Moscow Nervous About Armenian Parliamentary Elections

Moscow Nervous About Armenian Parliamentary Elections

Executive Summary:

• Russia has been meddling in Armenia’s upcoming June 7 parliamentary elections, initiating a multifaceted campaign aiming to discredit incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party, relying on pro-Russian political blocs and influence operations.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hardened rhetoric has translated into coercive economic measures, including threats to drastically raise the price of its gas exports to Armenia should it leave the Eurasian Economic Union and import and export restrictions on Armenian products.
• Russia is clearly threatened by the possibility of Pashinyan’s reelection, especially as Pashinyan has received endorsements from the West and financial assistance from the European Union to help combat Russian interference.

Russia has been meddling in Armenia’s upcoming June 7 parliamentary elections. These elections are viewed by many not only as a decision on domestic policy in Armenia, but also as a signal of Armenia’s future trajectory on the global stage and its autonomy. The elections consist of 18 parties and alliances, but are functionally a competition between incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party and three opposition parties. Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan is heading Armenia Alliance, which is currently the largest opposition bloc in parliament, and businessperson Gagik Tsarukyan heads the Prosperous Armenia party, which presently holds no seats in parliament and is polling behind the other two opposition blocs. The opposition bloc that is leading in polls, Strong Armenia, is headed by Russian–Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. Both Tsarukyan and Karapetyan have been accused of being tied to Russia (The Insider, May 19). 

Moscow has initiated a multifaceted campaign aiming to discredit Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party. Moscow’s preferred candidate, Karapetyan, is presently under house arrest for publicly calling for the overthrow of the government (Interfax, April 17). He is furthermore constitutionally barred from becoming prime minister due to his Russian citizenship and will remain so despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled pleas (President of Russia, April 1). The Kremlin, therefore, does not seem to be relying on a single party claiming victory—unlike in recent parliamentary elections in Moldova and Hungary, where it placed its bets on Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party and Igor Dodon’s Patriotic Electoral Bloc, respectively (see EDM, October 20, 2025, April 7, 15). Rather, the Kremlin appears to aim for a fragmented political landscape in which the cumulative support of the Armenia Alliance, Prosperous Armenia, and Strong Armenia parties prevents the Civil Contract from securing a parliamentary supermajority (Telegram/@russicaRU, May 27). 

Moscow has planned an information campaign around Armenia’s parliamentary elections since at least spring 2025, after the Kremlin’s Armenia policy came under the purview of First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko (Ekho Kavkaza, April 30, 2025). In April 2025, Vedomosti reported that Kiriyenko was instructed to carry out “information work” against Armenia, as “its leadership is increasingly drifting toward the West, which is unacceptable from the point of view of Russian state policy” (Vedomosti, April 30, 2025). Following former Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak’s departure from the Kremlin in September 2025, furthermore, Moscow’s post-Soviet policy was concentrated in the newly created Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation under Kiriyenko and Vadim Titov (see EDM, October 20, 28, 2025). 

The investigative site Agents reported that since October 2025, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and media bloggers had been receiving regular orders to criticize Pashinyan and his party (Telegram/@agentstvonews, October 8, 2025). It also noted that the Russian disinformation network “Matryoshka” had been activated. This timeline aligns with the establishment of the Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation. The directorate appears to be aiming its campaign at voters who trust no political leaders in Armenia, who make up to as much as 60 percent of the country’s electorate (Telegram/@russicaRU, January 14; IRI, March 5). According to RFI, the Matryoshka network has published at least 389 fake videos about Pashinyan and Armenia (X/@RFI_Ru, May 25). Topics range from fake rumors about Pashinyan’s health to claims that he is “destroying Armenia’s cultural code” (The Insider, May 29). Since early March, Matryoshka has published at least 20 videos claiming that Pashinyan could start a war with Russia, while endorsing Pashinyan’s opponents as capable of maintaining friendly relations with Moscow (X/@agents_media, May 13; X/@antibot4navalny, May 26). 

