ARRESTED: Senior Islamic State Leader Abdul Nasser Qardash Highlights Internal Divisions
ARRESTED: Senior Islamic State Leader Abdul Nasser Qardash Highlights Internal Divisions
On May 20, Iraqi authorities announced that the arrest of Abdul Nasser Qardash, one of the most prominent leaders of the Islamic State (IS) (Sky News Arabia, May 20).
He was the leader of IS’ last stronghold in al-Baghuz in eastern Syria, located near the border with Iraq. Before that, he occupied senior positions within IS since the inception of the group. Although the Iraqi government claimed that the arrest was the result of an Iraqi operation, Qardash was in fact arrested a year earlier by the U.S. and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria. He was believed to have been handed over to the authorities of his native Iraq only recently (Orient News, May 22).
He is the most senior IS member to be captured alive, fulfilling Baghdad’s need to highlight progress in the face of a recent surge in IS activities across Iraq, and also in Syria.
Lifelong Salafist
Abdul Nasser Qardash has used several aliases throughout his long career within the jihadist movement, including Abu Abdul Rahman al-Shami. His real name, however, is Taha Abdul-Raheem Abdullah Bakr al-Ghsani. He is still widely known in IS circles as Hajji Abdul Nasser Qardash. He was born in 1967 in the town of Tal Afar in Ninawa province in northern Iraq near the borders with Syria and Turkey. He has a degree in civil engineering. Qardash comes from the Turkmen ethnicity. Turkmans of Tal Afar in particular have played a significant role in the resurgence of IS under the leadership of its former leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (killed in a U.S. raid in northern Syria on October 2019) (Al Jazeera, May 21).
Qardash is not to be confused with Abdullah Qardash, a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qureshi, who is believed to be the current leader of IS. No direct relation between the two men seem to exist, but they both come from the Turkmen community of Tal Afar. [1] The name Qardash in this article is in reference to Abdul Nasser, not Abdullah.
Qardash is a lifelong Salafist, and has been an adherent of the ideology since the 1990s when it was not possible to form political or armed groups during the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. After the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, he became a member of the only Salafi-jihadist group that was then operational in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam. Ansar al-Islam was active in parts of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq that had been outside the control of the Hussein government since 1991 (Al Arabiya, May 22).
After the Invasion
Qardash was first arrested by U.S. forces in 2005. He was reportedly sentenced to only 18 months in prison since he was not in a senior position in the insurgency at that time. He was released from Abu Ghraib prison in 2007. When al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) declared itself as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in October 2006, which is the direct predecessor of IS, he became a senior member. Qardash was appointed as the wali (or local ruler) of the region of al-Jazeera in northwestern Iraq. In 2008, Qardash was arrested again, but was released the following year after managing to hide his identity. ISI was going through difficult times during this period as it suffered major blows at the hands of U.S. forces and Sunni fighters of the Sahwa awakening groups. The Sahwa groups turned against jihadists and were funded and supported by U.S. forces. The Sahwa groups were key to the success of the U.S. surge strategy between 2007-2008 (Al Arabiya, May 22).
When al-Baghdadi became the leader of ISI, Qardash secured a meeting with him and was supposed to be promoted to the position of wali of northern Iraq. Qardash’s friend and patron, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who was currently holding that position, was about to be promoted to the position of wali of the whole of Iraq.
Qardash claims that he disagreed on policies and principles with al-Baghdadi, saying that he was against extremely violent and cruel actions by the organization. He might be exaggerating the degree of his disagreement with al-Baghdadi, but the idea of his promotion was dismissed after that meeting. Yet, he remained a well-known figure within the organization and a close friend of al-Turkmani, who was one of Baghdadi’s chief lieutenants.
In Syria
As ISI gained control of more land in Syria after the 2011 uprising turned into a civil war, Qardash moved there to run the group’s efforts in developing weapons and equipment. He was close to Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the man ISI sent to start its branch in Syria, al-Nusra Front, and to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the ISI spokesman.
With his strong ties to al-Turkmani, Qardash remained an asset to al-Baghdadi. In April 2013 al-Baghdadi’s leadership faced its most serious internal challenge. Al-Julani refused to follow al-Baghdadi’s decision to unify ISI and al-Nusra Front and form Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS). Qardash provided details after his arrest on that chapter in the history of IS and al-Nusra. The split was preceded by a plan to arrest al-Baghdadi and remove him from leadership. Abu Maria al-Qahtani, a prominent militant leader in al-Nusra, set in motion a plan to arrest al-Baghdadi, who was then on a visit to eastern Syria. The plan was aborted by al-Julani, who, despite his disagreement with al-Baghdadi, was not ready to make such an aggressive move. The split continued anyway and al-Nusra became al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria.
A war between al-Nusra and IS followed, resulting in hundreds of fighters from both sides being killed. IS emerged victorious in most areas. The split by al-Nusra gave al-Baghdadi little choice of who to depend on. Qardash was one of the few senior members in Syria who did not join al-Nusra. He was immediately promoted to the position of wali of eastern Syria. Under his leadership, IS maintained its position in the face of al-Nusra’s challenge despite the fact that the latter had greater potential appeal to Syrians. Al-Nusra was more openly dedicated to Syrian affairs and not to global jihad.
