AQAP’s Virtual Jihadist – Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh
AQAP’s Virtual Jihadist – Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh
Following the notorious Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris, online supporters of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State spent considerable time jostling with each other over which group could claim credit for the deadly attack. Before al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a lengthy statement, its first claim of responsibility came in a series of short Twitter posts by the account @ba_yman. Underscoring the fact that AQAP wanted these tweets to be seen as an official claim of responsibility, an AQAP source sent these tweets by email to several journalists – in both their Arabic original and an English translation – 20 to 30 minutes before they were posted online. [1]
The Twitter account @ba_yman belonged to a pseudonymous figure who had been posting online as Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh since late 2009. Al-Danquluh has been publicly identified as a senior al-Qaeda leader by a knowledgeable jihadist source, which seems credible based on the promotion of his online writings by prominent jihadist forums as well as the general respect that has been conferred upon him. In this way, he seems to be part of a definable trend of AQAP leaders posting their strategic writings online pseudonymously, which has also been done by the group’s late deputy amir Said al-Shihri (who posted as Abu Asma al-Kubi) and also Abu Sa’d al-Amili (the pseudonym employed by another AQAP leader, whose actual identity remains unknown) (Militant Leadership Monitor, October 2013). As al-Danquluh was chosen to claim responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack by AQAP, his profile is sure to rise further.
Background
Al-Danquluh’s first public writing under this pseudonym was posted to jihadist forums in November 2009 and focused on the political situation in Yemen. [2] His article promoted AQAP as the representative of Yemen’s Sunni Muslims, while the other sides in Yemen’s conflict were secularism (represented by the ruling regime, then led by Ali Abdullah Saleh) and the “rejectionists,” a derogatory term for Shi’a Muslims (represented by Yemen’s Houthis). The early focus of al-Danquluh’s writing suggested that he may have been located in Yemen and subsequent articles in fact specified that he was located in that country.
Interestingly, his first article ended with the prediction that the United States would intervene in Yemen militarily – and he welcomed it. Al-Danquluh boasted that “it will be the mercy bullet and the last pin in the tomb of Americans, their presence in the region and the Western plan.” [3] Since the article was published less than two months before the 25-year-old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted the Christmas Day bomb attack, there is a reasonable chance – given al-Danquluh’s connection to AQAP – that the discussion of U.S. intervention was based on foreknowledge of that terrorist attack and anticipation of the U.S. response.
Even though he was a new writer, al-Danquluh’s writing was heavily promoted in jihadist forums at the time, including the al-Fallujah forums, where his first two articles were promoted on banners on the home page. Furthermore, influential forum participants immediately heaped praise on his writings and he was even compared to the prominent strategist Abu Bakr Naji, the author of The Management of Savagery. Heavy promotion of a new writer on the forums may be a sign that he is someone of prominence in the jihadist movement: The writings of Said al-Shihri and Abu Sa’d al-Amili have similarly received heavy promotion from forum administrators. These administrators are not disinterested observers of jihadist writings. Rather, their consistent ability to immediately promote the work of leaders in jihadist organizations, once these individuals decide to become active online, suggests that the forum administrators are frequently plugged into the highest echelons of the movement.
One thing that stood out to online jihadists is the fact that al-Danquluh’s name is apparently not of Arabic origin. Dar ul-Murabiteen Publications at one point transliterated his name as “Bakhasrov Adankalo,” the first name of which suggests that he may be from the North Caucasus. [4] However, jihadist speculation about al-Danquluh’s origin is just that – speculation – and there is no compelling metric for determining his ethnic origin.
After he so prominently emerged as a writer on the jihadist forums, al-Danquluh then disappeared for about two and a half years, only re-emerging in May 2012. His return post began with an apology for being so “late in speaking and commenting on events,” explaining that the reason for this was “some personal circumstances.” [5]
In March 2014, the informed jihadist media operative known as al-Siyasi al-Mutaqa’id publicly identified al-Danquluh on Twitter as “an AQAP leadership figure.” Al-Danquluh would himself join Twitter later in the year, creating the @ba_yman account on September 27, 2014. He then posted his first tweet on December 9, suggesting that he had joined Twitter to ensure more timely dissemination of his work: He noted that an article he had written months earlier was not posted by an associate who had promised to do so.
Shortly after al-Danquluh claimed the Charlie Hebdo attack for AQAP, Twitter suspended his account. However, he soon returned to Twitter as @by_yman.
Strategic Ideas
Though al-Danquluh’s early writings focused on the situation in Yemen, he has recently – as have many jihadist strategists – come to focus on the competition between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. His position on this intra-jihadist rivalry has closely hewed to that of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, which has been critical of Islamic State leadership while at the same time trying to keep the contentiousness of the conflict relatively limited. The purpose of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in pursuing this course is clear: It would like, at some point, to lure many Islamic State members back into the al-Qaeda fold. To this end, al-Danquluh’s criticisms of the Islamic State’s leadership have often been subtle rather than direct.
Interestingly, al-Danquluh’s writing began with a tack that was much more favorably predisposed to the Islamic State than it would later become: While clearly aligned with al-Qaeda, he also saw the Islamic State in a positive light, similar to the approach of his AQAP compatriot Abu Sa’d al-Amili. After the Islamic State, then the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, announced that it was merging with the Nusra Front (al-Qaeda’s recognized affiliate in Syria) in April 2013, only to have this advance rebuffed, al-Danquluh posted a short note at the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum that defended the leadership of the Islamic State against suspicions then being voiced about them. Some prominent jihadist commentators, such as Asad al-Jihad2, had argued that the Islamic State’s leadership had been infiltrated by intelligence services. [6]
As the conflict between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State escalated, al-Danquluh wrote more vigorously to defend al-Qaeda’s leadership, while refraining from fully taking the knives out against the Islamic State. In an article dated February 2014 that was addressed to supporters of the Islamic State, he attacked those who questioned al-Qaeda’s leadership, arguing that they were speaking from their own egos. [7] He also recounted the Islamic State’s disobedience to al-Qaeda amir Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Later in the year, al-Danquluh wrote a defense of AQAP’s neutrality with respect to the jihadist infighting in Syria. He stated that AQAP supported reconciliation between rival jihadist factions and refused to throw its weight behind any faction. [8] His position angered some pro-al-Qaeda hardliners who favored a more confrontational approach to the Islamic State, such as Abu Abbas al-Qatari, a prominent online jihadist who argued that AQAP’s official neutrality was encouraging the Islamic State’s brutality and thus, was complicit in the shedding of Muslim blood. [9]
And when al-Danquluh joined Twitter, he quickly posted an article on the beheading of Yemeni soldiers, something that members of AQAP front group Ansar al-Shari’a had done in August. This article on beheadings is the one that he explained he had given to an associate previously, only to learn that the associate did not post it—thus prompting al-Danquluh to join Twitter, in order to have better control over the distribution of his writings. He warned that beheading their captives could be strategically disastrous for AQAP, causing the group to be seen as “savages and slaughterers.” [10] In addition to addressing this internal issue of AQAP’s tactics, this statement can also be seen as a shot at the Islamic State, given that one of the major disputes between the Islamic State’s and al-Qaeda’s leadership involved the extreme brutality that the Islamic State employs. Indeed, the brutality of the Islamic State’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, helped prompt the uprising in Iraq that undermined that group in the 2007-2008 period.
Prior to the split between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, al-Danquluh’s strategic thinking was more focused on al-Qaeda’s fight against the United States. In addition to hoping that the United States would send ground troops into Yemen, he outlined the strategic benefits of AQAP’s ongoing attempts to bomb U.S.-bound aviation. In May 2012, al-Danquluh explained that AQAP’s bomb-making innovations, even though they had not succeeded in bringing down any planes, were forcing the United States to spend “billions.” [11] This is consistent with the approach that Osama bin Laden dubbed the “strategy of a thousand cuts” in 2004, which seeks to impose disproportionate costs on the United States through terrorist attacks, even those that do not succeed in striking their target. [12]
Conclusion
Al-Danquluh provides an important window into AQAP’s posture and the strategic thought of its leadership. Even when he was expressing the organization’s neutrality regarding the infighting in Syria, it was clear that al-Danquluh remained in the pro-al-Qaeda camp, warning against any disparagement of al-Qaeda’s leadership. And as the Islamic State became more aggressive in its posture toward al-Qaeda, al-Danquluh in turn became more aggressive toward it—at one point describing the Islamic State’s disobedience toward al-Zawahiri, and sometimes more subtly criticizing it.
The presence of AQAP leaders on forums and social media is unique among al-Qaeda’s regional branches. Although a number of al-Qaeda leaders serve as spokesmen for the organization, AQAP has been involved in more direct communications with jihadists. Though the challenge the Islamic State poses to al-Qaeda is sometimes overstated by observers, one area where the Islamic State has clearly outcompeted al-Qaeda is in appealing to and inspiring young jihadists, especially through social media. Leaders from other al-Qaeda branches thus might, like AQAP, over time adopt a more conspicuous online presence – perhaps to compete with the Islamic State, or perhaps simply to gain greater advantage by being better able to inspire jihadists to action internationally, including “lone wolf” terrorists.
While the trend is likely toward more al-Qaeda leaders raising their online profile (although doing so presents operational security challenges), the fact is that many are participating in social media and the forums already. And of these, Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh has long been worthy of attention – but his profile has just been raised significantly, following the Paris attacks.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program.
Notes
1. One journalist who received the tweets before they were posted online is Jeremy Scahill of The Intercept. See his discussion at https://twitter.com/jeremyscahill/status/553954939907887105 (posted Jan. 10, 2015).
2. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, “An Eye on Yemen’s Situation: Yemen Today, Confusing Question, Big Mystery in Observers’ Minds,” November 10, 2009.
3. Ibid.
4. See Bakhasrov Adankalo, “The CIA Digs a Grave for America in Yemen,” translated by Dar ul-Murabiteen Publications, posted November 12, 2009, available at https://www.ummah.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-239811.html. The original is no longer available online.
5. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, “Al-Qaeda in al-Sab’in Square: Beware of My Assault and My Destruction,” posted to Ansar al-Mujahideen network, May 28, 2012.
6. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, post copied onto the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, April 2013.
7. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, post dated February 18, 2014.
8. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, post dated September 13, 2014.
9. Abu Abbas al-Qatari (@av1xx), Twitter posts, September 15, 2014.
10. Bakhsuruf al-Danquluh, “A Message to the Mujahideen of Ansar al-Shari’a Regarding the Beheading of Yemeni Soldiers,” dated August 24, 2014.
11. Al-Danquluh, “Al-Qaeda in al-Sab’in Square,” op. cit.
12. For bin Laden’s discussion of the “strategy of a thousand cuts,” see Osama bin Laden, speech broadcast on al-Jazeera, October 29, 2004. For subsequent discussion of how terrorist attacks do not need to succeed in order to contribute to the strategy of a thousand cuts, see Head of Foreign Operations [Anwar al-Awlaki], “The Objectives of Operation Hemorrhage,” Inspire, November 2010.