This narrative coincides with Putin’s own rhetoric. On May 9, journalists asked Putin about Pashinyan’s hosting of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Putin responded that, “As for Armenia’s plans to join the European Union, this, of course, requires special consideration” (President of Russia, May 9). He expanded on this sentiment at the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Kazakhstan on May 28–29. There, Putin compared Russia’s current tensions with Armenia to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, stating, “The crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the [European Union]” (Kommersant, May 29). 

Putin’s hardened rhetoric has translated into coercive economic measures. Moscow has threatened to drastically raise the price of its gas exports to Armenia should it move to join the European Union (Kommersant, April 1). Putin also warned that Armenia would lose at least 14 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) should it leave the EAEU (Interfax, May 29). Russia has long demonstrated its willingness to take measures against its neighbors that have begun to turn towards the West, often through economic penalties in the energy sector. For example, at the beginning of 2025, Russia’s state-controlled energy corporation, Gazprom, ceased delivering gas to Moldova in a move that seemed to stoke widespread anger against the pro-Western government and demonstrate the supposed costs of defying Moscow (Telegram/@gazprom; DW, December 28, 2024; Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 6, 2025; see EDM, September 25, 2025). In 2009, Gazprom completely halted gas supplies to Ukraine after failed pricing negotiations, plunging the country into an energy crisis (RIA Novosti, January 17, 2009). 

Moscow has begun moving beyond threats over gas supplies. Recent economic measures seem to be aimed at products that directly impact everyday Armenians, likely in an attempt to demonstrate its leverage beyond the energy sector. The European Union has labeled these moves as nothing less than “economic coercion” (European Commission, June 4). Moscow has established numerous import and export bans on Armenia over the past weeks, including temporary restrictions on imports of major agricultural products such as flowers, fresh produce, dried fruit, and Armenian mineral water Jermuk, citing Armenia’s “alleged failure to comply with the EAEU’s phytosanitary requirements” (Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision; Kavkaz-Uzel, June 1). This followed Moscow’s ban on the import of Armenian fish products on May 29, citing facilities refusing to be inspected (OC-Media, June 2). In response to these restrictions, the Armenian government has begun to offer subsidies and created a support program for exporters of products meant for Russia (Armenpress, June 4). 

The opposition has used Armenia’s economic issues, particularly with Russia, as a campaign tactic against Pashinyan’s government, especially in the past week. Tsarukyan has stated that Pashinyan and Civil Contract are “unleashing an economic war” with Russia through Yerevan’s deteriorating relations with Moscow and discussions of leaving the EAEU (Arminfo, June 2). Karapetyan has stated, “If this government remains, Armenia’s economy will be in deep crisis” (Kavkaz-Uzel, June 1). 

Russia is clearly threatened by the possibility of Pashinyan’s reelection. Pashinyan has received overwhelming approval from the West, including endorsements from U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron and financial assistance from the European Union to help combat Russian interference (see EDM, May 11, June 3; OC-Media, June 3; European Commission, June 4). Russia is using Armenia’s growing ties with the European Union as an excuse to apply pressure on Armenia through its membership in the EAEU. On May 30, Moscow summoned its ambassador to Armenia, Sergei Kopirkin, for “consultations” about Yerevan’s steps toward rapprochement with the European Union, which is framed as detrimental to its cooperation with the EAEU (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 30).

The economic coercion Russia has been using against Armenia is a common practice from the Kremlin against countries in its orbit that show interest in turning toward the West. Many of these actions are reminiscent of economic pressure it used to try to influence Ukraine in 2013, a year before the Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and on Moldova and Georgia in 2006 in response to interest in deeper EU integration (The Moscow Times, June 4). Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said on May 31 following the EAEU summit, “Armenians need to be cautious so as not to repeat what happened in Ukraine … Everything started exactly the same way there” (BelTA, May 31). Russia’s actions have caused former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to go as far as saying that if Pashinyan wins, Russia may attempt to occupy Armenia by marching troops through Georgia (Facebook/SaakashviliMikheil, June 1). Despite being unlikely, especially as Russia is expending large military resources on its war against Ukraine, the looming threat brought by Russia’s clear interest in the outcome of Armenia’s elections shows that the results will be a significant factor in the future of Russian–Armenian relations and the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus.