Balancing Development and Security in Global AI Governance
Executive Summary:
- Artificial intelligence (AI) is a core pillar of “comprehensive national power” in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where senior officials frame the necessity of leadership in AI development as crucial for gaining an advantage in great power competition.
- Beijing is increasingly concerned about AI-related risks. Its calls for a global AI governance framework, however, are less about managing risks than about building non-Western influence in the AI domain.
- A recent collection of unusual People’s Daily articles on global AI governance advocate positioning the PRC as the rule-maker in the international system. None calls for cooperation with the United States, suggesting that this is not currently a priority for Beijing.
Beijing is fully committed to the pursuit of supremacy in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Officials frequently tie the technology to the country’s “comprehensive national power” (CNP; 综合国力), which Chinese leader Xi Jinping has stated must surpass that of the United States in order to achieve the Party’s primary aim of national rejuvenation (Xinhua, September 26, 2021; China Brief, July 9).
Recent articles from prominent officials and researchers have nevertheless shifted equal focus to the myriad risks associated with AI. This partly stems from very real concerns about the hard problems that rapid technological progress presents; but it is equally about the Party’s persistent preoccupation with political control and its attempts to exert more influence over the direction of international approaches to governing AI.
No Slowdown in Sight
A People’s Daily article from early 2025 laid out the stakes with unusual clarity. Written by an academician at the Chinese Academy of Engineering named Gao Wen (高 文), the article argues forcefully that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should spare no efforts in its pursuit of AI progress. [1] Gao describes the technology as a “core element in measuring a nation’s CNP” (衡量国家综合国力的核心要素), an “essential requirement” (必然要求) for consolidating the foundation of a strong nation, and the “strategic high ground in great power competition” (大国竞争的战略制高点). “Whoever gains the upper hand and seizes the initiative in the field of AI,” he writes, “will gain greater influence on the international stage” (谁能在人工智能领域抢占先机、赢得主动，谁就能在国际舞台上掌握更多话语权). He concludes by admonishing his readers that “opportunity knocks but once” (机不可失，时不再来), calling for “unswervingly promoting” (坚定不移地推动) the innovative development of AI (People’s Daily, February 24, 2025).
Subsequent official statements echo Gao’s analysis. A recent People’s Daily commentary, which described AI as “a strategic technology affecting a nation’s CNP” (影响国家综合国力的战略性技术), resembled quotes from politburo standing committee member Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) and state media describing computing power and AI talent as important manifestations of CNP (People’s Daily, May 19, May 30; CCTV, June 6). Most recently, Minister for State Security Chen Yixin (陈一新), in a widely-read article for China Cyberspace Magazine, used a similar framing, saying that “whoever can seize the development opportunities of AI … will have grasped the pulse of the times” (谁能把握人工智能 …发展机遇，谁就把准了时代脉搏) (WeChat/China Cyberspace Magazine, September 12).
Theory Articles Articulate Global Governance Approach
Six articles published in the People’s Daily in August underscore the extreme seriousness with which Beijing is approaching AI development and competition. What makes these articles unusual is their format. In each case, they appear in pairs, with their headlines printed vertically rather than horizontally—an editorial decision that the China Media Project has described as “a propaganda appropriation of the traditional parallel saying, or duilian (对联)” (Substack/Lingua Sinica, August 18). [2]
These articles all focus on the global governance of AI. Each takes as its departure point a quote from Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference, which was held this summer in Beijing (China Brief, July 22, August 13). While the first two pieces were authored by a reporter for the newspaper and appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily, the others were all commentaries published on the theory pages. The authors of these commentaries comprised the following senior personnel at important governance and research institutions:
- Xue Lan (薛澜): dean of the Institute for International Governance of Artificial Intelligence at Tsinghua University
- (co-author) Chen Ying (陈颖): special researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
- Wei Liang (魏亮): vice president of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT)
- Chen Zhimin (陈志敏): researcher at the Fudan University Base of the Shanghai Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
- Zhang Weiwei (张薇薇): deputy director of the Institute of World Peace and Security at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
The collection of theoretical commentaries trace Beijing’s global ambitions for AI governance. [3] The first pair lays out how recent PRC actions lay the groundwork for AI to become an “international public good that benefits all of humanity” (成为造福全人类的国际公共产品), and why “Chinese wisdom” (中国智慧) offers the only viable route to international cooperation (People’s Daily, August 20, [a], [b]). The second pair, published the following week, articulates the PRC’s principles, guidance, and actions for “leading global AI governance” (引领人工智能全球治理), and frames them in relation to the country’s four global initiatives, which cover development, security, civilization, and global governance (People’s Daily, August 26, [a], [b]).
Figure 1: The Theory Page of the August 20 People’s Daily
The discussion of Beijing’s approach repeats many of the same points of the country’s now-familiar pitch to the world. Wei Liang provides a succinct distillation of this. He writes in his article that “China will strengthen the alignment and coordination of its AI development strategies, governance rules, and technical standards, forging a path of open consultation, multi-party participation, mutual trust, and joint governance” (中国将通过加强人工智能发展战略、治理规则、技术标准的对接协调，走出一条开放协商、多元参与的互信共治之路). Chen Zhimin then adds some specifics. He suggests that global AI governance should focus on expanding Beijing’s preferred rights—to develop, use, and benefit from AI (发展权、使用权和受益权)—and highlights several regional institutions and cooperation mechanisms to support this agenda. At the center of these is the World AI Cooperation Organization, which he says aims to “transform interim meetings and policy dialogues into regular institutional cooperation, incorporating development strategies, governance rules, technical standards, capacity building, and joint research into a relatively stable cooperation framework” (把阶段性会议和政策对话转化为常态化制度合作，把发展战略、治理规则、技术标准、能力建设和联合研究纳入相对稳定的合作框架).
