“An Average Young Tunisian”: A Profile of Aymen al-Samiri, Mastermind of the June 27 Tunis Double-Attack
“An Average Young Tunisian”: A Profile of Aymen al-Samiri, Mastermind of the June 27 Tunis Double-Attack
Introduction
From June 27 to July 3, Tunisia saw a series of chaotic events, as the country’s capital was struck by two nearly simultaneous suicide bombings, followed by a massive government manhunt for those behind the attacks. Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed defined these five days as being “difficult,” later adding that “thanks to the work of the security and military forces, and particularly the anti-terrorist unit, we managed to eliminate or arrest all the members of this group” (HuffPost Maghreb, July 3). Chahed was referring to the group that carried out the June 27 twin attacks in Tunis. Authorities arrested more than 20 people in connection with the attacks. The actual perpetrators of the attack and the leader of the cell were eliminated. The two suicide attackers were Mohammed Amin al-Kahlawi and Moncef al-Mansouri. Al-Kahlawi was a 28-year-old graduate in physical education, originally from Douar Hicher, historically the “radical area par antonomasia” of Tunis. Al-Mansouri was a 45-year-old security guard from Sidi Bouzid, an impoverished town in central Tunisia and the birthplace of the 2010-2011 Jasmine Revolution (Jomhouria, June 27).
The mastermind of the twin suicide attacks, however, was a much younger man, 23-year-old Aymen al-Samiri (usually spelled Smiri by local media, since the a is usually not pronounced in colloquial Tunisian). Despite his youth and apparent lack of significant militant experience, authorities labeled him as a “very dangerous threat“ in the days after the two attacks (Radio Mosaique FM, July 4). On July 2, the authorities warned of the danger emanating from Samiri, and asked the public for information concerning his whereabouts. On the evening of July 3, security forces nearly captured Samiri. However, before he could be arrested he blew himself up at the above-ground light rail station in Hay (Cité) al-Intilaka in the area of Ettadhamen. Islamic State (IS)-Tunisia claimed responsibility for the twin attacks and Samiri’s suicide bombing (Tunisie Numerique, June 27). The group also hit the Tunisian headlines more recently, after some of its Tunisian members released a video, allegedly filmed near Kairouan, declaring their allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Kapitalis, July 19).
June 27: A Day of Chaos
June 27 was a chaotic day for Tunisia. In the morning, two suicide attacks occurred, one after the other. A suicide bomber attacked a police vehicle in downtown Tunis. The blast killed a municipal police officer and injured four people. A few minutes later, another suicide bomber attacked a police station in the area of El Gorjani, where the special anti-terrorist unit is headquartered. Hours before, at 3:00 AM, terrorists attacked a broadcasting station at Mount Arbata in the country’s southern Gafsa governorate (Realites, June 27). The events in Tunis were probably not connected with what happened in Gafsa, yet they were perceived to be part of the same wave. In addition, early afternoon that same day, unconfirmed rumors concerning the death of the Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi began flooding the Web, fueling confusion and further apprehension. An adviser had to confirm that the president was indeed taken to a military hospital following a severe health crisis, but that he was still alive. The day after the emergency, the government made clear that the president was recovering (Jeune Afrique, June 27; Anadolu Agency, June 27). Yet, his health was clearly deteriorating and it became known that the president had been sick for some time. He passed away on July 25, on Tunisia’s Republic day, after being taken again to the capital’s military hospital late on the evening of July 24.(Espace Manager, July 24; Jeune Afrique, July 25; Liberation, July 25; RFI, July 25).
However, the unfortunate coincidence of the timing of these attacks and the president’s health issues created a tense environment. One observer called the day a second “Black Thursday” in Tunisian history, recalling the chaotic unrest that engulfed the country on January 26, 1978 (African Manager, June 27). On “Black Thursday,” one of the most important events in the history of independent Tunisia, general strikes in the country were met with unusually harsh repression, which resulted in dozens of people being killed and hundreds injured (Jeune Afrique, January 26, 2018). The comparison was an obvious exaggeration, but it shows the alarm—in some cases, hysteria—with which many greeted these events as they were unfolding. In the following days, tension remained high across the country, and the events of July 3 were the culmination of this tension.
Aymen al-Samiri: Average Youngster, Terrorist Mastermind
On the evening of July 3, Samiri killed himself in a suicide bombing at the light rail station of Cite’ Intilaka. Samiri was considered the tête pensante (mastermind) of the twin attacks in Tunis (Radio Mosaique FM, July 4). Not far from where he died, security forces found 10 kilograms of explosive material, carefully hidden under a tree planted in the patio of the El-Ghofrane mosque (Radio Mosaique FM, July 3; HuffPost Maghreb, July 3). Later, authorities confirmed that this material belonged to Samiri and that he had plans to attack security patrols, foreign embassies, or commercial entities. Al-Intilaka is part of the broader area of Ettadhamen, a rough neighborhood of the capital historically known for its high rates of crime. Ettadhamen also became a significant hotbed of radicalization after the 2011 revolution (YouTube, May 21, 2013). Many locals traveled to Syria and Iraq. The Libya-based jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia had a strong presence in this area and controlled most of its mosques.
Samiri was born on March 19, 1996. The authorities released information on him the day before his death, as he was on the run from security forces who had information that he was preparing another attack. After his death, authorities did not release much more information.