Part of IS’ success against al-Nusra was due to Qardash’s strategic planning. He decided to focus on sectarian issues and the grievances of Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria. He promoted IS discourse that focused on the feelings of Sunnis directed against the Shia-led government of Iraq and the Alawaite domination of Syria under President Bashar al-Assad. He believed that those sectarian feelings superseded the nationality of Sunnis on both sides of the border. Some sources suggested that it was him who lobbied the leadership for the idea of merging IS Iraqi and Syrian branches into one group.
The second pillar of his strategy confronted the economic deprivation of Sunnis, especially the youth. He dedicated financial resources to recruit angry Sunni youth, which gave IS the foot soldiers that helped the group extend its domination to Syria and Iraq (Making Policies, May 22).
Baghdadi’s Entourage
Qardash attempted to draw a distinction between his views and those of his leader, al-Baghdadi. He has claimed that al-Baghdadi always relied on personal loyalty from his subordinates. This seems to have contributed to the early success of IS amid the complicated environment of the Syrian civil war, where multiple rebel groups operated. Before that it was also important for the groups’ survival and later mass resurgence in Iraq, following setbacks resulting from the U.S. surge strategy in 2007-2008.
Qardash in a post-arrest interview, provided greater insight on another internal conflict inside IS between al-Baghdadi’s leadership and the even more extremist faction of al-Ghulat. Al-Ghulat was a group led by a Tunisian IS member named Abu Jafa al-Hattab. He was a member of a smaller group of foreign fighters who joined IS after its inception and expansion into Syria. The group’s ideology stated that even if a person did not know about the ‘real Islam’ (which they claim to be Salafi-jihadism) and therefore remained misguided, he should still be punished by death. Furthermore, anyone who does not embrace and conduct that hardline ideology should also be condemned as a non-Muslim. That logic would open the possibility of condemning al-Baghdadi himself (Al Arabiya, May 22).
Another area of disagreement with al-Baghdadi was in media policy. Qardash claimed that Abu Muhammad Furkan, who was in charge of the media arms of IS, played a major role in shaping organization-wide policies. Qardash admits that Furkan’s portrayal of the group’s brutality was attractive to many jihadists around the world, but he considered it to be too vicious and against the spirit of Islam. However, Qardash still appreciated the effectiveness of Furkan’s policy, called ‘Electronic Jihad,’ which prioritized sharing impactful, however brutal, acts on social media. It attracted followers from around the world.
As IS began suffering military retreats and losing territory, Qardash became even more important within the leadership. After the killing of al-Adnani (in a U.S. raid in Syria in 2016) and in the face of growing internal friction, al-Baghdadi appointed him chairman of the delegated committee, a leadership group within the organization, that he trusted and which he gave some of his authority into (24.ae, May 21).
Despite Qardash’s claim that he did not agree with all al-Baghdadi policies he remained a senior leader of IS. Qardash was the leader of IS’ last battle defending al-Baghuz in March 2019 (Middle East Online, March 14, 2019).
The New Caliph and the Future
As someone who knew both the former and current leaders of IS, Qardash contrasted their two characters in an interview. Despite his criticism of al-Baghdadi, he portrayed him as a decisive leader, while on the contrary, he said the new leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qureshi, is not so strict and prefers to take his time to make decisions. He does not necessarily think that al-Qureshi’s qualities are bad. Qardash claimed that many of IS’ bad decisions, especially those concerning executions, were taken hastily by al-Baghdadi under the influence of poor advisors. After his arrest, Qardash was vocal in expressing his frustration with the degree of influence those who were close to al-Baghdadi exerted on the IS leader’s decisions.
Qardash seems to be open to the possibility that the current leader of IS, al-Qureshi, is not necessarily Abdullah Qardash, as has been speculated by some analysts. He could be Abu Saad al-Shimali who is also a senior member of IS, but he is from Syria. Thus far, the leaders of IS have been Iraqis and the leadership of the group became even more Iraqi-dominated under al-Baghdadi, who relied on personal contacts and confidants. It is therefore unlikely that al-Qureshi is a Syrian national, but Qardash’s statement on the matter leaves that possibility open (Making Policies, May 22).
During the period of the surge strategy in 2007-2008, Qardash indicated that IS worried most about the combination of Sunni anti-IS fighters of the Sahwa Awakening and U.S. support. In the anti-IS campaign in Iraq and Syria after 2014, the United States worked mostly with Shia and Kurdish forces. In light of Qardash’ revelations, future strategies to combat IS will need to look at the importance of including Sunni fighters in countering the IS insurgency.
Qardash pointed out that internal divisions within IS might hinder the leadership of the new caliph. A group of IS members from the Jazrawi clan from northern Iraq, who formed an influential block in IS under al-Baghdadi’s leadership, have not been on good terms with al-Qureshi and they might represent a challenge to his leadership. Al-Baghdadi was ruthless in crushing all internal challengers, but he was in control of large territory and massive resources when he did that. His successor will most likely be working towards unifying the group, which is still under immense pressure.
Qardash also remembers the conclusion of al-Baghdadi after IS lost most of the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria. The leader of IS told him that the continuity of the organization’s activities and attacks—especially against the West—is even more important than controlling territory.
Notes
[1] Tal Afar is a predominately Turkmen town but the Turkmen community in is divided between Shia Turkmen and Sunny Turkmen. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took charge of IS Sunni Turkmen from Tal Afar became more instrumental in IS and its leadership. Examples are: Abdullah Qardash, Abdul Nasser Qardash and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who was a chief lieutenant of Baghdadi and was killed in US airstrike in 2015.
