An Update on Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Is the One-Eyed Jihadist Still Alive?
An Update on Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Is the One-Eyed Jihadist Still Alive?
Who is Mokhtar Belmokhtar?
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is an Algerian national who fought in the country’s 1990s civil conflict and later became a commander in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s southern branch. He was given the moniker “Mr. Marlboro” on account of his role in smuggling goods (namely cigarettes) in the region, providing AQIM with significant revenue. Belmokhtar has also been called “the one-eyed Nelson” after losing an eye while fighting Russian forces during the Soviet Union’s 1979-88 occupation of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, he developed direct connections with a number of jihadists who went on to become senior figures in al-Qaeda. This likely in part explains his fractious relationship with the leadership of AQIM, who he believed had accorded him insufficient respect. Belmokhtar rejected their authority on several occasions, and in December 2012 left to form the al-Mulathameen Brigade (“Those who Sign with Blood” Brigade).
Belmokhtar’s aggressive style and desire to prove his jihadist credentials to AQIM’s leadership prompted him to orchestrate several high-profile attacks against Western interests across the region. Indeed, the al-Mulathameen Brigade rose to prominence when it carried out an attack in January 2013 on Algeria’s Ain Amenas gas facility, during which at least 37 hostages were killed (Echorouk, July 21, 2013). In August 2013, the al-Mulathameen Brigade merged with another AQIM breakaway group—the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA)—to create a new group, al-Murabitun. However, Belmokhtar continued to recognize the authority of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and consequently conducted joint operations with AQIM elements in Mali and elsewhere, despite his official break from the group.
Belmokhtar was designated an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist by both the United States and the UN in 2003, but it was not until 2013 that the U.S. State Department similarly designated al-Mulathameen Brigade and al-Murabitun.
Belmokhtar has been reported dead a number of times over the years, including a report that he was killed in Chad in 2013. However, just two months later, Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for two suicide truck bomb attacks on a French-owned uranium mine in Arlit, Niger, and a military base 150 miles away in Agadez (Al-Jazeera, May 24, 2013). Later, in 2015, the Libyan government announced that a U.S. airstrike had killed Belmokhtar. U.S. officials confirmed the airstrike and that Belmokhtar had been a target, but were unable to confirm that he was killed (Al-Monitor, June, 2015). In November 2016, Belmokhtar was targeted in a French airstrike in southern Libya, based on intelligence from the United States (Middle East Eye, December 15, 2016). However, U.S. officials were again unable to confirm Belmokhtar’s death.
Belmokhtar and al-Murabitun’s Activities since 2016
Belmokhtar does not appear to have issued any public statements since 2015, fueling speculation that he had been killed in the French airstrike in 2016. However, Algerian intelligence services, working in collaboration with counterparts in Niger, suggested to local media in 2016 that Belmokhtar had successfully escaped, although with serious injuries (Middle East Eye, December 15, 2016). The same month, a woman described as a wife of Belmokhtar was arrested in Libya where she gave birth to his child, according to authorities in eastern Libya. The woman—a Tunisian national—was seized on her way to Derna and reportedly said that Belmokhtar was alive and residing in southern Libya (Middle East Eye, November 23, 2016).
Moreover, a number of significant attacks linked to al-Murabitun have taken place since 2016, suggesting that the group has not suffered any operational setbacks that might be expected following the death of its leader. Such attacks suggest that the group has maintained both the capacity and intent to carry out significant violence. In January 2017, for instance, AQIM claimed responsibility for a large-scale attack in Gao, northern Mali, killing 77 people and injuring dozens more (Al-Jazeera, January 8, 2017). A subsequent statement by AQIM said that the bombing was “punishment for Mali’s cooperation with France” and attributed the attack specifically to its affiliate al-Murabitun. The statement did not include any mention of Belmokhtar’s death.
Weeks after the Gao attack, al-Murabitun formed the wider jihadist alliance Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM) with several other smaller regional groups, including the Islamist Tuareg organization Ansar al-Dine, AQIM’s Sahara division, and the Katiba Macina Liberation Front of Ansar al-Dine. This new alliance was to be led by Iyad ag Ghali, the historical leader of Ansar al-Dine. The newly-formed group subsequently carried out and claimed a number of attacks, including a May 2017 assault on the headquarters of a UN peacekeeping force in the northern Mali city of Timbuktu, which resulted in the death of one peacekeeper (AllAfrica, May 3, 2017). JNIM’s longstanding links to local tribes and communities have since allowed it to consolidate its position as the dominant jihadist group in Mali.
In October 2017, a criminal court in Oran, Algeria, sentenced Belmokhtar to death in absentia after finding him guilty of forming and leading a terrorist organization (AQIM) and being in possession of, trading in and marketing weapons and ammunition. Belmokhtar had been tried and sentenced to death in 2012, along with nine other individuals. That case dated back to April 2011 over a plan to kidnap foreigners who were members of the construction team for Oran’s tramway (Middle East Monitor, October 16, 2017). The 2017 sentence against Belmokhtar suggests that authorities believed him to be alive and operational at this time.
More recently, in June 2018, the London-based Saudi magazine al-Majalaa suggested that reports of Belmokhtar’s death could be false. The report, which cited correspondence with Libyan and Algerian intelligence services, stated that Belmokhtar was operating in the Sahel, in the largely ungoverned spaces between Chad, Niger, and Mali. A source in the Algerian intelligence services said they could not confirm whether Belmokhtar is alive or dead, adding that if he had been killed the news would likely have spread among tribes in the region (Al-Majalaa, June 8, 2018).
Conclusion
Reports of Belmokhtar’s death seem, on balance, most likely false or exaggerated. However, his relatively low profile since 2016 despite the high tempo of activities by al-Murabitun, AQIM and JNIM suggests that he has taken on a less prominent leadership role, possibly as a result of serious injury or internal disagreements over ideology and strategy. Indeed, reports from 2017 suggest that Belmokhtar may have been dismissed by al-Murabitun’s council of elders in favor of Abderrahmane al-Sanhaji, a younger jihadist who is also an Algerian national (Middle East Eye, May 9, 2017).
Meanwhile, in November 2019, the United States imposed sanctions on senior JNIM leader Amadou Kouffa, days after France’s Minister for the Armed Forces said French troops had killed another JNIM leader, Ali Maychou, in Mali in October of that year, reflecting the growing threat the group poses in the region. In Algeria, the security forces’ capabilities will continue to significantly limit the ability of AQIM and al-Murabitun militants to carry out attacks, and they will likely focus on conducting kidnappings in the more remote border areas in the southern part of the country. Militants will have more success in conducting attacks in Mali, Niger and Libya given the permissive security environments. JNIM remains the most significant regional jihadist group, and will continue to pose the greater threat to targets in more central areas and cities such as Gao and the capital, Bamako. JNIM militants will also continue to prioritize attacks on military convoys and bases, especially those hosting foreign troops as part of the G5 Sahel mission.