Samiri’s Facebook was allegedly still online immediately following his death, and those who saw it said it looked like the standard account of a man of his age. Indeed, a typical comment made by Tunisians after these events was that Samiri looked much like an average young Tunisian, and he had neither visible nor obvious symptoms of being radicalized. Interestingly, despite his youth, Samiri was considered the leader of this small cell. The men who carried out the suicide missions before him were older. This suggests he had strong leadership skills. In many of these radical circles, age, experience and seniority are typically essential factors in determining hierarchy, influence and control. However, that was not so in this case.
A vital element in understanding more about Samiri’s profile is his origins. He was from Tunis, more precisely from the area of Hay Ibn Khaldoun, where he was living up to the time of his death. Hay Ibn Khaldoun is a low-income neighborhood located in the northwest area of the Tunisian capital (YouTube, April 21, 2015). This neighborhood was created in the 1970s and was considered the first affordable mass housing project in Tunisia’s history. A rapidly expanding area, it accommodated people who were moving to the capital from different, rural regions of Tunisia. At that time, authorities feared the emergence of informal and unregulated neighborhoods, similar to what happened in Cairo, Egypt, which experienced a chaotic urbanization process. However, this area soon lost its primary function. From being a residential unit, it turned into a mixed-use, densely populated, mostly dysfunctional area that became home to petty crime, drunken fighting, and problems related to small-scale illegal activities. The neighborhood has since seen sporadic revolts against the police and the government over the past few years. For instance, this area was among the most active in the anti-austerity protests that shook Tunisia in early 2018 (Tunis Webdo, January 10, 2018). Hay Ibn Khaldoun historically accommodated social groups coming from the most disparate areas of Tunisia. As such, this area—like many others with this type of socio-economic milieu—suffered from inter-communal tension based on conflicting regionalist sentiments.
Years before, this area hit the headlines in Tunisia when a father killed his daughter in what was considered an “honor killing.” The man murdered his teenage daughter after finding out she went back home from school alongside a male classmate (Tunis Webdo, June 12, 2014). This episode elicited a significant reaction from across the country. In Tunisia, honor crimes are considered to be a rural thing of the past, and have almost completely disappeared. The fact that this happened in a neighborhood of the capital shocked the public. However, this episode was indicative of a larger tendency: the presence of a conservative and traditional mindset, and old-fashioned social habits, among Tunisia’s populace. Indeed, being in an area historically devoted to welcoming people from other parts of Tunisia, it neither had a specific social, economic and cultural identity nor a clear historical connection. This is markedly different from other, more established, areas of the capital. Inevitably, financial hardship, diverse geographic and socio-cultural backgrounds—which are particularly significant in a country where regionalism is still a significant problem—and overpopulation created the conditions for a remarkable level of dysfunction. The consequences became more visible in the aftermath of the revolution, as the presence of groups linked to transnational jihadist organizations grew (Tunisie Numerique, September 20, 2016).
Similarities to—and Differences from—Other Cases
In many ways, Samiri’s profile is similar to that of other radicalized Tunisians. Yassine Labadi, one of the perpetrators of the Bardo attacks in March 2015, was also from the Hay ibn Khaldoun neighborhood. He became radicalized in a mosque in El Omrane, a neighborhood adjacent to Hay Ibn Khaldoun and comparable in its socio-economic features. Like Samiri, Labadi was also considered an average Tunisian who suddenly became radicalized due to the growing influence of online propaganda (Middle East Eye, March 21, 2015). However, unlike Samiri, Labadi went to Derna, Libya, where he trained with IS before returning to Tunisia. No evidence exists that Samiri did the same. It seems he was radicalized, and became a “significant threat,” as defined by the Tunisian security services, without training abroad. This detail has several important implications for counter-terrorism in Tunisia. Over the past few years, Tunisian counter-terrorism was focused primarily on returnees from Syria and Iraq, or Tunisians and/or fighters of other nationalities who were fighting with IS in Libya. However, in those cases, there was a logic to follow in tracking them: they traveled before returning and were, in most of the cases, on the security forces’ radar. In comparison, it is more difficult to spot and anticipate the actions of those young Tunisians who were radicalized within the country and never traveled abroad, particularly if their families or immediate social environment do not suggest anything suspicious. This was also the case with the woman who blew herself up on October 29, 2018, on Avenue Bourguiba, injuring 20 persons. Mouna Guebla, a 30-year-old unemployed woman originally from small rural town of Zorda, was the first female suicide bomber in the history of Tunisia. She was also a complete unknown to security forces and was radicalized online. In her inner circle, no one noted any change. The hours spent alone in her room on her laptop, which the family could afford only after selling a few olive trees, were allegedly used to “prepare for her doctorate” as later claimed by her family (Jeune Afrique, October 30, 2018).
Conclusion
Tunisian counter-terrorism capacities have strengthened significantly over the past few years, particularly after the wave of attacks in 2015. That said, there are still loopholes, and some terrorists can still slip through the net, as shown by the recent twin attacks in Tunis. These two attacks were not particularly sophisticated, yet they managed to create significant tension in the country. Samiri’s prototype is that of a militant difficult to detect before he acts: not particularly well-trained, or experienced; young and somehow average in his appearance and outlook; with neither experience abroad nor structural connections with transnational groups, as he seemed to be more inspired by IS rather than being an active member. Despite all these weaknesses, however, his actions and plans kept Tunisia in a state of alert for five days
