Baku Confronts Mehdiyev’s Legacy 

Baku Confronts Mehdiyev’s Legacy 

Executive Summary:

• On February 10, Azerbaijani authorities extended the house arrest of former presidential aide Ramiz Mehdiyev for four months, after arresting him in October 2025 on charges of treason, actions aimed at usurping state power, and the legalization of property acquired through criminal activity. 87-year-old Mehdiyev was head of the presidential administration of Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2019.
• State-affiliated media outlets allege that Mehdiyev planned a coup with expected backing from the Kremlin, though the claims have not been independently verified. According to anonymous Azerbaijani officials cited in government-aligned media, Russian officials deemed the plan unviable and informed Azerbaijan of the plot in October 2025.
• Mehdiyev’s arrest demonstrates Baku’s desire to limit alternative centers of power, ensure only one line of contact exists between Baku and the Kremlin, and appear to address elite corruption. According to reporting out of Baku, Mehdiyev possessed extensive patronage networks and influence, and shaped political appointments, corruption schemes, and pro-Russian policies during his tenure.

On February 10, Baku extended the house arrest for longtime Azerbaijani presidential aide Ramiz Mehdiyev for another 4 months. The Azerbaijani authorities first detained Mehdiyev last year on October 14, and charged him with treason, actions aimed at usurping state power, and the legalization of property acquired through criminal activity (YouTube/Baku TV, October 14, 2025; Vesti Baku, October 17, 2025) On the same day, Baku revoked his status as a member of the Security Council of Azerbaijan (YouTube/ATV News, October 17, 2025). The 87-year-old Mehdiyev, who headed the presidential administration of Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2019, is accused of planning a coup with the anticipation of political backing from Russia. According to state-affiliated media, Mehdiyev approached Russian contacts in 2025 with a plan to seize power through force and then form a temporary State Council, which he would lead, to govern Azerbaijan (Azeri-Press Agency, October 16, 2025). According to state media reports, Russian President Vladimir Putin eventually concluded that the plan had no chance of success and informed Aliyev of the plot during their October 2025 meeting in Dushanbe, which occurred during a period of frosty Azerbaijan–Russia relations (Eurasianet, October 17, 2025; see EDM, November 12)

In the early 2000s, the current President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, was not the only potential successor when the health of his father, Haydar Aliyev, the third president of Azerbaijan, was deteriorating. Mehdiyev, known as the “grey cardinal,” boasted strong connections in and outside the country. He appointed those loyal to him to prominent positions and maintained strong relations with the Russian elite. When Haydar Aliyev died, numerous newspaper articles discussed Mehdiyev’s ambition to become the next president (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 25, 2002). Mehdiyev did not cease his political activities after the current president assumed his office. He allegedly “appointed” members of parliament, consolidated relations with Russia’s new government, and promoted the appointment of city and district chief executives loyal to him. In a 2016 interview, Arif Mammadov, the former permanent representative of Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, alleged that Mehdiyev shaped Azerbaijan’s position on one of the resolutions under discussion at the time. Mammadov said that Azerbaijan intended to support the law, but the Russian delegation was dissatisfied with Baku’s position on the matter. He then adds that, after several minutes, a call was received from the Presidential Administration instructing them “to do what the Russian representative says” (YouTube/Xural TV, November 26, 2016). This case illustrates Mehdiyev’s purported influence on the country’s decision-making processes and his loyalty to the Kremlin.

In October 2019, Ilham Aliyev dismissed Mehdiyev as head of the administration of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan. His removal was not a newly debated issue for many people in Azerbaijan. News related to his possible removal from senior positions had been circulating in the media since the 2010s. Until 2019, when pro-government media reported unfavorable stories concerning Mehdiyev’s conduct in office—alleging his responsibility for reform stagnation, corruption, and the deterioration of relations with the European Union and the United States—he consistently managed to assert his significance to top Azerbaijani leadership. During this time, Mehdiyev convinced Ilham Aliyev of his usefulness by helping manage crises, including the 2012–2013 riots in Guba and Ismayilli and the 2013 “End Soldier Deaths” protests in Baku. 

Mehdiyev is widely considered to have been a main driver of Azerbaijan’s crackdown on civil society and independent media during his time in the presidential administration (OC Media, October 17, 2025). During Mehdiyev’s tenure in the presidential administration, even moderate opposition members were detained and excluded from participation in political processes in Azerbaijan. In the years since Mehdiyev’s dismissal, the ruling elite in Azerbaijan reportedly widely discussed a constitutional referendum on changing the electoral system from a majoritarian system to a proportional or mixed system. Members of parliament have allegedly made frequent statements to the media about the need for reform (Reytinq, May 25, 2024). 

Mehdiyev was also associated with regional corruption scandals, as many district chief executives implicated in corruption cases had been part of the regional political networks he supported. Mehdiyev predominantly advocated for the appointment of politicians loyal or close to him, who governed their districts in a quasi-autocratic manner, resulting in corrupt schemes within cities, allegedly sometimes led by Mehdiyev himself (Konkret, August 26, 2020). Escalating corruption contributed to the failure of the government’s economic improvement plans, unrest among local populations, and the inefficient allocation of funds to build unused factories and buildings. Unsurprisingly, the arrest of corrupt district chiefs sped up after Mehdiyev’s 2019 removal from the presidential administration. The government has arrested nine district executive chiefs since 2020 (Facebook/Meydan TV, December 22, 2025). In a meeting with newly appointed regional leaders, Ilham Aliyev, criticizing previous corrupt district leaders and possibly alluding to Ramiz Mehdiyev, stated, “I am absolutely certain that from now on, you will not be given any illegal instructions from the center” (YouTube/ARB24, November 12, 2025). 

Remaining in office for an extended period provided Mehdiyev the opportunity to deploy his allies into senior positions. This consolidation of power posed a potential threat to the government itself. Mehdiyev’s arrest alone does not terminate his influence within the country, as approximately 50 individuals were allegedly listed as potential collaborators in his letter to Russian representatives outlining his plan for a new government in Baku (Baku.ws, October 29, 2025). Already rocky relations with Russia could deteriorate further if Mehdiyev’s Russia-related operations and those of his loyal associates are publicly disclosed in full (see EDM, February 10). Relations between the two countries have been strained since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, particularly after the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani passenger plane by a Russian missile (see EDM, January 15, March 27, May 20, July 7, November 12, 2025, January 15).Mehdiyev authored numerous articles during his time leading the presidential administration, blaming the United States and European Union for destabilization in the South Caucasus (Azadliq Radiosu, December 12, 2014). Mehdiyev was not the sole driver of strained relations between Western countries and Azerbaijan, but his personal role in corruption and anti-Western views exacerbated tensions. Mehdiyev rarely criticized Russia, which failed to effectively mediate the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, to the same extent that he criticized the West. In his articles, Mehdiyev also criticized the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, claiming that they “undermined the independence of states.” This perspective conflicted with the intentions of the Azerbaijani government, which was actively seeking engagement with international organizations for loans. Mehdiyev contended that these organizations’ demand for reform in Azerbaijan, including calls for the denationalization of the economy, were incompatible with a sovereign state. The arrest of Mehdiyev brings new opportunities for the Azerbaijani government. Baku has several options: to release Mehdiyev, prolong his detention period once again, or prove the charges against him.