An In-Depth Portrait of Sadiq al-Ahmar: A Window into Yemeni Tribal Power Politics

An In-Depth Portrait of Sadiq al-Ahmar: A Window into Yemeni Tribal Power Politics

One of the principal power brokers in Yemen is Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar.  As leader of the Hashid tribal federation, the strongest and second largest in Yemen, al-Ahmar is an individual of unique power. It was via his ability to control both the levers of legitimating and hard power–his ability to simultaneously call forces into the field, and force their withdrawal or defection by tribal fiat–that enabled General Ali Moshin’s uprising after he led the charge against Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime in 2011. Though Moshin had nearly half of the Yemeni military under his roster, as commander of the 1st Armored Division and most of the Northwestern Military district, it was only when al-Ahmar gave the uprising his sanction that major defections occurred. Al-Ahmar tapped into a deeply held tribal loyalty that transcended conventional military and political lines. [1] His sanction lent the uprising decisive support. 

Since the end of open hostilities, al-Ahmar has receded into the background, seemingly content to let others, such as his brother Hamid al-Ahmar engage in the political sphere and push the family’s public agenda. This is in part emblematic of the nature of his power and his capacity as an individual. His strength is not derived from personal acumen or brilliance; it comes as a result of the nature of his position. As tribal power by its nature is diffused across families and disparate elements, al-Ahmar’s power and his relationship to the forces under his command is more subtle and complex than might be expected. 

Early Life

Sadiq al-Ahmar is the eldest son of the late Sheikh Abdullah ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar, one of the most powerful figures in modern Yemeni history and the late leader of the Hashid tribal federation. Born in 1956, Sadiq was raised in the heartland of the Hashid in the Amran province and the titular capital of the al-Khamri tribe. He was an early observer of the subtle machinations of Yemeni politics, having watched his father maneuver between the competing Republican and Royalist governments of North Yemen. 

By the mid 1970’s with the fighting at an end, Sadiq’s father dispatched his son to be educated in Egypt; but simmering disagreements between his father and the Egyptian government led Sadiq to conclude his studies in Yemen. Sadiq then went on to study in the United States for several years, pursuing a graduate degree in California, and eventually attaining a light aircraft pilot’s license at Howard Pilot College.

While a higher education, especially in foreign schools, was and to a degree remains the norm for the Yemeni elite, it did not match the kind of grooming or attention usual for an heir apparent. In particular, Sadiq’s decision to pursue a pilot’s license instead of returning to engage in politics is seen as an oddity and according to some sources reflective of a strained relationship with his father. [2] However in the early 1990’s he returned to Yemen, and was promptly ushered into the Assembly of Representatives by his father. In his time as a representative, he performed few activities and left most responsibilities to other members of his faction, particularly his brother Hamid who despite being ten years his junior attained the Speaker’s position. 

Tribal Chief and Family Ties       

Despite his position as tribal chief, he has relatively few personal accomplishments, while his personal acumen and intelligence has been a persistent subject of rumor and debate. His lackluster record becomes particularly striking when compared to his brothers. His younger brother Hamid al-Ahmar has amassed a large personal fortune as a result of his investment in telecommunications companies and has positioned himself as a principal backer of the opposition group, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform better known as al-Islah. [3] Another younger brother, Himyar al-Ahmar was the Deputy Speaker of Parliament and a key political interlocutor between the General Peoples Congress (GPC) and the tribes. The third younger brother, Hussein al-Ahmar is a deft military and political organizer and heads the National Solidarity Grouping a political organization that represents the disparate Yemeni tribes. 

Nevertheless it was Sadiq who was selected as tribal leader after his father’s death in 2007. This was for several reasons. The first and simplest was that as the eldest son, he could claim the greatest traditional right. The second is more complicated and has to do with the familial politics of the al-Ahmar family. The two strongest contenders, Hamid and Hussein have a great dislike for one another considering their mutual desire for power and their positions on opposing tracks of Yemeni politics. 

In the years before their father’s death the two brothers had already established the narratives that hold true for them today. Hamid had taken up position as the “modern” man of the family, aggressively moving to secure his position in the telecommunications industry and to establish an opposition media, while simultaneously becoming the strongman patron of a major political party, al-Islah. Hussein on the other hand has taken the opposite tact, building old tribal alliances and familial connections with the hope of tapping into the traditional routes that have led to power in Yemen. [4]

Others have speculated that there is also an internal rift between the two, rooted in having different mothers and thus different sub-tribal backgrounds. Two sources close to the al-Ahmar family confirmed this assessment, while a third source attested the brothers do not have different tribal affiliations. Nevertheless the contrast that the two brothers have drawn between themselves is stark, with Hamid embracing modernity, and Hussein cultivating tribal connections, and both having aspirations for power. 

