Putin’s Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite

Putin’s Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite

Executive Summary:

• The death of Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, at 73, has focused new attention on Putin’s age and the certainty that at some point he too will pass from the scene.
• At the same time, it called attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite and the likelihood that there will be a parade of funerals among it in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.
• That historical comparison, in turn, has intensified speculation that Russia may change radically after Putin leaves the scene, something that he and his team want to prevent but that many others hope to see happen. 

Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, died on June 26 at the age of 73—the same age as the Kremlin leader. His death has unsurprisingly focused new attention on Putin’s age and the certainty that, at some point, he too will pass from the scene (Radio Svoboda, July 1). At the same time, it has drawn attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite and the likelihood of a parade of funerals among its ranks in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. It is clear to everyone that the passing of an elite whose members have been in power for a long time, as was the case in Brezhnev’s time and is now the case in Putin’s, could open the way to radical and unexpected change. That possibility is certainly on the minds of both those in the current elite who want to see their policies continue after they leave the scene and those who want to replace them and see radical policy changes. It is thus likely to define how each will deal with the other and this evolving situation in the coming months and years.

Putin’s time in office has lengthened and now exceeds even that of Brezhnev. The current ruler’s country has entered a period of stagnation and foreign policy challenges much like his Soviet predecessor. Ever more analysts inside Russia and abroad have drawn parallels between the two rulers and how the length of their time in office affected and will affect the future (MK.ru, June 28, 2025). Ivanov’s death has only increased the frequency of such comparisons. One recent survey collected a dozen of them, with many of them noting that Putin, like Brezhnev before him, has brought this problem on himself (Radio Svoboda, July 1). He keeps officials around for a long time to promote an image of stability rather than allowing the gradual replacement of the current members of the elite with new blood.    

Two of the comments about Ivanov’s passing that this selection includes seem especially prescient. In the words of one, the death of Ivanov shows that “Putin’s entourage is thinning” and that soon the country will enter into a period “with a series of high-profile funerals.” Another was even more direct in making that comparison, noting that Ivanov’s demise has “something very Brezhnev-like to it.” Then, a half century ago, “it also seemed that the leaders of the country were as much part of the permanent landscape as the Kremlin wall; but then it turned out that they were mortal,” and so too was the system they had led for so long (Radio Svoboda, July 1).

Comparing the Brezhnev elite and the Putin elite is not without problems. It is certainly far more difficult to define the top elite now than it was to specify who was in it under Brezhnev. Under the latter, there was near-universal agreement that the members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constituted that elite and thus tracked how those aged as Brezhnev remained in power. Now, there is no one institution everyone would agree is the equivalent. Perhaps the one that comes closest, especially given the Kremlin leader’s use of it in recent years, is the Russian Security Council, which Putin chairs. The Russian Security Council decides on a broad swath of issues far beyond national security as typically defined. In addition to Putin, the Security Council has 12 permanent members and 20 additional members (President of Russia, accessed July 7). The members of Putin’s council thus resemble the full members of the Politburo in Soviet times and others the candidate members of that earlier regime. That is especially the case if one considers the ages of the full permanent members of this Putin-era institution.

Six of the 12 permanent members, other than Putin, are now over 70. Four of those are older than Putin and Ivanov (Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 74; Nikolai Patrushev, aide to the president, 74; Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, 76; and Valentina Matviyenko, head of the Federation Council, 77). Five are between 60 and 70, and only one (Anton Vaino, chief of the staff of the Presidential Administration, 54) is younger than that. Many of the oldest have been with Putin for decades. The actuarial tables suggest that those over 70 and perhaps some of those in their 60s will not be able to continue in office either because of declining health or death in the future. They will thus have to be replaced, and the most likely source of new blood will be the other, still non-permanent, members of the Russian Security Council, just as was the case when the Soviet Politburo typically promoted candidate members to full membership. Of these analogs to the candidate members of the Politburo, the situation is somewhat different. Only five of the 20 are over 70, 13 are in their 60s, and two are in their 50s.

The existence of this reserve suggests the analogy between Putin’s situation and Brezhnev’s may not be as extreme as some have suggested. There are available, slightly younger cadres who could be promoted more or less naturally into permanent membership in the Russian Security Council. There are, however, three caveats to that. First, those permanent members are unlikely to go quietly or even be asked to do so because Putin, like most leaders, feels most comfortable with those he has known and worked with for a long time. Second, the age data presented here, if anything, understates the gap between those closest to the throne and those slightly more removed, with the former also the oldest and the latter the most likely to have different views. Third, while Putin and others talk about the renewal of the Russian elites, they are unlikely to have the chance to do it calmly and rationally, but instead be forced to do so by deaths or illnesses. This pattern opens the way for major changes in Russia’s rule, if not in the first round, then in the second or third. 

Looming behind that, of course, is something that makes the analogy between the end of the Brezhnev era and the approaching end of Putin’s. When Brezhnev died and was succeeded by two other aging leaders, the Russian people could see that the regime had come to an end and were thus more ready for the radical changes that Gorbachev introduced. It is not unthinkable that, however powerful the current elite appears and however many steps it takes to prevent change, something similar will happen once again in Russia.