Armenian Election Results Hold Contradictory Implications for Iran

Armenian Election Results Hold Contradictory Implications for Iran

Executive Summary:

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections reinforces the country’s pro-Western trajectory and is likely to advance peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Türkiye, leading to contradictory implications for Iran.
• For Tehran, renewed momentum behind the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) presents major strategic concerns, including potential reductions in Iran’s transit leverage, expanded U.S. economic presence near its borders, and heightened security risks amid growing Armenian–Western cooperation.
• Armenia’s gradual disengagement from Russia could create opportunities for Iran in energy, transport, and infrastructure sectors, even as a possible Armenian withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union threatens Iran’s trade and transit access to the bloc.

Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections resulted in another victory for the ruling Civil Contract Party (49.81 percent) led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. This result may signify the continuation and consolidation of a Western foreign policy trajectory that has been underway since the Velvet Revolution in May 2018 (Armen Press, June 8). The outcome of the elections holds potentially far-reaching implications for neighboring countries, including Iran, which appears to have contradictory implications for Armenia’s southern neighbor. 

With Pashinyan’s victory and the further consolidation of his political position, it is expected that Armenia’s de-escalation efforts, the implementation of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and the normalization of relations with Türkiye will continue to advance (see EDM, May 22). Such developments would further strengthen the regional 3+3 framework in the South Caucasus (see EDM, March 24, July 17, 2024, March 13, 17, 19, 2025). This mechanism remains consistent with Iran’s long-standing strategic policy of opposing the involvement and intervention of extra-regional powers in South Caucasus affairs (see EDM, June 16, 2021). By contrast, had the opposition prevailed in the June 7 parliamentary elections, a return to tensions and estrangement in Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye would likely have undermined the viability of the 3+3 framework—effectively reducing it to a 2+3 format—potentially leading to its collapse as a meaningful regional mechanism in the South Caucasus. 

Unblocking regional transportation routes through normalization with Azerbaijan and Türkiye could pave the way for the restoration of the Julfa–Nakhchivan railway line—the Soviet-era rail connection severed following the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s. Its revival would effectively reconnect Iran to the South Caucasus by rail for the first time in more than three decades (see EDM, April 15, 2024, September 11, 2025; RIAC, March 2). By contrast, had the opposition won the elections, the restoration of the Julfa–Nakhchivan railway would almost certainly have been removed from the agenda. Azerbaijan is unlikely to permit the reopening of this rail link between Iran and Armenia unless it secures transit access to Nakhchivan through Armenian territory.

A victory by Armenian nationalist and conservative forces would, in all likelihood, have halted the ongoing peace negotiations and prospective peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the normalization process between Armenia and Türkiye, and the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenia’s Syunik Province. The suspension of TRIPP would have alleviated a significant portion of the strategic concerns and perceived threats that emerged for Iran in the aftermath of the 2020 Second Karabakh War. It would also have preserved the role of the Bileh Savar–Nakhchivan land route through Iranian territory as the sole transportation and transit corridor linking Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan (The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 5, 2024). Likewise, the Aras Corridor in northwestern Iran—currently under construction and frequently presented as an alternative to both the Zangezur Corridor and TRIPP—would have retained its strategic relevance, importance, and operational necessity (see EDM, January 10, March 27, April 15, November 18, 2024, September 11, 2025).

Pashinyan’s victory and continued tenure in office are likely to facilitate TRIPP’s implementation. From Iran’s perspective, this project differs little in substance from the proposed Zangezur Corridor and could generate similar border-related, commercial, transit, and geopolitical challenges. This is arguably one of the most significant strategic concerns that Tehran will face following Pashinyan’s re-election. 

Pashinyan and other Armenian officials have repeatedly assured Iran over the past year that TRIPP would pose no threat to the Iran–Armenia border. Iranian policymakers, however, remain convinced that such a project could create a range of serious security and geopolitical challenges (JAM-News, August 15, 2025). These include potential implications for the 40-kilometer (24.8-mile) Iran–Armenia border, the Norduz customs crossing in Iran, and the Meghri crossing in Armenia, as well as the extensive bilateral trade and transit network through which more than 80,000 trucks pass annually (see EDM, September 11, 2025). 

The 12-day U.S.–Israeli war against Iran in June 2025 and the more recent conflict have significantly heightened Tehran’s sensitivity toward TRIPP and the potential presence of U.S. companies in proximity to Iran’s northern borders. These concerns have become particularly pronounced because, under the recent agreement signed during U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Armenia, the involvement of American companies is not intended to be temporary (U.S. State Department, May 26; Armenian Embassy to the United States, June 17). Rather, the arrangement envisages an initial 49-year concession period, which may be extended by mutual agreement for an additional 50 years, bringing the total duration to up to 99 years. For Iran, such an arrangement would extend far beyond a transportation or infrastructure project. It would effectively establish a long-term American economic and strategic presence in one of the most sensitive geopolitical regions bordering Iran (Defapress.ir 10, 2025).

