media like any typical intelligence professional.

The government of the Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi has not accepted responsibility for the killing of the protesters. The PMU also denied any involvement in the killing of the protesters, but its leaders warned that they were ready to crush what they saw as a conspiracy. Al-Lami is reported to be in charge of this mission. Soleimani himself came to Baghdad as soon as the protests broke out to lead the efforts to repress them. His tools to do that were the Shia militias and his confidant al-Lami, who has power and influence over the commanders of those militias (Al-Arabiya, October 31).

On the tactical level as a member of the KHI, al-Lami is an expert in forming and commanding small groups that operate separately to achieve certain objectives in various locations, a tactic the militia used against the U.S.-led coalition forces during the Iraq war. The same tactic has been used during the ongoing protests, but this time it is being used against protesters instead of organized militaries. It has not been as effective in stopping the protests and has still resulted in significant casualties.

In addition to the snipers and killing squads operating in Baghdad and the southern provinces, al-Lami’s men also launched a campaign to gather intelligence about key figures in the leaderless protest movement. Activists who were believed to be instrumental in the protest movement in Baghdad and elsewhere were kidnapped or assassinated. Protesters and Iraqi security forces accuse the militias, and al-Lami and his associates in particular, of being behind the campaign (Al-Quds, October 6).

Al-Lami is based in Baghdad and is known in its affluent quarters as someone who loves to socialize in luxurious hotels. Business people, who understand the power of the militias, often try to establish and maintain good relations with him. He is believed to have accumulated personal wealth by providing protection or using his power to take over expensive properties.

Conclusion

The speculation that there is a growing rivalry between al-Lami and Muhandis is likely to be exaggerated. Al-Muhandis has historical ties to Iran and he is and will likely always be one of the most trusted figures in the IRGC-QF circles. In fact, al-Lami owes his very position to al-Muhandis. In his mid-sixties and involved in military activities, al-Muhandis needed a trusted person to take over the tasks that require hands on supervision, such as imposing discipline and commitment within the PMU’s several militias and protecting senior figures like Soleimani. But as al-Muhandis heads to retirement, al-Lami, believed to be in his early forties, is in the best position to succeed him, whether on top of the KHI or the PMU. He was chosen to be the head of intelligence in the interior ministry after the formation of prime minister Abdul-Mahdi’s government last year, but political turmoil meant that his appointment had to wait (24.ae, October 17).

As long as he maintains and consolidates his links to Soleimani and influential parties in Iran, he will be in a good position. The protest movement succeeded, with the help of Iraq’s most senior cleric Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to force Abdul-Mahdi to declare that he would resign. Still they are unlikely to change the whole regime in Iraq as none of the parties that have real influence—namely the United States, Iran, and Sistani—want such an outcome. That means the power of the militias will not be shaken easily. But al-Lami will still be tested. Recent media reports suggest that leaking his name as a prime suspect in the crackdown had actually come from within the PMU in order to save the reputation of more high ranking politicians like Falih al-Fayadh, head of the PMU and a national security advisor (Ultra Iraq, October 20).

If al-Lami is not presented as a scapegoat for the regime and survives the ongoing crisis, he could emerge as one of the most prominent figures in a new generation of militia leaders in Iraq.