Setting out this ambitious agenda is ostensibly the primary purpose for these articles. At the same time, AI-related risks emerge as a dominant preoccupation of each of these expert commentators.
Balancing Risks a Growing Preoccupation
The Chinese government has, for nearly a decade, viewed security with the same degree of importance as development. Numerous documents published in recent years have discussed the need to balance these two sides of the governance coin (Wang, 2023). [4] In the AI era, however, striking that balance is more challenging than ever. The government’s Artificial Intelligence Security Governance Framework 3.0 (人工智能安全治理框架3.0), released earlier this week, provides the most comprehensive list of all perceived threats AI poses (Cyberspace Administration of China, September 14).
The four theoretical commentaries, coupled with Chen Yixin’s article, all strike a concerned, if not alarmist, tone. In their article, after the introductory paragraph with its mandatory quote from Xi Jinping, Xue Lan and Chen Ying immediately turn to concerns about AI safety. They discuss the need to protect against “various endogenous and derivative risks” (各类内生和衍生风险), and to create “laws and regulations, technological supervision, risk warning, and emergency response systems, and to construct a security bottom line and prevent abuse and misuse” (法律法规、技术监测、风险预警、应急响应体系，筑牢安全底线，防范滥用恶用).
Several of the authors advocate for a global governance framework precisely because of what they see as the scale of AI risks. Xue Lan and Chen Ying describe these risks as “transnational, complex, and systemic” (跨国性、复杂性和系统性), and warn that a shared vulnerability could lead to a collective failure. Wei Liang, meanwhile, writes that the danger of “risk spillover” (风险外溢) underscores the urgency of governance efforts, and he worries that AI’s increasing integration with critical infrastructure could potentially escalate into systemic risks. Zhang Weiwei similarly sees a breakthrough on governance as “urgently needed” (亟待), as the risks mean that AI governance “cannot be confined to the level of a single nation” (不能局限在单一国家层面). In a brief discussion of military applications of AI, he warns that “the relentless pursuit of asymmetric advantages through technology will exacerbate the security predicament of the international community, leading to greater insecurity and even a tragedy for all humanity” (一味追求通过技术带来不对称优势，将加重国际社会的安全困境，导致更大的不安全甚至全人类悲剧).
Any workable global governance framework would need buy-in from the United States. On this point, however, the authors have little in the way of suggestions, instead choosing to recite standard critical refrains. One warns that countries that follow their own approach “harm the common interests of all countries” (损害各国共同利益). Another denounces “some countries” (个别国家) who view AI as “a tool for great power competition” (大国博弈工具), leading to “fragmentation and factionalism” (碎片化、阵营化) in global governance mechanisms. A third also implicitly criticizes the United States for attempting to “monopolize rule-making” (垄断治理规则制定权) and “increasing the difficulty of coordinating global governance” (推高全球治理的协调难度) in order to “maintain or expand [its] own advantages” (维护或扩大自身优势). This all indicates that Beijing’s bid for global AI governance is more about building power and influence outside of the West. As one scholar recently observed, the PRC seeks to build consensus among Global South countries to “unify their negotiating positions, and enhance their seats and weight in international standard setting and governance consultations” (统一谈判立场，提升其在国际标准制定与治理磋商中的席位与权重) in order to “break down technological hegemony and rule monopolies” (破除技术霸权与规则垄断) (Wen Wei Po, July 28).
Conclusion
Beijing is making its pitch to lead the global governance of AI, but cooperation on AI is by no means a priority. Chen Yixin’s article shows this most clearly. Among a list of eight basic points to adhere to, international cooperation ranks last, while AI’s “strategic positioning” (战略定位) comes first; and of seven policy prescriptions he sets out, international cooperation is again bottom of the list, while pole position is given to upholding the Party’s overall leadership. This suggests that Beijing’s interpretation of AI safety differs from Western understandings in important ways. It also suggests that cooperation with Washington is not a priority that any official or Party-aligned voices are currently advocating for.
Notes
[1] Gao Wen is the director of Pengcheng Laboratory, which conducts AI and cyber research that could facilitate future cyberattacks or support mass surveillance, according to research by MERICS. The U.S. Commerce Department sanctioned the lab in January 2025, shortly before Gao Wen penned his commentary in the People’s Daily (MERICS, July 3, 2025).
[2] The only other instance of articles following this same format that this author has found from 2026 came on July 29, and took as their subject “new-quality productive forces” (新质生产力), Xi Jinping’s preferred formulation to describe scientific and technological advances that are intended to function as the new drivers of economic development (People’s Daily, July 29, [a], [b]).
[3] David Bandurski of the China Media Project has discussed the first pair of articles, which appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily (Substack/Lingua Sinica, August 18). Consequently, this article focuses instead on the commentaries that appeared subsequently on the newspaper’s theory pages.
[4] Wang, Howard. 2023. “‘Security Is a Prerequisite for Development’: Consensus-Building toward a New Top Priority in the Chinese Communist Party.” Journal of Contemporary China 32 (142): 525–39. doi:10.1080/10670564.2022.2108681.