At the same time, Pashinyan’s victory could accelerate Armenia’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the eventual removal of Russian military facilities from the country (Armenpress, June 11). Such developments would create greater opportunities for Armenia to deepen its relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and expand military and intelligence cooperation with the United States (Public Radio of Armenia, June 12; Armenian Ministry of Defense, June 15). For Iran, particularly in the aftermath of the two 12-day conflicts over the past year and the recent 40-day war, these developments could pose new security and strategic challenges along Iran’s northwestern frontier. They could also extend the scope of Israeli intelligence and security influence—already perceived by Tehran as significant in Azerbaijan—into Armenia (Iran Daily, September 18, 2023).

Had the opposition emerged victorious in Armenia’s parliamentary elections, relations between Armenia, Russia, and the CSTO would likely have reverted to their pre-2018 trajectory. For Iran, such an outcome could have served as an important buffer against the expanding influence of both the West and Türkiye in the South Caucasus. Under those circumstances, the regional balance of power might have gradually returned to the configuration that existed before 2018, marked by the formal alliance between Russia and Armenia and the revival of the informal but strategically significant Iran–Armenia–Russia alignment in the South Caucasus (see EDM, March 19, 2025). Following Pashinyan’s renewed victory, however, such a scenario appears increasingly unlikely.

Pashinyan’s victory is expected to accelerate Armenia’s gradual disengagement from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and deepen its cooperation with the European Union—a course of action that has elicited a strong response from Moscow (see EDM, June 5, 16). Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the EAEU could pose a significant challenge to Iran’s trade and transit relations with the bloc. Armenia is the only EAEU member state that shares a direct land border with Iran. The Preferential Trade Agreement between Iran and the EAEU, which entered into force in October 2019, was upgraded to a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025, a development of considerable importance for Iran, particularly under continuing sanctions (Mehr News Agency, May 18, 2025). Consequently, a possible Armenian withdrawal from the EAEU could deprive Iran of a substantial portion of the economic and commercial advantages associated with this framework. Had the opposition won the parliamentary elections, Tehran would likely have felt far more confident about the continuity of Armenia’s EAEU membership.

Pashinyan’s victory, which is likely to accelerate Armenia’s gradual disengagement from Russia’s long-standing dominance over key sectors such as natural gas, railways, electricity, and telecommunications, could also create new opportunities for Iran. Over the past three decades, Russia has erected significant barriers to the expansion of Iranian gas exports to Armenia to preserve its monopoly over Armenia’s energy infrastructure. Gazprom had  pressured on Armenia to reduce the diameter of the Iran–Armenia gas pipeline. This move effectively eliminated the possibility of extending Iranian gas exports onward to Georgia (see EDM, November 20, 2024). Consequently, Armenia’s emancipation from Russian dominance in the gas sector could create greater room for Iran to expand its gas exports to Armenia, provided Iran can increase its domestic production and export capacity. Iranian gas exports to Armenia are carried out under a gas-for-electricity swap arrangement. Any increase in Iranian gas exports would be accompanied by a corresponding rise in electricity imports from Armenia—an issue of particular importance given Iran’s current electricity supply imbalance. Otherwise, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, through swap arrangements via Iranian territory, may capture a substantial share of Armenia’s gas market at Russia’s expense.  

A similar dynamic applies to the railway sector. Approximately a decade ago, Russia openly opposed the construction of the Marand–Norduz–Meghri–Yerevan railway corridor, largely to preserve its dominance over Armenia’s rail infrastructure (see EDM, March 19, 2025). A reduction in Russian economic influence would likely create greater opportunities for Iranian participation and investment in this sector. The same logic broadly applies to electricity, telecommunications, and other strategic infrastructure sectors. By contrast, had the opposition won the elections and Armenia–Russia relations reverted to their pre-2018 pattern, Russian dominance over Armenia’s economic infrastructure would likely have continued, leaving little room for an expanded Iranian economic presence.

None of the possible outcomes of the Armenian elections would have fully advanced Iran’s maximum strategic objectives in the South Caucasus. Iran would have been able to secure only a portion of its interests and policy goals in the region. This reality stems partly from the nature of the objectives and interests that Iran itself has defined in the South Caucasus, and partly from the deep-rooted divisions, rivalries, and conflicting agendas within the region, many of which lie beyond Iran’s ability to influence or control.