Considering these family schisms and dilemmas, the natural choice shifted to Sadiq. In addition to his aforementioned legitimacy as the eldest son, he had a harmonious relationship with his brothers, and maintained excellent relationships with other tribes and sub-tribal groups. These characteristics made him attractive as a competent and neutral steward of the tribes’ fortunes. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly as far as his brothers’ views may be concerned, Sadiq has not fathered any children and is not likely to do so. [5] 

This last point may be the most important considering Sadiq is nearing 60, meaning he will not provide an heir. According to several keen observers of the al-Ahmar family, this has two significant results. The first is that it has blunted Sadiq’s own ambition, since he has no legacy to protect or pass on, and has consequently made him more amenable to working and compromising within his family. The second is that his powerful brothers, Hamid and Hussein, who are much younger than Sadiq, can look at his position with the reasonable expectation that they will have the chance to compete for it once again. 

Objectives and Perspective

While Sadiq may not be the most intellectually astute of his brothers, he has demonstrated a tremendous natural instinct for tribal politicking with the overriding concern of defending the interests of his tribe and lines of patronage. Like many tribal leaders, Sadiq al-Ahmar is no ideologue. Interested primarily in material benefits, he is unlikely to find common cause with political outcasts like al-Qaeda. Instead Sadiq has focused on maintaining his family and his tribe’s position in the conventional political landscape, which has meant continuing to partner with and back the Saleh government despite personal disagreements. 

Indeed despite several of his brothers taking strong and bellicose positions against the Saleh regime, Sadiq did nothing until Ali Moshin openly rose against the state. It was not until the military had been nearly split in two by Moshin’s defection that Sadiq felt confident enough to act. However it is important to note that once Sadiq acted, his commands were obeyed. His brothers, their relatives, and the entire tribal support structure reacted and reacted quickly.  

Aside from expressing some support for the demonstrators in a public appearance, Sadiq has made little commentary on the political scene since the end of the fighting. However according to some sources Sadiq has become enamored with the idea of Hamid al-Ahmar occupying the presidency after the next elections, which may be held in as little as two years time. [6] This would put the al-Ahmar family in the unprecedented position of controlling the actual levers of patronage from the Presidency, as well as the Hashid tribal, military, and political network that is the recipient of said patronage. 

While former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was from the Sanhan tribe, a group within the Hashid, and while he created significant conduits of patronage and bribes to the Hashid and al-Ahmar family in particular, it was conditional and obviously not a permanent arrangement. 

Removing the presidential intermediary and placing an al-Ahmar in the position would be an almost unprecedented boon for a political family in Yemen. Not since the Zaydi Imamate has a family controlled the executive as well as tribal political space. With the authority of the presidency, a strong position in Parliament, and control over the substantial military and tribal assets of the Hashid, the al-Ahmar family would be the most powerful leadership Yemen has seen since the fall of the monarchy more than half a century ago. 

Attractive as this route to power for the al-Ahmar family is, it will require a close relationship between Hamid and Sadiq, and may in fact require close coordination between Hamid and Hussein to avoid open dissension. If this is the objective that the al-Ahmar family decides to pursue, it is one that will require familial consultation.  Convincing Sadiq to take risky positions has never been an easy thing to do, his slow reaction to his brothers belligerency in last years revolution is a testament to that. But the allure of power and such unbridled control may prove decisive. If that is the case, then Sadiq will be an actor of paramount importance in the coming years as the turbulence of Yemeni politics offers an opening for him to fortify the family’s position and assist Hamid’s electoral pursuits.  

Saudi Connection

The relationship between the al-Ahmar family and Saudi Arabia goes back to the early 1930’s when King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia clashed with the Yemeni Zaydi Imamate in the Asir War that saw Saudi Arabia take control of what is now southwestern Saudi Arabia. In that conflict Sadiq’s grandfather Sheikh Husayn Bin Nasser al-Ahmar made the decision to acknowledge the temporal authority of King Abdulaziz and the spiritual authority of the local religious establishment. This decision contributed greatly to Husayn’s eventual execution by the penultimate Imam of the Zaydi Imamate, but bound the al-Ahmar family and the Hashid to Saudi Arabia. 

Since that time, the Hashid via the al-Ahmar family have been the primary vehicle Saudi Arabia has used to affect their agenda in Yemen. The al-Saud (term referring to the royal family of Saudi Arabia), have pumped huge amounts of money to their tribal contacts and cultivated long term relationships with senior tribal figures across north Yemen. The government and tribal offensives against the Houthi in 2010 would likely have been impossible without coordination and consultation with Riyadh. A case and point is the Popular Army, an amalgam of Yemeni tribes utilized by the government to fight the Zaydi insurgency. This group was financed with money from the al-Saud and coordinated by Hussein al-Ahmar. [7]

The involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni revolution was significant, especially as it pertained to its contacts within the al-Ahmar family and the government camp. Senior Saudi royals such as Prince Nayef had been murmuring discontent about Saleh for sometime, and may have agitated to reduce support for the government as early as late 2010. However concern for stability, ever the watchword in Saudi politics overrode such concerns. The civil uprising caught them by surprise, and as it transitioned towards a violent confrontation there was an immediate need to intercede and avoid the sort of civil war that analysts were predicting with increasing regularity. [8]

Saudi involvement consisted of overt measures like the GCC Peace Proposal, and high profile delegation missions. But below the surface, many sources have claimed that Saudi officials exerted intense effort to restrain both Ali Abdullah Saleh and the al-Ahmar family. Specifically it has been alleged that senior Saudi royals, perhaps even King Abdullah himself, told them that assassinating the other or allowing the situation to devolve into outright civil war was not an option. There is some circumstantial evidence that gives credence to this when considering the relatively light weaponry used to raid Sadiq’’s compound in al-Hassaba and the use of light mortars to attack the Presidential Palace instead of Ali Moshin’’s heavy artillery. 

With the revolution over and the political dust still settling, how Sadiq and the rest of the al-Ahmar family move forward with their plans and objectives will remain contingent on how amenable they remain to the al-Saud. Without Saudi money and without money flowing from the Presidency, the power of the family will be significantly neutered. The relationship is somewhat symbiotic however, as Saudi objectives in Yemen are likely to be achieved via the utilization of the al-Ahmar family and their Hashid tribal contacts. 

Military Potential

Like most tribal leaders, al-Ahmar’s military potential comes from his ability to draw upon reserve tribal levies. In the case of the Yemeni uprising this numbered upwards of 40,000 with some estimates as high as 60,000. However al-Ahmar is unique in terms of the permanent force he has at his disposal. At his compound at al-Hassaba, reliable sources place his personal guard at 200 fighters, which proved critical in the early stages of the uprising last year. [9]  

Towards the end of May, Saleh chose to mount a raid on Sadiq’s compound in an effort to stop the budding insurrection at its source. Several hundred police and troops from the al-Najda (Emergency Police), the Interior Ministry, and the Republican Guards attempted to storm the compound. Sadiq’s personal bodyguard was capable of fending off the attacks long enough for more tribal fighters and members of Ali Moshin’s military detachments to reach his position and launch a local counter-attack that eventually reached the Interior Ministry and SABA buildings.

On a larger scale al-Ahmar controls a network of at least 2,000 fighters dispersed so as to protect himself and key members of his family. [10] It was these forces that formed the first wave of the Hashid resistance as tribal fighters began their march to Saan’a.  

While Sadiq and the Hashid retain significant military power, and the ability to dilute the strength of their opposition, they are severely limited by the lack of heavy equipment. In the Battle of San’aa the majority of the tribal fighters were unable to make it into the city itself. [11] Reinforced elements of the Republican Guard, though heavily outnumbered, were able to hold the fighters at checkpoints north of the city. Without the backing and pressure from Ali Moshin, it is likely that Sadiq’s forces would have eventually been swept back to their tribal strongholds.             

Conclusion 

Sadiq al-Ahmar is not as important as the tribe he represents. The Hashid remain the most well-organized, well-armed, well-funded, and well-connected tribal group in Yemen. Furthermore the existing alliance between the Hashid and Bakeel that Sadiq has been steward of only enhances their position. At present the future of the Hashid will in part define the future of Yemen. The lines of patronage from the state and from Saudi Arabia remain robust and active, their large representation in the military remains relatively unchallenged, and members of the al-Ahmar family are rising stars on the emerging political scene. 

The phenomenon of Yemeni tribal politics has placed an immense amount of intrinsic respect and power into Sadiq’s hands. He has proven to be a quiet and prudent individual; a man deeply concerned with his tribes position in Yemen, and one who despite his weaknesses has a natural gift for tribal politics. As long as the situation in Yemen remains relatively calm it is unlikely that much will be heard from Sadiq al-Ahmar. 

Given the current state of affairs in Yemen, it seems unlikely that political calm will last for too long. The aspirations of his brothers, the continued al-Qaeda insurgency, the enduring presence of Yemeni secessionists, and of course the familiar dance between the al-Ahmar family and the central government, all seem likely to give Sadiq a reason to re-enter the fray at some point in the near future.  

Notes

1. Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012.

2. Author interview with senior Watan party member, July 2012.

3. State Department Cable 222993 released via Wikileaks and may be viewed here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/83500/09sanaa1617.pdf.

4. Author interview with senior political leader Abdulghani al-Iryani , August 2012.

5. Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012.

6. Ibid.

7. Author Interview with Ali al-Ahmed, August 2012.

8. Author interview with Muneer Mawari, July 2012.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. “Clashes between Yemeni Tribal Fighters and Military Leave 9 Dead” al-Arabiya, September 14, 2011.